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ARTICLES:
Fugitive Slaves and Undocumented
Immigrants: Testing the Boundaries of
Our Federalism
SANDRA L. RIERSON*
Federalism—the dual system of sovereignty that invests
both the nation as a whole and each individual state with the
authority to govern the people of the United States of America—is a foundational pillar of American democracy.
Throughout the nation’s history, political crises have tested
the resilience of this dual system of government established
by the United States Constitution. The fundamental contradiction of slavery in a nation founded on the principle that
“all men are created equal” triggered the nation’s most
prominent existential crisis, resulting in the Civil War. In the
years leading up to that war, the federal government’s protection of the institution of slavery, via the Fugitive Slave
Acts, clashed with the personal liberty laws of the free states.
These states had eliminated slavery within their own borders, and hence did not embrace federal laws compelling
them to allow (or assist in) the pursuit and capture of putative slaves living on free soil. The intensity of the resistance
within these states increased as the federal government
*
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ratcheted up efforts to enforce the Fugitive Slave Acts, with
little consideration given to the conflicting values of American citizens living in free states.
The most crucial federalism crisis of today stems from
conflicting state and federal perspectives as to immigration.
The Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” approach to
“illegal” immigration has been tone deaf to the mores of
people who live in diverse states such as California, especially as to immigrants who are seeking asylum. The President has personally repudiated and even mocked the nation’s long-standing commitment to the legal principle of
non-refoulement, which prohibits the forcible return of refugees to countries where they face serious threats to their
lives or freedom. Moreover, the Trump administration’s
heavy reliance on executive action to achieve its goals, rather than the legislative process, has generated policies that
lack widespread support among the national citizenry, not
just that of an individual state.
The United States may learn some valuable lessons by
reflecting on its past, specifically the history of the federal
laws that sought to force the free states to recognize slavery
within their borders. Heavy-handed attempts to compel compliance with federal law tend to engender resistance rather
than cooperation, especially when, in the eyes of many, the
federal law lacks both moral and democratic legitimacy. At
a minimum, the federal government should not attempt to
commandeer California and similar states to implement federal immigration policies that are misaligned with the values
of the majority of their citizens. The safety valve of federalism allows these states to decline to do so.
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INTRODUCTION
History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.1
The presence of slavery in some, but not all, of the United States
posed an existential threat to the dual system of federalism created
by the U.S. Constitution from the earliest days of the Republic.2 The
South’s dogged quest to protect the institution of slavery is traditionally associated with a states’ rights philosophy.3 However, during this era, the South relied heavily on federal power to preserve
slavery in the South and enable its spread throughout the territories.4
The battle over fugitive slaves—enslaved people who escaped their
masters and fled to free states in the North—pitted the federal Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, which granted Southerners broad
powers to reclaim human “property” in free states, against free
states’ personal liberty laws, which sought to protect the civil and
human rights of all state citizens, including the free blacks and
slaves who were at risk under the federal law.5
Today, the United States faces another challenge testing the
boundaries of federalism, this time involving immigration rather
1

This quote is often attributed to Samuel Clemens, the nineteenth century
author known by his pen name, Mark Twain. History Does Not Repeat Itself, but
it Rhymes, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Jan. 12, 2014), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/01/12/history-rhymes/. However, the true origin of the quote is unknown. See id. A passage from Twain’s satire of the Gilded Age encapsulates the
idea expressed within it: “History never repeats itself, but the Kaleidoscopic combinations of the pictured present often seem to be constructed out of the broken
fragments of antique legends.” MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE
GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TO-DAY 430 (1873). Historian Eric Foner has made a
similar observation regarding the immigration conflict that is the subject of this
Article: “History never really repeats itself, but uncanny resemblances exist between the pre-Civil War years and our own time, in terms of both the actions of
the federal government and the resistance it has evoked.” Eric Foner, What the
Fugitive Slave Act Teaches Us About How States Can Resist Oppressive Federal
Power, NATION (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/whatthe-fugitive-slave-act-teaches/ [hereinafter Foner, What the Fugitive Slave Act
Teaches Us].
2
See infra Section I.
3
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union, 45 AKRON L. REV. 449, 470 (2012) [hereinafter Finkelman,
States’ Rights].
4
See infra Sections I.C.–I.E.
5
See infra Sections I.B.–I.E.
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than slavery. More parallels exist between these two controversies
than are immediately apparent.6 As most of the power in Washington, D.C. has shifted right with the Trump administration, proponents of states’ rights are increasingly found in left-leaning Blue
states, not the conservative Red states typically associated with demands for local control.7 Like the Fugitive Slave Acts, efforts to increase enforcement of federal immigration laws have engendered
conflict between federal and local governments.8 President Trump,

6

See, e.g., Foner, What the Fugitive Slave Act Teaches Us, supra note 1;
Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History
of Fugitive Slave Rendition, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 5–7 (2013) [hereinafter
Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform]; Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 216–32 (2013); Karla M. McKanders, Immigration
Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH.
U. L. REV. 921, 947–52 (2012); Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, The Underground
Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, Litigation, and
Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1435 (1987); James A. Kraehenbuehl, Comment, Lessons from the Past: How the Antebellum Fugitive Slave Debate Informs
State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1481–
86 (2011).
7
See infra Section II.C.2.; see also Mallory E. SoRelle & Alexis N. Walker,
Both Democrats and Republicans Care About ‘States’ Rights’ – When It Suits
Them, WASH. POST (June 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/23/both-democrats-and-republicans-care-about-states-rights-when-it-suits-them/ (discussing that while states’
rights is a notion typically associated with the Republican party, in the wake of
the Trump administration, Democrats are turning to state power); Heather Gerken,
We’re About to See States’ Rights Used Defensively Against Trump, VOX,
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism-trump-progressive-uncooperative (last updated Jan. 20, 2017, 2:14 PM).
8
See infra Part II.
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who decried federal government overreach during the Obama administration,9 has vowed that recalcitrant states will bend to the federal will.10
Three main ideological parallels exist between the modern immigration debate and the fugitive slave crisis:
1) Lack of public faith in the federal law leads some individuals
to conclude that the law is so morally bankrupt that they are compelled to violate it.11 The Underground Railroad of the 1850s and
the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s existed for this reason.12 In
essence, the gulf between the beliefs of the people of an individual
state versus the values embodied in a federal statute drives some citizens to exercise civil disobedience.13
2) Fundamentally, modern refugees share one critical commonality with antebellum fugitives: a desire to make or retain a home on
“free soil” and not to return from whence they came.14 In both eras,
some members of these vulnerable populations are or were legally
entitled to remain as either free persons of color in the nineteenth
century or as asylees today.15 The failure of federal law to provide
due process to those who are targeted for removal under the terms

In 2012, Trump tweeted, “Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing executive orders that are major power grabs of authority?.” @realDonaldTrump,
TWITTER (July 10, 2012, 10:11 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/222739756105207808; see also Aaron Blake, The GOP Decried ‘King
Obama.’ Now It’s Mostly Quiet on Trump’s Effort to Revise the Constitution by
Himself, WASH. POST (June 31, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/31/gop-decried-king-obama-now-its-mostly-quiettrumps-effort-revise-constitution-by-himself/.
10
See infra Section II.C.2.–II.C.3 (discussing Trump’s Executive Order and
lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice seeking to compel state cooperation
with federal authorities in the immigration arena).
11
See infra Section II.A; see also, e.g., Michelle Boorstein, Trump Administration’s Immigration Policies are ‘Immoral,’ Say Leading Catholic Bishops,
INDEPENDENT (June 14, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-immigration-catholic-bishops-moral-usmexico-border-a8399016.html.
12
See infra notes 313–315, 316–334 and accompanying text.
13
See infra Section II.A.
14
Immigrants at risk of deportation, like free Blacks and fugitive slaves of
the nineteenth century, must live “in constant fear of being torn from their families
and homes.” Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform, supra note 6, at 1.
15
See infra Sections II.B.1.–II.B.2.
9
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of the Fugitive Slave Acts and the Immigration and Nationality Act
undermines the legal and moral legitimacy of both laws.16
3) If the lack of public support for federal law is sufficiently
widespread in a particular state, that state may decline to participate
in the administration of the federal law.17 The anti-commandeering
principle, which traces its roots to the fugitive slave crisis, 18 is currently the primary means by which states resist the implementation
of federal immigration policy within their borders.19
The struggles of the nineteenth century offer more than a history
lesson in today’s increasingly charged immigration debate. In each
case, absolutist interpretation and enforcement of federal laws intended to compel compliance may have had the opposite effect. Hyper-charged efforts to enforce laws may do more to expose the injustice engendered by those laws than years of advocacy by people
opposed to them.
I.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN PROTECTING
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ANTEBELLUM ERA
The existence of slavery in the United States, and its disproportionate concentration in the South, created sectional conflict from
the time of the Founding until the Civil War. When the Constitutional Convention convened in 1787, slavery was recognized and
protected under the laws of every state except Massachusetts.20
However, the states were moving in opposite directions on the issue
of slavery: states north of the Mason-Dixon line had begun the process of immediate or gradual emancipation or would soon do so,
while states to the south clung to slavery, which tightened rather
than loosened its grip on the region during the post-Revolutionary

16

See Section II.B., infra.
See Section II.C., infra.
18
See infra notes 135–144, 510–513, 524–529 and accompanying text.
19
See infra Section II.C.
20
Massachusetts abolished slavery in 1780 by virtue of that state’s constitutional Declaration of Rights, a result that was later affirmed by case law. See
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 43–45 (1975); see also William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of
Slavery in British North America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1742–73 (1996).
17
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period.21 The division between slave and free states created a federalism dilemma: what was the status of a person who was labeled a
slave under the laws of one state upon removing himself to the territorial boundaries of a state that did not recognize the institution of
slavery?22 The Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause was one of the
nation’s earliest attempts to answer that question.
A.
The Origins of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause
The Fugitive Slave Clause—which, like all other provisions of
the Constitution, does not include the word “slave”—provides the
following:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.23
This provision of the Constitution, which was approved unanimously, generated a “puzzling” and “deeply disturbing” lack of debate.24 The Fugitive Slave Clause and the statutes that later interpreted it were key factors contributing to the intersectional strife that
culminated in the Civil War.25
The Fugitive Slave Clause was initially proposed by South Carolina delegates Charles Pinckney and Pierce Butler, in the context
21

See Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 781–84 (2011) (discussing the process by which slavery
was abolished in the northeastern and mid-Atlantic states).
22
See infra Part I; see also Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery
Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement, Federalism, and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1406, 1414 (2004) [hereinafter Finkelman, The
Roots of Printz].
23
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
24
See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 330–33 (2009) (discussing the legislative history of
the clause).
25
See, e.g., Rierson, supra note 21, at 808–23 (discussing the Fugitive Slave
Laws and concluding that “[t]he Fugitive Slave Laws and the controversies that
they spawned were but one example of a force that drove the two regions apart,
with each side becoming increasingly intolerant of the other’s position”).
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of the debate regarding the extradition clause. Pinckney and Butler’s
original wording proposed “to require fugitive slaves and servants
to be delivered up like criminals.”26 James Wilson of Pennsylvania
immediately objected on the grounds that this language would require “the Executive of the State” to capture such fugitives, “at the
public expence.”27 Roger Sherman of Connecticut interjected that
he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a
slave or servant, than a horse.”28 Butler then withdrew his motion
but reintroduced it the next day, revised as follows:
If any Person bound to service or labor in any of the
United States shall escape into another State, He or
She shall not be discharged from such service or labor in consequence of any regulations subsisting in
the State to which they escape; but shall be delivered
up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.29
The delegates then approved Butler’s motion unanimously, with no
further debate.30
The paucity of recorded debate surrounding the Fugitive Slave
Clause suggests that, at a minimum, the delegates failed to appreciate the significance of it.31 In part, this failure may have been due to
a lack of foresight. As noted above, at the time of the Convention
almost all of the states recognized the institution of slavery.32 In fact,
as of the date of the first national census, more slaves were living in
New York and New Jersey than in Georgia.33 Because the Mason26

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 443 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 445–46.
30
Id. at 446.
31
Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 260
(1994) [hereinafter Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court] (describing
the history of the clause and concluding that the lack of debate likely demonstrated
that “northern delegates simply failed to appreciate the legal problems and moral
dilemmas that the rendition of fugitive slaves would pose”).
32
See Wiecek, supra note 20.
33
The census documented 21,324 slaves living in New York and 11,423
slaves living in New Jersey in 1790 (for a total of 32,747); at the same time 29,264
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Dixon Line was not a bright demarcation between slavery and freedom in 1789, the federalism conflict presented by alleged fugitives
was not a significant extant problem.34 Although the slave population boomed in the South and declined (slowly or quickly, depending on the state) in the North after the Convention,35 the delegates
may not have fully appreciated that they were on the front end of
this trend. Nevertheless, the Southern delegates would have been
keen to avoid this conflict, given that English law on the subject was
not favorable to them. The English high court decided Somerset v.
Stewart in 1772, holding that a Virginia slave who escaped from his
master while living in London was no longer a slave, given that the
“positive law” of England did not allow slavery.36 Therefore, Southern delegates would have wanted to ensure that freedom was not
similarly bestowed upon a slave who escaped to a state, such as Massachusetts, that had no “positive law” respecting slavery.37
Northern delegates, however, may have regarded South Carolina’s request regarding fugitive slaves as a relatively minor issue.
slaves were recorded as living in Georgia. Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,
tbls 25, 45, 47 (United States Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper
No. 56, 2002), http://mapmaker.rutgers.edu/REFERENCE/Hist_Pop_stats.pdf;
see generally GRAHAM RUSSELL HODGES, ROOT & BRANCH: AFRICAN
AMERICANS IN NEW YORK & EAST JERSEY 1613-1863 (1999) (discussing the history of slavery in these states).
34
See DON E. FEHRENBACHER & WARD M. MCAFEE, THE SLAVEHOLDING
REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES’ GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO
SLAVERY 207 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001) (observing that, in 1787, “flight of
slaves across state boundaries was still far from being a significant national problem”).
35
Lincoln Mullen, These Maps Reveal How Slavery Expanded Across the
United States, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 15, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/maps-reveal-slavery-expanded-across-united-states180951452/; see also Rierson, supra note 21, at 781–84 (discussing the abolition
of slavery in Northern and mid-Atlantic states).
36
Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B.). For a more
complete account of Somerset, see MARK S. WEINER, BLACK TRIALS:
CITIZENSHIP FROM THE BEGINNING OF SLAVERY TO THE END OF CASTE 70–88
(2004); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND
COMITY 16–18, 70–125 (1981) (discussing treatment of Somerset in U.S. courts).
37
See COVER, supra note 20, at 43–45; see also Massachusetts Constitution
and the Abolition of Slavery, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-abolition-of-slavery (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
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Even though Somerset raised the possibility that a slave’s status
could be altered by his location,38 the common law (of which the
delegates would have been aware) presumed that slave holders had
a right of recaption as to any escaped slave.39 The common law right
of recaption permitted owners of “lost property capable of locomotion” to retrieve their property without legal process, so long as they
did so in an “orderly” fashion without injuring any third parties.40
When Connecticut representative Sherman compared the seizure of
a slave to the capture of a horse,41 he could have been referring to
this common law principle, which did in fact treat fleeing slaves and
runaway horses identically.42 Moreover, unlike the other major compromises on slavery, the Fugitive Slave Clause did not impact the
balance of power among the states in Congress.43 The Three-Fifths
Clause did so directly: it included three-fifths of all slaves in the
population used to calculate the number of Congressmen a state
could send to the House of Representatives.44 The Slave Trade
Clause indirectly enhanced Congressional representation in the

38

See Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510.
See ERIC FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 32 (2015) [hereinafter FONER, GATEWAY TO
FREEDOM].
40
See id.
41
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 443;
THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780–1861, 17 (1974).
42
See FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 32.
43
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1.
44
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
Based on the 1790 Census, Virginia’s enslaved population alone entitled it to approximately six members in the House of Representatives, more than the total
allotment of Congressional representatives for five other states. See Gibson &
Jung, supra note 33. Three-fifths, or 60%, of Virginia’s 1790 slave population
(287,959) was equivalent to approximately 172,775 free persons for the purpose
of calculating Congressional representation. Id. That number, divided by 30,000
(the population base for apportionment of Congressional representation), equals
5.8, or six seats in the House of Representatives. The states with total population
below 172,775 were Delaware (59,096, including 8,887 slaves), Georgia (82,548,
including 29,264 slaves), New Hampshire (141,885), Rhode Island (68,825), and
Vermont (85,425). Id.
39
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South.45 By allowing the continued importation of slaves (or at least
preventing Congressional interference with it) for twenty years, this
Constitutional clause allowed Southern states participating in the international trade to increase their slave populations,46 which ultimately would augment their representation in Congress via the
Three-Fifths Clause.47 Unlike these other Constitutional provisions,
the Fugitive Slave Clause did not have the potential to alter any
state’s federal political representation.48
The delegates were also almost certainly aware that the Continental Congress had passed the Northwest Ordinance only weeks
earlier. The Ordinance famously excluded slavery from the Northwest Territories and thereby provided an eventual template for the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery.49
However, it also included an analog to the Fugitive Slave Clause:
“[A]ny person escaping into the [Northwest territories], from whom
labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original
States, . . . may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person
claiming his or her labor or service.”50 This provision of the Ordinance, which itself generated little recorded debate, was not directly
discussed during the Convention debate on the Fugitive Slave
Clause.51 However, the delegates may have been inspired by it or at

45

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
Id.
47
See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26 at
222–23 (recording remarks by Governor Morris (Pennsylvania), arguing that the
southern states were encouraged to import “fresh supplies of wretched Africans”
by the “assurance of having their votes in the Natl Govt increased in proportion”
to the number of slaves imported).
48
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2, and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3,
repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
49
Article 6 of the Ordinance provides: “There shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary Servitude in the said territory otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” 32 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 343 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) [hereinafter NORTHWEST ORDINANCE].
50
Id.
51
FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 35–36.
46
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least aware of it; the differences between the two clauses, in terms
of wording, are relatively minor.52
A final reason for the lack of extended discussion of the Fugitive
Slave Clause may relate to its timing. When the Fugitive Slave
Clause was proposed in August 1787, the delegates had already endured the long, hot summer months in Philadelphia.53 The prospect
of engaging in another lengthy, contentious debate regarding the
subject of slavery (or anything else) would not have been enticing
to anyone. The delegates almost certainly wanted to go home.54 The
Convention concluded on September 17, 1787,55 approximately two
weeks after the delegates added the Fugitive Slave Clause to the
Constitution.56
Whatever the reason, Northern delegates acquiesced to Southern
demands on the subject of fugitive slaves at the Constitutional Convention, offering a mere token resistance.57 What followed, however, was a wave of increasingly hostile reactions to Southern slave
catchers in the Northern states that were neither token nor insignificant.
52

Compare NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 49, at 343 (“[A]ny person
escaping into the [Northwest territories], from whom labor or service is lawfully
claimed in any one of the original States, . . . may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service . . . .”), with U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3., repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“No Person held to
Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due.”).
53
See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1206 (2003) (discussing the consequences of “four months of hard work drafting a Constitution in
the hot Philadelphia summer of 1787”).
54
See FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 36 (noting that “ready
acceptance” of the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution was likely due in part
to “the weary desire of most delegates to finish their work and go home”).
55
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 641
(Sept. 17, 1787).
56
The delegates adopted the clause in substance in a vote taken on August
29, 1787. Id. at 446. However, the final version of the Fugitive Slave Clause,
which included minor changes in wording proposed by Committee of Style, was
approved on September 15, 1787. Id. at 621.
57
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text; see also FEHRENBACHER &
MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 35–36.
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The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and the Anti-Kidnapping
Laws of the Northern States
Congress passed the first statute implementing the Fugitive
Slave Clause of the Constitution in 1793.58 Like the Constitution itself, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 never uses the word “slave”;
instead, it refers to an enslaved person as “a person held to labor in
any of the United States [or the Territories], under the laws
thereof.”59 The Act empowered a slaveholder—a “person to whom
such labor or service may be due, his agent or attorney”—“to seize
or arrest” an alleged fugitive in the state to which he had escaped.60
Once the alleged fugitive had been seized, the Act permitted the
“claimant” to bring the fugitive before a federal judge or a local
magistrate in the non-slave state, where he was required to prove the
slave status of the fugitive “to the satisfaction of such Judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit.”61 If the judge or magistrate was “satisfied” with the proof of the person’s enslavement,
he was required to “give a certificate” to the claimant, which acted
as a warrant to remove that person to the state or territory where he
was enslaved.62 The Act also imposed a penalty of $500 on anyone
who tried to “rescue,” “harbor or conceal” a fugitive slave, or who
tried to “obstruct or hinder” efforts to capture an alleged fugitive.63
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was silent as to the rights of
those accused of being fugitive slaves.64 Although it empowered private citizens to “seize or arrest”65 alleged fugitive slaves, it did not
specify the manner by which an arrest could be carried out. More
importantly, the Act did not describe the process by which the enslavement of a person could be proven, other than refer to “oral testimony or affidavit.”66 Due process protections on behalf of alleged
fugitives—some of whom were in fact free—were not part of the

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 4.
See id. § 3.
Id.
Id.

612

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:598

Act.67 Key procedural protections that were well-established under
nineteenth century law, such as the right of trial by jury and the writ
of habeas corpus,68 were not guaranteed. Finally, although the Act
imposed criminal penalties on those who sought to thwart the apprehension of an alleged fugitive, it did not punish those who intentionally kidnapped free blacks and sold them into slavery for profit, under the guise of capturing fugitive slaves.69 The problem of kidnapping and wrongful enslavement was a significant one, even at the
nation’s Founding.70
Some efforts were made, at the federal level, to improve the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, specifically as to its encouragement, or at
least enablement, of the kidnapping of free blacks.71 The free black
67

MORRIS, supra note 41, at 21 (describing the process established under the
1793 Act as “a summary ministerial hearing,” pursuant to which a judge had “no
authority to conduct a full investigation if there was a competing claim to freedom”).
68
See id. at 8–12.
69
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 302, 302.
70
In 1788, Massachusetts abolished the slave trade and took steps to curb
kidnapping of free blacks via statute. Act of Mar. 26, 1788, ch. 48, 1787 Mass.
Acts 615. The statute, which provided a private right of action for “friends” and
families of Massachusetts inhabitants who were removed from the state and sold
into slavery, recognized that “peaceable inhabitants of this Commonwealth . . .
have been privately carried off by force, or decoyed away under various pretenses,
by evil minded persons, [and] with a probable intention of being sold as slaves”
outside the Commonwealth. Id. at 616; see also Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444,
pmbl., 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052 (recognizing that “unprincipled persons have
kidnapped free persons of color, within this state, and attempted to transport them
out of the state, and sell them into slavery,” a practice which the legislature characterized as “nefarious and inhuman”). The American Convention of Abolitionist
Societies alerted its members in 1801 that the “inhuman crime of kidnapping” had
“recently increased to an alarming degree” in certain parts of the country. MORRIS,
supra note 41, at 26; see also infra notes 83–95 and accompanying text. Despite
the Northern states’ efforts to prevent the kidnapping of free blacks, this practice
continued throughout the antebellum period. See generally SOLOMON NORTHRUP,
TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE (David Wilson ed., 2011) (memoir of Solomon
Northrup, a free man from New York who was kidnapped and sold into slavery
in the South); CAROL WILSON, FREEDOM AT RISK: THE KIDNAPPING OF FREE
BLACKS IN AMERICA 1780–1865 (1994); see also Judson Crump & Alfred L. Brophy, Twenty-One Months a Slave: Cornelius Sinclair’s Odyssey, 86 MISS. L. J.
457, 458–59, 468 (2017) (describing Sinclair’s kidnapping in Philadelphia and
the trial that eventually returned him to freedom).
71
See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 30–34.
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population was instrumental in raising these issues in Congress via
the petition process.72 In 1797, a group of former slaves from North
Carolina submitted a petition to Congress claiming that, after they
had been manumitted by their owners, they were pursued, captured
from their homes in Pennsylvania, and ultimately sold back into
slavery under the auspices of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.73 They
sought redress from the Congress, especially on behalf of those
“who have been emancipated and tasted the sweets of liberty, and
[were] again reduced to slavery by kidnappers and man-stealers,”
asking, “is not some remedy for an evil of such magnitude highly
worthy of the deep inquiry and unfeigned zeal of the supreme Legislative body of a free and enlightened people?”74 Although Congress ultimately provided the petitioners no relief, Representative
Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts responded to the petition by
suggesting that the Act should be amended to better protect alleged
fugitives who claimed to be freemen but were labeled fugitive slaves
under the Act, adding that he hoped “the House would take all possible care that freemen should not be made slaves.”75 A similar petition was submitted by Pennsylvania Rep. Robert Wal, on behalf of
a group of free blacks from Philadelphia in 1800.76 The petitioners
wrote that the “solemn compact, the Constitution, was violated by
the trade of kidnapping, carried on by the people of some of the
Southern States on the shores of Maryland and Delaware,” resulting

72

See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 2015–18 (1797).
See id.; see also The Earliest Extant Negro Petition to Congress, 1797,
reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES 39, 39–44 (Herbert Aptheker, ed. 1951) (commenting on and reproducing
text of the petition).
74
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1797).
75
Id. at 2023–24. Varnum observed that “[i]f these people had been free, and
yet were taken up under a law of the United States, and put into prison, then it
appeared plainly the duty of the House to inquire whether that act had such an
unjust tendency, and if it had, proper amendments should be made to it to prevent
the like consequences in the future.” Id. at 2023.
76
6 ANNALS OF CONG. 229–31 (1800); see also A “Disquieting” Negro Petition to Congress, 1800, reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 73, at 44, 44–45 (commenting on and
reproducing text of the petition).
73
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in the separation of families and the sale of free persons into slavery
in Georgia, “which was degrading to the dignified nature of man.”77
Congress took no action to solve the problem of kidnapping described in these petitions. Pro-slavery Congressmen successfully resisted any attempts to modify the Act in ways that would have complicated slaveholders’ efforts to reclaim their human “property” in
Northern states.78 During debates regarding the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Law, Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi (who would later become the first and only President of the Confederacy) flatly denied
that any free black person had ever been kidnapped from a free state
and sold into slavery.79 In the end, the only proposed amendments
to the 1793 Act that came close to success were those that restricted,
rather than expanded, the rights of free blacks under the Act.80
As a result of their lack of success at the federal level, some
states that either had abolished slavery or had enacted gradual emancipation statutes sought to mitigate the negative impacts of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 through their own laws. These early “personal liberty laws” were generally not intended to assist slaves who
were attempting to escape to freedom.81 Most proponents of these
77

6 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1800). Rep. Waln characterized this grievance
as “the operation of the fugitive act, by which free men were carried and sold into
slavery.” Id. at 230.
78
See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1585, 1588 (1850); MORRIS,
supra note 41, at 35–41.
79
See Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1588 (1850). Davis argued that he
had “yet to see the first proof” that any free Black person living in a free state had
been kidnapped and sold into slavery in the South, arguing that if such a kidnapping were to occur, the victim would be “liberated at once and the thief arrested.”
Id.; see also FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 228–29 (discussing
legislative history of 1850 Fugitive Slave Act).
80
See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 35–41 (describing Congressional efforts to
amend the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 during the period 1817 to 1822); H. Robert
Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 30 L. & HIST.
REV. 1133, 1143, 1146–48 (2012) (describing failed Congressional efforts to pass
a bill in 1801 and 1802 that would have imposed liability on Northern employers
for hiring fugitive slaves and required free blacks to carry certificates of freedom).
81
The majority of these statutes were limited, by their terms, only to the kidnapping of free citizens who were sold into slavery. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1808,
ch. 96, § 1, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300 (applying to any “person of colour, not
being a slave”); Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444, pmbl., 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052
(applying to “free persons of color”); Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 1, 1854 Conn.
Pub. Acts 80, 80 (applying to “any free person entitled to freedom”); Act of Feb.
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laws were not abolitionists: they did not believe that Congress had
the power to eliminate slavery in any state that wanted to keep it.82
These state laws were passed primarily to address the problem of
kidnapping and subsequent enslavement of free blacks who resided
in these states. To achieve this goal, these laws generally served one
of two basic purposes: 1) to criminalize the kidnapping of free black
people for the purpose of selling them into slavery;83 and/or 2) to
require some measure of due process in the proceedings that determined whether a person was in fact a fugitive slave (or, alternatively,
a free person).84
The earliest state laws that addressed the problem of kidnapping,
particularly as it applied to free black people residing in free states,
tended to focus on criminal penalties associated with taking free
people out of these states for the purpose of selling them into slavery
in states or territories that recognized slavery.85 The most obvious
13, 1855, No. 162, § 6, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 414 (same). Others achieved
the same goal by limiting the scope of their application to persons to whom a
claim had not been properly established under the federal Fugitive Slave Act. See,
e.g., ILL. CRIM. CODE § 56 (1833) (criminalizing the theft, taking, or arrest of any
person, “whether white, black, or colored, in this state,” for the purpose of carrying that person “into another country, state, or territory . . . without having established a claim according to the laws of the United States”).
82
See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND
SLAVERY ON TRIAL 24–25 (2010).
83
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1808, ch. 96, § 1, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300 (punishing anyone who “without due process of law, [does] seize and forcibly confine
or inveigle, or kidnap any negro, mulatto, mestee, or other person of colour, not
being a slave, with intent to send him out of this state, against his will”); ILL.
CRIM. CODE, § 56 (1833).
84
LUBET, supra note 82, at 29 (noting that “many northern states attempted
to impede the rush to bondage by enacting personal liberty laws . . . that required
some measure of legal process as a condition of lawful removal” during this time
period); MORRIS, supra note 41, at 29 (observing that “[t]hrough the first two
decades of the nineteenth century . . . the free states acted to secure a hearing
within their jurisdiction for those who claimed to be free in the face of a competing
claim to slavery, and at the same time they continued to accept the fact that a
general right of recaption [of slaves] existed.”).
85
One of the earliest statutes addressing this issue, however, addressed civil
damages rather than criminal penalties assessed against those who would carry
off by force or lure away “peaceable inhabitants” of the state, “with a probable
intention of being sold as slaves” outside the state. Act of Mar. 26, 1788, ch. 48,
1787 Mass. Acts 615, 616. The title—An Act to Prevent the Slave Trade, and for
Granting Relief to the Families of Such Unhappy Persons as may be Kidnapped
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cases of kidnapping involved the forcible removal of a known free
person of color from the state with the intent to transport that person
over state lines and into slavery.86 Such forcible removal could be
accompanied by a bad faith claim that the person was a fugitive
slave.87 Of course, with no effective legal process, the states had no
way to test claims as to a person’s slave status. Particularly after the
passage of the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, states focused
their statutory efforts on assuring that established legal processes—
which often tracked the terms of the 1793 law—were followed, to
provide some assurance of a good faith claim to slave status.88 The
goal of these laws was to decrease the likelihood that a free person
would be doomed to slavery, either intentionally or unintentionally.89 The penalties for violating these laws typically involved a

or Decoyed Away from this Commonwealth—suggests the statute was designed
to secure damages on behalf of the family of the person captured and sold into
slavery, as it specified that the money recovered was for the “use and maintenance
of the wife, children or family of the injured party.” Id. at 617. The law notes that
criminal remedies for kidnapping were provided by the common law, specifically
the writ de homine replegiando. Id. at 616–17.
86
In addition to forcible removal, however, almost all of the statutes also
prohibited anyone from luring a free person out of the state by fraud or false pretenses. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1808, ch. 96, § 1, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300 (defining kidnapping to include inveigling “any negro, mulatto, mestee, or other person of colour, not being a slave” to leave the state); Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444,
§1, 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052 (preventing the removal of a free black person
from the state by “fraud[] or deception”); Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, § 1, 1820
Pa. Laws 104, 104 (criminalizing the removal of a free person of color from the
state by “fraud or false pretences” or seduction); Act of Mar. 185, 1838, ch. 323,
§ 1, 1838 Me. Laws 470, 470 (imposing criminal penalties on anyone who “shall
inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent either to cause such person to be
secretly confined or imprisoned in this State against his will, or to be sold as a
slave”).
87
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of the
intentional kidnapping of free blacks); see also LUBET, supra note 82, at 28–29.
88
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 15, 1846, ch. 6, § 13, 1846 N.J. Laws 567, 572 (penalizing anyone who takes a person out of the state “under pretence” that the person is a fugitive slave, without following procedures established by the statute);
Act of Mar. 25, 1826, ch. 301, § 3, 1826 Pa. Laws 793, 794 (establishing a process
for reclaiming a person “held to labour or service in any of the United States, or
in any of the territories,” who had escaped into Pennsylvania).
89
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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fine not exceeding $1,000, and/or a term of imprisonment or sentence to hard labor ranging from one to ten years or more.90
Later versions of the personal liberty laws focused more specifically on the procedural protections afforded to those who were accused of being fugitive slaves. Apparently unconvinced that the
summary procedures afforded under federal law were adequate to
prevent either errant or intentional wrongful declarations of enslavement, these state laws endeavored to provide fugitive slaves with a
heightened degree of legal process.91 In 1824, Indiana granted a
right to an “appeal” to a trial by jury, if either party was dissatisfied
with the outcome of the summary proceeding regarding a person’s
enslavement.92 An 1840 New York law replaced the summary process previously established by statute with a right to trial by jury on
behalf of the “claimant” or the person accused of being a fugitive
slave.93 Connecticut also granted the right to trial by jury to either
party in a case involving an alleged fugitive slave, but also
90

See, e.g., Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 444, § 1, 1819 Ohio Laws 1052, 1052
(establishing a sentence of confinement plus hard labor for a period of one to ten
years); Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, § 1, 1820 Pa. Laws 104, 104–05 (establishing
a penalty of a fine of $500 to $2,000, in addition to seven to twenty-one years of
imprisonment); ILL. CRIM. CODE § 56 (1833) (establishing a penalty of one to
seven years confinement, for each person kidnapped or attempted to be kidnapped). New York established a severe penalty for a second offense, imposing a
term of imprisonment “at hard labor, or in solitude” for life. Act of Apr. 1, 1808,
ch. 96, § 2, 1808 N.Y. Laws 300, 300. Vermont, in one of the earliest statutes,
gave the convicted defendant a choice of being “publicly whipped, on his naked
back, not exceeding 39 stripes,” or paying a fine of up to $1,000, or hard labor or
imprisonment for up to seven years, and also required him to pay damages to the
person kidnapped. Act of Nov. 8, 1806, ch. 103, 1806 Vt. Acts & Resolves 151,
151–52.
91
See infra notes 92–96.
92
Act of Jan. 22, 2824, ch. 47, § 2, 1824 Ind. Acts 221, 221–22 (allowing
either party to appeal from summary process of determining whether an alleged
fugitive was a fugitive slave, to a jury trial).
93
Act of May 6, 1840, ch. 225, § 1, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 174 (providing
that, upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an alleged fugitive
slave, “the claim to the service of such alleged fugitive, his identity, and the fact
of his having escaped from another state of the United States into this state, shall
be determined by a jury”). Several other states also guaranteed the right to a trial
by jury in any case involving a fugitive slave. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 29, 1840, No.
8, § 3, 1840 Vt. Acts & Resolves 13, 13; Act of Apr. 15, 1846, ch. 6, § 5, 1846
N.J. Laws 567; Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 2, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413,
413; Act of Feb. 19, 1857, ch. 8, § 6, 1857 Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 13.
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“[p]rovided, that “no person shall be qualified to sit as a Juror in said
case, who believes there is not constitutionally, or legally, a slave in
the land.”94 States also frequently guaranteed both claimants and accused slaves the right to seek relief via a writ of habeas corpus95 or
a writ of personal replevin.96
These laws illustrate free states’ growing frustration with the
federal government’s failure to protect the rights of free black people living within their borders, who often lived in fear that they
would be yanked from the street and sold into slavery. Free states
acted in response to federal government inaction and their own shifting tides of public opinion, eventually erecting legal barriers to the
reclamation of fugitive slaves that made “slave hunting” a legally
fraught endeavor. As a result, historian Paul Finkelman has estimated that, after 1830, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was “virtually
unenforceable” outside the border states.97
C.

Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the Triumph of Federal
Supremacy
Against this backdrop of growing state resistance, in 1842 the
Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Prigg v.
Pennsylvania.98 Prigg tested the boundaries of federalism under the
Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution.99 The Supreme Court, in
a majority opinion written by Associate Justice Joseph Story, upheld
the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and struck
down Pennsylvania’s personal liberty laws on federal supremacy
grounds.100 The Court’s decision, however, did not put an end to
94

Act of June 1, 1838, ch. 37, § 4, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts 32, 33.
See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1840, ch. 225, § 1, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 174; Act
of June 1, 1838, ch. 37, § 1, 1838 Conn. Pub. Acts 32, 32; Act of May 21, 1855,
ch. 489, § 2, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 924; Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 2, 1855
Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 413; Act of Feb. 19, 1857, ch. 8, § 5, 1857 Wis. Sess. Laws
12, 13.
96
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 13, 1837, ch. 221, § 1, 1837 Mass. Laws 240, 240–
41.
97
Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns
Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793,
1797–98 (1996) [hereinafter Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves],
98
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
99
See Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves, supra note 97 at 1798–
99.
100
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 542, 571.
95
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personal liberty laws, nor did it resolve the crisis of federalism created by the Mason Dixon Line’s demarcation between slavery and
freedom.
The facts underlying the dispute in Prigg illustrate both the
tragic circumstances under which the states’ personal liberty laws
were invoked and the practical limits of their effectiveness. The case
involved a woman named Margaret who was, at least in theory, enslaved under the laws of Maryland.101 Her parents were held in slavery in Maryland, but their putative owner, John Ashmore, allowed
them to live independently and told others that he had freed them.102
Margaret, her husband Jerry Morgan (a free black man born in Pennsylvania), and their two children were all described as “free” in the
1830 Maryland census.103 In 1832, several years after Ashmore’s
death, Margaret and Jerry Morgan and their children moved from
Maryland to Pennsylvania.104 The Morgans had at least one additional child while living in Pennsylvania, who would have been considered free under Pennsylvania law.105 Five years after the family
left Maryland, Ashmore’s widow hired an attorney and neighbor,
Edward Prigg, to recover Margaret Morgan and her children from
Pennsylvania, claiming to own them as slaves.106 Prigg traveled to
Pennsylvania, apprehended the Morgan family, and took them to a
local magistrate to obtain a certificate deeming Margaret and her
children fugitives, thus authorizing their rendition to Maryland as
101

Id. at 539.
Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 274.
103
Id. at 275. Despite this evidence, the jury in the underlying state case found
that Margaret Morgan was, in fact, a fugitive slave who was the property of John
Ashford’s widow, Margaret Ashford. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556.
104
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556 (discussing jury’s special verdict, finding
that Margaret Morgan moved from Maryland to Pennsylvania in 1832); see also
LUBET, supra note 82, at 30; Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court,
supra note 31, at 274–75.
105
Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 276.
The Pennsylvania jury found that at least one of the Morgans’s children was born
in Pennsylvania under circumstances that would have rendered the child free under Pennsylvania law. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 557.
106
Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 275–
76; see also LUBET, supra note 82, at 30. Prigg was accompanied by John Ashmore’s son-in-law, Nathan Bemis, and two neighbors, Jacob Forward and Stephen
Lewis, Jr. Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 275–
76.
102
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slaves.107 The magistrate, however, refused to issue the certificate,
apparently not convinced of their enslavement.108 Rather than seek
the legal redress provided for in the Pennsylvania statute, Prigg forcibly took Margaret Morgan and her children (but not her husband
Jerry Morgan) south to Maryland, where they were delivered to
Ashmore’s widow and later sold to a slave trader.109 The legal record
makes no further mention of the fate of Margaret Morgan or her
children. Prigg, however, was extradited from Maryland and tried
and convicted of kidnapping by a Pennsylvania jury.110 The appeal
of his criminal conviction was taken up directly by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 111
Prigg was charged under a Pennsylvania law enacted in 1826,
titled “An act to give effect to the provisions of the constitution of
the United States, relative to fugitives from labor, for the protection
of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping.”112 Prigg was
indicted for violating section 1 of this law when he removed Margaret Morgan from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania “with force
and violence” and took her to Maryland, “with a design and intention there to sell and dispose of [her] as and for a slave and servant
for life.”113 The jury that convicted Prigg did not find that Margaret
Morgan was free.114 On the contrary, they found that she was enslaved and further that she had “escaped and fled from the state of
107

Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556–57 (findings of jury’s special verdict).
LUBET, supra note 82, at 30; Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme
Court, supra note 31, at 276.
109
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 557 (findings of jury’s special verdict); see also
LUBET, supra note 82, at 30; Finkelman, Story Telling and the Supreme Court,
supra note 31, at 276.
110
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 543. Bemis, Forward, and Lewis were also indicted for kidnapping. Id.
111
Id. at 558 (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved the lower
court judgment pro forma, allowing defendant to prosecute a writ of error in the
U.S. Supreme Court).
112
Act of Apr. 11, 1826, ch. 301, 1826 Pa. Laws 150. The text of this statute
is reproduced in the Prigg opinion, as part of the jury’s special verdict. Prigg, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) at 551–56.
113
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 543; see also Act of Apr. 11, 1826, ch. 301, § 1,
1826 Pa. Laws 150, 150 (any person who “by force and violence” takes or carries
away “any negro or mulatto” from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, “with a
design and intention of selling and disposing of such negro or mulatto, as a slave
or servant for life,” is guilty of a felony).
114
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556.
108
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Maryland” without her owner’s knowledge or consent.115 The jury’s
finding of guilt was based on Prigg’s failure to follow the procedures
set forth in the Pennsylvania statute for reclaiming an alleged fugitive slave.116
Justice Story invalidated Prigg’s conviction for kidnapping,
holding that the law he violated—Pennsylvania’s personal liberty
law—was unconstitutional on grounds of federal supremacy.117 He
wrote that “[t]he [Fugitive Slave] clause manifestly contemplates
the existence of a positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner
of the slave [to reclaim his property], which no state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain.”118 Story
concluded that “we hold the power of legislation on this subject to
be exclusive in Congress.”119 Under this logic, almost all of the existing state personal liberty laws were unconstitutional in that they
infringed upon the plenary power of Congress to regulate in this
arena. The Supreme Court thus held that the free states were powerless to directly impose conditions on the manner in which the Fugitive Slave Clause was implemented on their soil.
Justice Story claimed that his decision in Prigg was compelled
by his duty to faithfully interpret the law, especially as expressed in
the U.S. Constitution.120 However, the decision that he wrote was
anything but inevitable. From a structural standpoint, the Fugitive
Slave Clause was not a poster child for federal supremacy. The powers of Congress are articulated in Article I, Section 8, of the United
States Constitution.121 The Constitution imbues Congress with the
power “[t]o lay and collect taxes, . . . to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
115

Id.
Id. at 556–57.
117
Id. at 612.
118
Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
119
Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
120
2 JOSEPH STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND DANE PROFESSOR
OF LAW AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 431 (William W. Story ed., 1851) [hereinafter LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY] (“I [would] never hesitate to do my duty
as a Judge, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, be the consequences what they may. That Constitution I have sworn to support, and I cannot
forget or repudiate my solemn obligations at pleasure.”)
121
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
116
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States, . . . [t]o borrow money, . . . [t]o regulate commerce, . . . [t]o
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, . . . [t]o coin money,” to
create federal courts, and “[t]o declare war,” among other things.122
Article I, Section 8, does not refer to fugitive slaves, either directly
or indirectly.123 Therefore, as a matter of textual interpretation, the
Fugitive Slave Clause is not obviously within the plenary power of
Congress.124
The Fugitive Slave Clause appears in Article IV of the Constitution, which generally addresses comity among the states.125 Section 1 of Article IV contains the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
requires each state to give “full faith and credit” to the laws and judicial proceedings of other states.126 When the laws of two states are
diametrically opposed—e.g., when one state embraces slavery and
another state rejects the propertization of human beings—then “full
faith and credit” is impossible.127 Section 2 of Article IV contains
the Fugitive Slave Clause, which attempted to resolve this anticipated conflict among free and slave states.128 Abolitionists argued,
and some state courts agreed, that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
was unconstitutional on the grounds that the States, rather than Congress, held the exclusive power to implement this Constitutional directive.129 From a textual standpoint, these state courts may have had
122

Id.
See id.
124
Justice Story addressed this argument in his decision, dismissing it on
grounds that Congress was empowered to enact the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act under
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 618–19 (1842) (“The end being required, it has been deemed
a just and necessary implication, that the means to accomplish it are given also.”).
125
See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV.
126
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
127
See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 623–24.
128
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 443–46.
129
See Baker, supra note 80, at 1153 (describing arguments made by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society regarding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1793); Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at
269–73 (discussing state court opinions interpreting the constitutionality of same).
State courts in New York and New Jersey held the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional. See, e.g., Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507, 525–26 (N.Y. 1835);
Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 269–73 (discussing state court opinions finding the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional). The New Jersey opinion was unpublished. Finkelman, Story Telling on
123
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the better side of the argument. However, Prigg held the opposite,
thereby placing the power of implementing the Fugitive Slave
Clause squarely within the plenary powers of Congress.130
Justice Story also relied on the “historical necessity” argument
to buttress his decision.131 Story and many other judges argued that
the Fugitive Slave Clause could not be tampered with by the states,
because, without it, “the Union could not have been formed.”132
However, as discussed, the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution generated very little debate.133 As to other Constitutional provisions—most prominently the Three-Fifths and Slave Trade
Clauses—Southern delegates loudly and frequently threatened to
abandon the Union if they did not get the concessions they demanded on slavery.134 However, no legislative history suggests that
the same was true as to the Fugitive Slave Clause. Therefore, the
the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 270–71. Writing for New York’s highest
court, Chancellor Reuben Wallworth reasoned, “I have looked in vain among the
powers delegated to congress by the constitution, for any general authority to that
body to legislate on this subject. It certainly is not contained in any express grant
of power, and it does not appear to be embraced in the general grant of incidental
powers contained in the last clause of the constitution relative to the powers of
congress.” Jack, 14 Wend. at 525–26; see also Finkelman, Story Telling on the
Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 272–73 (discussing Story’s treatment and misinterpretation of Martin in his opinion in Prigg).
130
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625.
131
Id. at 610–11.
132
Id. at 611; see also Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62, 63 (Pa. 1819)
(reasoning that “it is well known that our southern brethren would not have consented to become parties to a constitution . . . unless their property in slaves had
been secured”).
133
See supra Section I.A.
134
During the Three-Fifths Clause debate, North Carolina delegate William
Richardson Davie stated that he was sure his state “would never confederate on
any terms that did not rate [slaves] at least as 3/5,” and further that “[i]f the Eastern
States meant therefore to exclude [slaves] altogether [from the ratio of representation] the business was at an end.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 593 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. During the debate regarding the international slave trade, South Carolina delegate Benjamin Rutledge bluntly stated
that “[t]he true question . . . is whether the Southn. [sic] States shall or shall not
be parties to the Union.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 26, at 364. His fellow South Carolinian, Charles Pinckney, similarly threatened that “South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade.”
Id.
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historical necessity justification for Story’s decision in Prigg, like
the argument based on the plain language of the Constitution, is
weak.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg undermined
many of the free states’ attempts to protect the rights of black citizens via anti-kidnapping laws, the decision’s emphasis on the plenary power of Congress also created new avenues for state legislation designed to achieve the same ends.135 In his opinion, Justice
Story questioned the section of the 1793 Act that purported to require state enforcement of the federal law.136 In keeping with his
finding that the power to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves
was “exclusive in Congress,”137 Story suggested that the states could
not be compelled to enforce the Act.138 He reasoned that it might be
unconstitutional “to insist that the states are bound to provide means
to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere
delegated or intrusted [sic] to them by the Constitution.”139
Story’s opinion did not hold that states were powerless to pass
laws or decide court cases that affected fugitive slaves.140 Story recognized that the states, under their general police powers, did possess “full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them from their borders,” for the purpose of securing “the protection, safety, and peace of the state.”141 Although these types of
state laws could and did incidentally benefit slave owners, the federal government could not require the states to pass such laws for
135

Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625; see infra notes 147–51.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616.
137
Id. at 625.
138
Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Taney rejected Story’s reasoning
on this point, arguing that the states had a duty to “protect and support the [slave]
owner when he is endeavouring to obtain possession of his property found within
their respective territories,” while they were expressly forbidden to “make any
regulation” that would impair the slave owner’s ability to do so. Id. at 627 (Taney,
C.J., concurring).
139
Id. at 616 (majority opinion).
140
Id. at 615–16, 625.
141
Id. at 625; see also Kraehenbuehl, supra note 6, at 1477 (concluding that,
under this reasoning from Prigg, “States could . . . either assist in enforcing federal law or refuse to aid in enforcement if they so desired.”); Finkelman, The Roots
of Printz, supra note 22, at 1408–09 (concluding that, under Prigg, state officials
could enforce the federal Fugitive Slave Law, but could not be required to do so
by the federal government).
136
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the purpose of enforcing the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause.142
Similarly, although Story noted that a “difference of opinion” existed as to whether state magistrates were required to accept jurisdiction over Fugitive Slave Act cases, the Court entertained no
doubt that state magistrates could exercise such authority if they
chose to do so, “unless prohibited by state legislation.”143
In response to this reasoning in Prigg, some states passed new
legislation that forbade state cooperation with federal enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.144 These “noncooperative” personal liberty laws prohibited the use of state resources—including
jurists, jails, sheriffs, and courtrooms—to recapture alleged fugitive
slaves.145 These personal liberty laws were intended to send a message to the slave states: free state citizens would not voluntarily hunt
down alleged fugitive slaves, forcibly remove them from free state
soil, and send them back into slavery. If the laws were intended to
end southern demands of this nature, however, they failed miserably.146
D.

Northerners Fight for Local Control: The Second Wave of
Personal Liberty Laws
In the years following the Prigg decision, and prior to the passage of a new, more pro-slavery version of the federal Fugitive Slave
Act in 1850, five free states passed personal liberty laws that explicitly forbade cooperation with the federal government with regard to
the rendition of fugitive slaves: Massachusetts (1843),147 Vermont
(1843),148 Connecticut (1844),149 Pennsylvania (1847),150 and
142

Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615–16, 625.
Id. at 622; see also Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1408–
11 (discussing this reasoning in Prigg).
144
See infra notes 147–51; MORRIS, supra note 41, at 118.
145
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, § 2, 1843 Mass. Acts 33, 33. Historian Thomas D. Morris describes these “noncooperative” personal liberty laws
as part of a “containment policy” in the free states. See MORRIS, supra note 41, at
107–29 (discussing the legislative history of these laws).
146
See Rierson, supra note 21, at 813–14 (describing Southern reaction to the
personal liberty laws passed by Northern states after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Prigg).
147
Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33.
148
Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves 11.
149
Act of June 6, 1844, ch. 27, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 33.
150
Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, 1847 Pa. Laws 206.
143
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Rhode Island (1848).151 By enacting these laws, free states attempted to “disassociate themselves from slavery and thereby confine all action to the narrowest limits that would satisfy the Constitution.”152 These laws hindered Southerners’ efforts to reclaim
slaves in these states, at least temporarily, because, at the time, few
federal marshals and even fewer federal jails existed to fill the void
left by the denial of state law enforcement and judicial resources.153
In fact, before 1850, most free states—where fugitive slave disputes
were decided—had but a single federal judge.154
Connecticut passed a personal liberty law explicitly in response
to the Prigg decision.155 In its preamble, Connecticut’s 1844 law repealed two personal liberty laws passed in 1838 and 1839, reasoning
that “it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States . . . that both the duty and the power of legislation on [the]
subject [of fugitive slaves] pertain exclusively to the National Government.”156 The new statute deprived state judicial officers of the
authority to issue a warrant “for the arrest or detention of any person
claimed to be a fugitive from labor or service, as a slave, under the
laws of any other state or country, escaping into this state, or to grant
a certificate of the title of any claimant to the service of any person
so claimed to be a fugitive.”157 The Act specified, however, that it
did not purport to deprive any slaveholder of his Constitutional right

151

Act of Jan. 13, 1848, 1848 R.I. Acts & Resolves 12. Rhode Island amended
this statute in 1854 to clarify that its provisions were still in effect after Congress
passed a new Fugitive Slave Law in 1850. Act of June 14, 1854, 1854 R.I. Acts
& Resolves 22.
152
MORRIS, supra note 41, at 127.
153
See LUBET, supra note 82, at 34 (“At a time when there were few federal
judges and marshals, and virtually no federal jails, the denial of state facilities was
potentially a major impediment to the arrest, detention, and eventual return of
fugitives.”); Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with
Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845, 879 (2011) [hereinafter Finkelman, The Cost of
Compromise] (“With only a few federal courts operating in the country and a similarly small number of federal marshals, masters had to pursue their slaves on their
own or with professional slave catchers.”).
154
Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1403–04.
155
Act of June 6, 1844, ch. 27, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 33.
156
Id. pmbl.
157
Id. § 2.
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to reclaim a fugitive or to prevent any federal judicial officer from
enforcing those rights.158
Massachusetts enacted a non-cooperative personal liberty law in
1843, one year before the Connecticut statute was passed.159 More
than any other state, the Massachusetts law reflected popular sentiment against the federal Fugitive Slave Act, specifically in response
to the well-publicized arrest and trial of fugitive slave George Latimer in Boston.160 After much legal maneuvering in the Massachusetts courts, Latimer was ultimately released to the custody of his
putative owner, James Gray of Virginia.161 However, a group of
prominent Bostonians “bought” Latimer from Gray and thereby prevented his re-enslavement.162 In a letter published in The Liberator,
abolitionist and former slave Frederick Douglass wrote the following in reference to Latimer’s case:
Boston has become the hunting-ground of merciless
men-hunters, and man-stealers. Henceforth we need
not portray to the imagination of northern people, the
flying slave making his way through thick and dark
woods of the South, with white-fanged blood hounds
yelping on his blood-stained track; but refer to the
streets of Boston, made dark and dense by crowds of
professed christians.163
In response to the Latimer case, Massachusetts citizens submitted the “Great Massachusetts Petition” to the state legislature, a document containing over 60,000 signatures.164 The petition requested
the following:

158

Id.
Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33.
160
See id. For a discussion of George Latimer’s arrest and trial under the Fugitive Slave Act and the passage of legislation in response to it, see FONER,
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 111; MORRIS, supra note 41, at 109–
11; LUBET, supra note 82, at 32–34.
161
MORRIS, supra note 41, at 111; LUBET, supra note 82, at 32, 34.
162
MORRIS, supra note 41, at 111; LUBET, supra note 82, at 34.
163
Letter from Frederick Douglass to The Liberator (Nov. 18, 1842), reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 73, at 222, 224–25.
164
MORRIS, supra note 41, at 113; LUBET, supra note 82, at 34.
159
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1. To forbid all persons holding office under any law
of this state from in any way . . . aiding or abetting
the arrest or detention of any person claimed as a fugitive from slavery.
2. To forbid the use of our jails or public property . . .
in the detention of any alleged fugitive from slavery.
3. To propose such amendments to the Constitution
of the United States as shall forever separate the people of Massachusetts from all connection with slavery.165
The first and second objectives of the Petition took the form of
a bill introduced by State Representative Charles Francis Adams
(son of former President John Quincy Adams and grandson of former President John Adams),166 which was signed into law on March
24, 1843, with little debate.167 Like Connecticut, Massachusetts deprived its state judges of the authority to issue certificates or otherwise adjudicate fugitive slave cases.168 Massachusetts went further,
however, and also decreed that “[n]o sheriff, deputy-sheriff, coroner, constable, jailer, or other officer of this Commonwealth” could
arrest, detain, or imprison “in any jail or other building belonging to
this Commonwealth” any person on grounds that such person was

165

Massachusetts Historical Society, The Great Massachusetts Petition,
MASS.
HIST.
SOC’Y
(1842),
http://www.masshist.org/database/viewer.php?item_id=1683&mode=large&img_step=1&; see also MORRIS,
supra note 41, at 113.
166
Adams, Charles Francis, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS, https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=A000032 (last visited April 10, 2020).
167
Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33; MORRIS, supra note 41,
at 112–13 (discussing legislative history).
168
Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, §1, 1843 Mass. Acts 33, 33.
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“claimed as a fugitive slave.”169 Both Vermont170 and Rhode Island171 passed statutes that were essentially identical to Massachusetts’ 1843 personal liberty law, in 1843 and 1848, respectively. As
discussed infra, the 1843 Massachusetts statute was amended and
supplemented in 1855, yielding a more detailed personal liberty law
that pushed even farther at the bounds of the states’ Constitutional
ability to mandate resistance to enforcement of the federal fugitive
slave law within their borders.172
The state that was at the center of the controversy in Prigg—
Pennsylvania—was actually the first state to enact a personal liberty
law that deprived state judges of the authority to hear Fugitive Slave
Act cases.173 Pennsylvania enacted this law in 1820, approximately
twenty years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg.174 The
Act specified that “no alderman or justice of the peace of this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction or take cognizance of the case of
any fugitive from labor from any of the United States or Territories,
under [the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act].”175 However, six years later
Pennsylvania passed a new personal liberty law that detailed the process by which state judges would hear such cases.176 As discussed
supra, the Supreme Court in Prigg struck down Pennsylvania’s
1826 personal liberty law on grounds of federal supremacy.177

169

Id. § 2. The penalty for violating either section 1 or 2 of the Act was a fine
of up to $1,000 or a maximum jail sentence of one year. Id. § 3.
170
Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves 11. Section 3 of
the Act also prohibited a sheriff or other “officer or citizen of this state” from
transporting or removing a fugitive slave “from any place in this state to any other
place within or without” the state of Vermont. Id. § 3. The statute also repealed
Vermont’s earlier personal liberty law, which focused on providing a right to trial
by jury and other procedural protections to alleged fugitive slaves. Id. § 6.
171
Act of Jan. 13, 1848, 1848 R.I. Acts & Resolves 12. The penalties provided
for under the Rhode Island statute were a maximum $500 fine or up to six months
in jail. Id. § 3.
172
See infra notes 259–67 and accompanying text (discussing Act of May 21,
1855, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 917; Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 175, 1858 Mass.
Acts 151).
173
Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, 1820 Pa. Laws 70.
174
See id.; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
175
Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, § 3, 1820 Pa. Laws 70, 70.
176
Act of Apr. 11, 1826, ch. 301, § 5, 1826 Pa. Laws 150, 152.
177
See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 625.
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In 1847, Pennsylvania enacted a new personal liberty law that
repealed the law passed in 1826, attempting to comply with the letter
of the law as explicated by Story in Prigg.178 Section 3 of that law,
which was essentially identical to the same section in the 1820 statute, effectively deprived state judges of jurisdiction to hear Fugitive
Slave Act cases.179 Similar to the personal liberty laws passed by
Massachusetts, Vermont, and later Rhode Island, the Pennsylvania
statute further prohibited use of “any jail or prison of this commonwealth, for the detention of any person claimed as a fugitive from
servitude or labor.”180 The law also prohibited the kidnapping of any
“free negro or mulatto” from the commonwealth of Pennsylvania
for the purpose of selling that person into slavery outside the state.181
It also recognized and reaffirmed state court judges’ authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus, “and to inquire into the causes and
legality of the arrest or imprisonment of any human being within
this commonwealth.”182 Historian Thomas Morris has described
Pennsylvania’s 1847 statute as “an experiment in the possibilities
left open by [Prigg], as well as an effort at containment.”183
The personal liberty laws that were passed in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania aimed to satisfy
the constitutional obligations imposed on states while minimizing
the states’ connection to the institution of slavery. Some states repealed all pre-existing laws that attempted to provide accused fugitives with procedural protections in favor of the non-cooperative approach,184 but others, like Pennsylvania, attempted to maintain some
of these procedural protections even in the wake of Prigg.185 The
viability of these laws was thrown into question when Congress
178

Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, 1847 Pa. Laws 206; Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)

at 625.
179

Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, § 3, 1847 Pa. Laws 206, 207.
Id. § 6. The Act further required any jailer violating this part of the Act to
pay a $500 fine and “be removed from office, and be incapable of holding such
office . . . at any time during his natural life.” Id.
181
Id. §§ 1–2. These sections of the Act were essentially identical to the same
sections of the 1820 Act, except the 1847 statute specifically applied to “free”
negros or mulattos, whereas the word “free” was omitted from the 1820 statute.
Compare id., with Act of Mar. 27, 1820, ch. 73, 1820 Penn. Laws 70.
182
Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, § 5, 1847 Pa. Laws 206, 208.
183
MORRIS, supra note 41, at 118.
184
See, e.g., Act of June 6, 1844, ch. 27, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 33.
185
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 804, 1847 Pa. Laws 206.
180
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passed a law that did not attempt to compromise on the subject of
fugitive slaves, but rather capitulated to Southern demands: the 1850
Fugitive Slave Act.186
E.

The Triumph of Federal Power via the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850
Congress attempted to resolve the federalism issues created by
the Prigg decision and the free states’ response to it when it enacted
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.187 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
was part of the Compromise of 1850, an omnibus agreement that
was intended to (but obviously did not) avert the Civil War, which
broke out about a decade later.188 The Act, like many parts of the
Compromise of 1850, was a concession to the Southern States.189
No part of the Act was designed to protect the rights of black Americans, and it expressly required free state citizens to assist with the
implementation of the federal law and the apprehension of alleged
fugitives found on their soil.190 Historian Eric Foner has described
this statute as “the most robust expansion of federal authority over
the states, and over individual Americans, of the antebellum era.”191
186

See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 41, at 146 (noting key provisions of the
Act); COVER, supra note 20, at 175 (same). The legislative history of the Act is
discussed at MORRIS, supra note 41, at 131–45.
188
Under the Compromise of 1850, Congress: (1) admitted California to the
Union as a free state; (2) prohibited the slave trade in the District of Columbia;
(3) paid ten million dollars to Texas to settle a border dispute with New Mexico;
(4) enacted the Fugitive Slave Act; and (5) organized Utah and New Mexico as
territories without restrictions on slavery. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 75–76 (C. Vann. Woodward ed., 1988) (summarizing key provisions of the Compromise of 1850). For a more in-depth discussion of the Compromise of 1850, see HOLMAN HAMILTON, PROLOGUE TO
CONFLICT: THE CRISIS AND COMPROMISE OF 1850 (2005); see also WILLIAM W.
FREEHLING, 1 THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 1776-1854, at
487–510 (1990).
189
See Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise, supra note 153, at 882 (arguing
that the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act could not “be considered part of a ‘compromise’
because it was so utterly one-sided” in favor of the South); MORRIS, supra note
41, at 146 (observing that the “Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was scarcely a compromise”).
190
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
191
FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 125; see Foner, What
the Fugitive Slave Act Teaches Us, supra note 1 (characterizing the 1850 Fugitive
187
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The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850—which, like the Constitution’s
Fugitive Slave Clause and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, never
uses the word “slave”192—was intended to ensure that the free states
and their citizens did not impede Southern slaveholders’ efforts to
reclaim putative human property on free soil.193 The 1850 Act took
aim at free states’ personal liberty laws, trying to dismantle their
attempts to provide procedural protections to those who were accused of being fugitive slaves.194 The 1850 Act also went further,
legislatively declaring that free state citizens owed a duty to assist
the slave-catchers who pursued fugitives within their states.195 Although the Act attempted to squelch free states’ resistance to slavehunting on their soil, it failed.196 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
ultimately inflamed, rather than ameliorated, the federalism crisis
engendered by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.197
Free-state efforts to provide alleged fugitive slaves with a measure of due process, which had been ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,198 were targeted
Slave Act as “probably the most intrusive intervention by Washington into local
affairs of the entire pre-Civil War period”). See also Gautham Rao, The Federal
Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth Century America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 20–26 (2008) (discussing the incorporation of the federal posse comitatus doctrine into the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850, concluding that the doctrine radically transformed federal power over the
U.S. citizenry).
192
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,
§ 1; Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302. Like the 1793 Act, the statute
adopted in 1850 refers to escaping slaves as “fugitives” or “fugitives from service
or labor.” Compare Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, with Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. Slaveholders are consistently referred to as
“claimants.” Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. The word “slave”
appears nowhere in either Act or in the Constitution.
193
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; see also LUBET, supra
note 82, at 43 (noting that “it was evident from the start that the entire purpose of
the Act was to make it nearly impossible for judicial process to delay the restoration of slaves to claimants”).
194
See LUBET, supra note 82, at 45.
195
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 5–6, 9 Stat. 462, 462–63.
196
See FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 125 (observing that
the Act “could hardly have been designed to arouse greater opposition in the
North”).
197
See Rierson, supra note 21, at 814–22 (discussing the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850 and the role it played in bringing about the Civil War).
198
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842).
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and dismantled by federal law. While the 1793 Act did not guarantee
a jury trial, an appeal, or any other procedural protections, it also did
not explicitly exclude them.199 The 1793 Act also did not specify
acceptable forms of evidence on the issue of slave status, other than
to reference proof “either by oral testimony or affidavit.”200 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was more specific in its denial of procedural protections for those accused of being fugitive slaves. 201 In
defining what constituted “satisfactory proof” of ownership of an
alleged fugitive, the 1850 Act excluded the testimony of the person
accused of being a fugitive slave, which could not be admitted into
evidence.202 The law allowed slave holders to seize and arrest a person suspected to be a fugitive slave in a free state “without process,”
so long as they took the alleged fugitive before a federal commissioner to have his slave status determined in a summary proceeding.203 The federal commissioner’s decision as to the status of an
alleged fugitive was final; appeals were not permitted.204 The law
further provided that, if a commissioner issued a certificate finding
a person to be a fugitive slave, that finding would “prevent all molestation of [the putative owner of the slave] by any process issued
by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.”205
Most courts interpreted this statutory language to prevent use of the
writ of habeas corpus to seek state court review of the legality of a
person’s detention as a fugitive slave.206 The Act contained no statute of limitations.207
To resolve the problems created by a lack of federal manpower
to enforce the federal fugitive slave law, the 1850 Fugitive Slave
199

See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
Id. § 3.
201
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 6–7, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64.
202
Id. § 6.
203
Id.
204
The certificate issued by the commissioner was considered “conclusive” of
the claimant’s right to remove the fugitive “to the State or Territory from which
he escaped.” Id.
205
Id.
206
See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 143–44, 152–54 (discussing legislative history on writ of habeas corpus and the federal fugitive slave law, describing various
court opinions interpreting the fugitive slave law, and noting that the “effect of
the federal law on runaways upon a state habeas corpus” was “one of the most
warmly debated legal and constitutional problems of the decade”).
207
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
200

634

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:598

Act created a new, “national system of law enforcement.”208 The Act
authorized the creation of a new type of federal judicial officer in
the States and Territories: the federal commissioner, one of whom
was to be appointed in every county.209 The Act supplemented the
power of the federal commissioners by authorizing and empowering
them to appoint “any one or more suitable persons” to execute warrants issued under the Act, and further “to summon and call to their
aid the bystanders, or posse comitatus of the proper county, when
necessary to ensure a faithful observance” of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause.210 The Act further commanded “all good citizens” to “aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this
law, whenever their services may be required.”211
From the perspective of citizens residing in the free
states, the section of the Act that compelled their participation was particularly offensive, as it effectively
impressed them into the service of the slaveholder
and thereby metaphorically “enslaved” them as well.
Moreover, it directly and inescapably conflicted with
the laws and social norms of free state society, which
did not embrace complaisance with perpetrating
slavery.212
Anyone who resisted the commands of the Fugitive Slave Act
risked his liberty and the contents of his wallet. Any person who
assisted a runaway slave—by attempting to rescue him, harboring
or concealing him, or by aiding or abetting his escape (either directly
or indirectly)—could be sentenced to a maximum of six months in
prison, forced to pay a maximum $1000 fine, plus an additional
208

Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise, supra note 153, at 879.
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 462, 462. The Act specified that the federal courts “shall from time to time enlarge the number of the
commissioners, with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives
from labor, and to the prompt discharge of the duties imposed by this act.” Id. § 3
210
Id. § 5; see also Rao, supra note 191, at 20–26 (concluding that the incorporation of the federal posse comitatus doctrine into the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850 radically transformed federal power over the U.S. citizenry).
211
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §5, 9 Stat. 462, 463.
212
See Rierson, supra note 21, at 816; see also Rao, supra note 191, at 5 (noting that “a national duty to assist in the recovery of fugitive slaves imposed the
legal norms of slave society on free states”).
209
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thousand dollars in civil damages payable to the claimant.213 If a
federal marshal failed to “obey and execute” a warrant for a fugitive,
he could be fined $1000, payable to the claimant.214 If a marshal had
custody of a fugitive who managed to escape (with or without the
marshal’s assent), the marshal was liable to the claimant for the “full
value of the service or labor” of the fugitive.215 The federal commissioners who administered the Act also had a financial incentive to
find in favor of slaveholders.216 They earned a fee of $10 if they
issued a certificate affirming the claimant’s right to reclaim a fugitive slave; the fee was reduced to $5 if the commissioner found insufficient proof to issue a certificate.217
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 1850
Fugitive Slave Act in Ableman v. Booth, a case arising from a slave
rescue in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1854.218 Sherman M. Booth, the
editor of an abolitionist newspaper in Milwaukee, led the group that
freed Joshua Glover, an enslaved man who fled from Missouri and
ultimately escaped to Canada.219 Booth was charged with violating
the anti-aiding and abetting provisions of the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act.220 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, acting on a writ of habeas
corpus, ordered that Booth be released from custody on the grounds
that the Fugitive Slave Act violated the U.S. Constitution and was

213

Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §5, 9 Stat. 462, 463.
Id. § 5.
215
Id.
216
See id. § 8.
217
Id.
218
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858). For a more complete discussion of the
facts and politics surrounding this case, see generally Earl M. Maltz, Slavery,
Federalism, and the Constitution: Ableman v. Booth and the Struggle over Fugitive Slaves, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 83 (2008); Jeffrey Schmitt, Note, Rethinking
Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315 (2007);
A.J. Beitzinger, Federal Law Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 41 MARQUETTE
L. REV. 7 (1957).
219
Maltz, supra note 218, at 89–90; see also Schmitt, supra note 218, at 1323–
25; Beitzinger, supra note 218, at 10–11.
220
Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 507 (referencing Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464) (imposing liability on any person who aids,
abets or assists a slave who attempts to escape from custody under the Act).
214
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therefore void.221 The case eventually found its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice
Taney, the Court held that “the fugitive slave law is, in all of its
provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United
States.”222 The decision, which has been characterized as a “powerful reassertion of the Supreme Court’s authority over state
courts,”223 reasoned that “no power is more clearly conferred by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, than the power of this
court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising under such
Constitution and laws.”224 Booth reaffirmed the federal courts’ ability to compel enforcement of federal law, even in states where that
law was exceedingly unpopular, like the Fugitive Slave Act in antebellum Wisconsin.
The heavy-handedness of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was undeniable, leading one historian to describe it as “one of the most
draconian laws ever passed by Congress.”225 Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the first persons determined to be a fugitive slave under
the Act, Adam Gibson, was not, in fact, a slave: when Gibson was
presented to his putative owner in Maryland, the slaveholder
acknowledged that Gibson was not the man who had escaped him.226
The vast majority of proceedings instituted under the Act resulted in
the re-enslavement of alleged fugitives; federal commissioners
rarely found that an alleged fugitive slave was, in fact, free.227

221

Id. at 507–08. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the Fugitive Slave Act
to be “unconstitutional and void” on five separate grounds, which are briefly set
forth in its opinion. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 14 (Wis. 1854), rev’d sub nom. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 506; see also Schmitt, supra note 218, at 1330–36
(discussing the opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
222
Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 526.
223
Maltz, supra note 218, at 105.
224
Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 525.
225
Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1416; see FONER,
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 124 (similarly describing the Act as
“draconian”).
226
FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 241–42.
227
Out of 332 total cases brought under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act over a
ten-year period, only eleven alleged fugitives were released from custody on the
grounds that they were free. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS:
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 207 (1970); see also
HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION
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Slave owners’ high rate of success in proceedings instituted under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act perhaps belied the overall ineffectiveness of the law in retrieving slaves who fled North in search of
freedom.228 Although it is impossible to calculate the exact number
of slaves who escaped bondage during the decade between the enactment of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law and the outbreak of the
Civil War in 1861, estimates range from eight to fifteen thousand.229
During this same period, only about three hundred fugitives were
returned to slavery under the auspices of the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act.230 Many factors contributed to the fugitive slaves’ ability to
avoid capture, especially once they were ensconced in free communities.231 Resistance in the free states, both via efforts to work within
the law and in outright defiance of it, was one of them.
1. CONTINUED LEGISLATIVE RESISTANCE IN THE FREE STATES
The free states did not embrace the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.
Although some political and religious leaders in these states initially
counseled citizens to follow the law, regardless of their disdain for
it, resistance grew over time.232 Other events in the nation fed antiOF SLAVERY

412 (1998) (estimating that approximately 98% of prosecutions under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 resulted in the fugitive being returned to slavery).
228
Schmitt, Immigration Enforcement Reform, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that
“[a]lthough the federal government vigorously enforced the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, it was widely perceived to be a failure.”); Foner, What the Fugitive Slave
Act Teaches Us, supra note 1, (“The draconian law of 1850 didn’t stop the steady
flow of runaways from the South.”).
229
CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 168. Research has suggested that the number
of runaway slaves in the South may have been understated, particularly on the eve
of the Civil War. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER,
RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON THE PLANTATION 282 (1999). In 1860 alone, as
many as 50,000 slaves may have fled their masters but did not leave the South.
Id.
230
Out of 332 total cases, about 300 alleged fugitives were either “remanded”
to the South pursuant to a federal court order or were returned to the South “without due process.” CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 207. About thirty alleged fugitives were either found to be free, escaped, or were rescued from federal custody.
Id.
231
See id. at 168–69.
232
See Rierson, supra note 21, at 818–22 (describing the evolution of Northern opinion in relation to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, from grudging acceptance to outright defiance).
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slavery sentiment and increased politicians’ desire and ability to enact personal liberty laws that—at least in certain states—increasingly defied federal law on the subject.233 Most of the personal liberty laws discussed below were adopted after the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.234 The Kansas-Nebraska Act, which
repudiated the Missouri Compromise by repealing the federal ban
on slavery in the Northwest Territories,235 was a concession to
Southerners that generated an “explosion of northern anger” that ultimately “transformed the national party system and renewed the
sectional controversy in all its bitterness.”236 It also generated renewed opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.237 Other social
and political events during the 1850s also contributed to anti-slavery
sentiment in the Northern free states, including the publication of
Uncle Tom’s Cabin in 1852,238 Preston Brooks’ assault on Charles
Sumner in the Senate in 1856,239 and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dred Scott v. Sandford in 1857.240 All of these events influenced

233

See id. at 834 (“Although many white citizens in the free states opposed
slavery in the mid-nineteenth century, few would have accepted the label of ‘abolitionist,’ defined as one who advocated the immediate and total abolition of slavery, even in the southern states.”). Few anti-slavery Northerners wanted to eliminate slavery in the South; instead they were determined to prevent the spread of
slavery to the Territories. Id. at 838. Their objections to the institution of slavery
were primarily founded on a “free labor” philosophy, not a moral critique of the
institution. See id. at 838–44; see also ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 54–58
(1970) (describing reasons for intense Republican opposition to the spread of slavery into the Territories).
234
See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 924.
235
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 14, 10 Stat. 277, 282–83.
236
FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 236; see DAVID M. POTTER,
THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 160–76 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976)
(discussing the legislative history of the Kansas-Nebraska Act).
237
See FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 236 (“Enactment of the
Kansas-Nebraska bill, said one conservative Whig, would mean the ‘complete
nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law.’”) (citation omitted).
238
See infra notes 439–43 and accompanying text.
239
See DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL
WAR 293–96 (1960); see also Rierson, supra note 21, at 826–28.
240
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (holding that Dred Scott was a citizen and therefore the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over his lawsuit); see also Paul
Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L.
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public sentiment towards the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which in
turn inspired numerous states to take legislative action in opposition
to it.241
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 did not attempt to compel the
States to administer it. Rather, the Fugitive Slave Act authorized the
appointment of federal commissioners to enforce its own provisions.242 In 1855, Maine and Michigan passed new laws forbidding
cooperation with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.243 The language
used in Maine’s statute was essentially identical to that contained in
the non-cooperative personal liberty laws passed earlier by Massachusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island.244 As discussed above, these
laws prohibited use of state resources to pursue and capture fugitive
slaves on their soil, primarily (1) the state judiciary; (2) state deputies and other law enforcement officers; and (3) state jails and other
facilities for holding prisoners.245
Other personal liberty laws passed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Congress’s adoption of the 1850
REV. 1, 30–33 (1996) (discussing the impact the Dred Scott decision had on slavery); ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN
SLAVERY 92–98 (2010) (discussing Republican reactions to the Dred Scott decision); Rierson, supra note 21, at 828–32 (discussing the Dred Scott opinion and
the reaction to it in the Northern states).
241
See infra notes 243–69.
242
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 1–2, 9 Stat. 462, 462.
243
See Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch, 182, §§ 1–2, 1855 Me. Laws 207, 207–08;
Act of Nov. 13, 1850, No. 16, §§ 3, 6, 1855 Vt. Acts & Resolves 9, 9–10.
244
Compare Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, 1855 Me. Laws 207, with Act of
Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 69, 1843 Mass. Acts 33, and Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843
Vt. Acts & Resolves 11, and Act of Jan. 13, 1848, 1848 R.I. Acts & Resolves 12.
Maine’s law additionally clarified that it did not permit anyone to “hinder or obstruct” a U.S. marshal or any federal official from enforcing the Fugitive Slave
Law. Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, § 4, 1855 Me. Laws 207, 208.
245
See supra notes 168–172 and accompanying text (discussing personal liberty laws of Massachusetts, Vermont, and Rhode Island). The law passed in Michigan focused solely on law enforcement officers and jails; it did not address the
use of state judicial officers in Fugitive Slave Act cases. Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No.
162, § 5, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413, 414 (“No person arrested and claimed as a
fugitive slave shall be imprisoned in any jail or other prison in this State . . . .”);
Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 163, § 1, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 415, 415 (“[N]othing in
this [statute] . . . shall be construed to authorize or require any sheriff or other
officer to receive into or detain . . . in any of said jails or other public buildings,
any person claimed as a fugitive slave . . . .”).
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Fugitive Slave Act appeared to either ignore or narrowly interpret
these federal authorities.246 These personal liberty laws focused
again on extending procedural protections to those who were accused of being fugitive slaves.247 Some states, like Michigan, passed
such laws in concert with the non-cooperative personal liberty laws
described above.248 Michigan’s statute, passed in 1855, guaranteed
a person accused of being a fugitive slave the right to seek review
of detention decisions via the writ of habeas corpus and a jury
trial.249 Vermont, which had repealed its statute guaranteeing procedural protections to alleged fugitives in 1840 (in the same statute
that mandated non-cooperation with the federal government),250 reinstated some of these procedural protections in 1850, including the
writ of habeas corpus and the right to a trial by jury.251
Other statutes passed in the 1850’s granted further procedural
protections that directly contravened the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act,252
which required commissioners to “hear and determine” fugitive
slave cases “in a summary manner; and upon satisfactory proof being made, by deposition or affidavit.”253 Connecticut, Vermont,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin passed laws mandating that testimony by deposition could not be offered at a trial regarding a person’s slave status.254 These same states, along with Michigan, also
required that any declaration offered to establish a person’s enslavement required the support of the testimony of “at least two credible

246
247

See, e.g., Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, 1855 Me. Laws 207.
See, e.g., Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, §§ 3–4, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413,

414.
248

Id.
Id.
250
Act of Nov. 1, 1843, No. 15, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves 11.
251
Act of Nov. 13, 1850, No. 16, §§ 3, 6, 1850 Vt. Acts & Resolves 9, 9–10.
252
See, e.g., Act of Mar. 17, 1855, ch. 182, 1855 Me. Laws 207.
253
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64.
254
Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 4, 1854 Conn. Pub. Acts 80, 81; Act of Nov.
14, 1854, No. 52, § 3, 1854 Vt. Acts & Resolves 51, 52; Act of May 21, 1855, ch.
489, § 6, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 925–26; Act of Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 9, 1857
Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 14.
249
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witnesses.”255 Some states also specified that giving false testimony
as to a person’s slave status was a criminal offense.256
Some personal liberty laws attempted to ensure that those accused of being fugitive slaves had meaningful access to the courts
in that state.257 Over a hundred years before the Supreme Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to provide indigent
criminal defendants with access to counsel,258 New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin passed laws instructing state officials, typically a prosecutor, to provide free legal representation to
persons accused of being runaway slaves.259 New York and Vermont also statutorily mandated that alleged fugitive slaves could
subpoena witnesses free of charge.260 By passing these laws, states
recognized that without legal counsel and meaningful access to

255
Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 2, 1854 Conn. Pub. Acts 80, 80; Act of Nov.
14, 1854, No. 52, § 2, 1854 Vt. Acts & Resolves 51, 52; Act of May 21, 1855, ch.
489, § 6, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 925–26; Act of Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 8, 1857
Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 13–14; Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 8, 1855 Mich. Pub.
Acts 413, 414–15.
256
See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1854, ch. 65, § 1, 1854 Conn. Pub. Acts 80, 80
(imposing criminal penalties on anyone “who shall falsely and maliciously declare, represent or pretend, that any free person” is a slave, “with intent to procure
or to aid or assist in procuring the forcible removal of such free person from this
State as a slave”); Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 162, § 6, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 413,
414 (same); Act of Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 7, 1857 Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 13 (same).
257
See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, § 17, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 928.
258
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (holding that indigent
criminal defendants charged with serious crimes are entitled to legal representation in state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment).
259
Act of May 6, 1840, ch, 225, § 9, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 175–76 (providing
that the County district attorney must “render his advice and professional services” to alleged fugitive slaves, and “shall attend in his behalf on the trial of such
claim”; attorney fees were paid by the county); Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489,
§ 17, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 928 (requiring the governor to appoint, in every
county, a commissioner who would “diligently and faithfully . . . use all lawful
means to protect, defend, and secure to [alleged fugitive slaves] a fair and impartial trial by jury”); Act of Feb. 13, 1855, No. 163, § 1, 1855 Mich. Pub. Acts 415,
415; (requiring prosecuting attorneys to “diligently and faithfully . . . use all lawful means to protect and defend” any inhabitant of their respective counties who
is “arrested or claimed as a fugitive slave”); Act Feb. 23, 1857, ch. 8, § 2, 1857
Wis. Sess. Laws 12, 12 (same).
260
See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1840, ch, 225, § 10, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 176; Act
of Oct. 29, 1840, No. 8, § 7, 1840 Vt. Acts & Resolves 13, 14.
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courts, black citizens accused of being fugitive slaves stood no
chance of preserving their freedom.
The personal liberty law that went the farthest in terms of punishing those who assisted with enforcement of the Fugitive Slave
Act was adopted by Massachusetts in 1855261 over the veto of Governor Henry Gardner, a member of the Know-Nothing Party.262 Its
most controversial provisions were repealed in 1858.263 The law
passed in 1855 forbade any person “holding any office of honor,
trust, or emolument, under the laws of this Commonwealth” from
serving a warrant or issuing a certificate to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Act.264 Anyone who violated this provision was deemed to
have resigned his office, and was “forever thereafter ineligible to
[hold] any office of trust, honor or emolument” in the state. 265 Any
judge who acted as a federal commissioner in a Fugitive Slave Act
case could be impeached.266 Any lawyer who represented a claimant/slaveholder in a Fugitive Slave Act case could no longer appear
in the courts of the Commonwealth.267 Any law enforcement officer
who arrested or detained an alleged fugitive slave was subject to a
$1000 to $2000 fine and required to serve one to two years in state
prison.268 Three years later, these controversial provisions were either repealed or amended to clarify that punishment would not apply
to acts of “military obedience and subordination.”269
These non-cooperative personal liberty laws sought to fill the
space left by the Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg and to minimize
free states’ participation in the system of slavery that permeated the
South. Many states also sought to legislatively enhance due process
in fugitive slave rendition, despite the Supreme Court’s instruction
that such laws were invalid on grounds of federal preemption. Ultimately, these efforts were not effective in protecting individuals
who were arrested and charged under the Fugitive Slave Acts, only
a tiny fraction of whom were found to be free. Defiance of the law,
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, 1855 Mass. Acts 924.
See MORRIS, supra note 41, at 168–71.
Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 175, 1858 Mass. Acts 151.
Act of May 21, 1855, ch. 489, § 9, 1855 Mass. Acts 924, 926.
Id. § 10.
Id. § 12.
Id. § 11.
Id. § 15.
Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 175, 1858 Mass. Acts 151.
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rather than attempts to reform it, secured freedom on behalf of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals, very few of whom were ever
prosecuted under the Fugitive Slave Acts.
2. SLAVE RESCUES AND JURY NULLIFICATION
The personal liberty laws described above represented just one
form of resistance to the activity of “slave catching” in the free
states. Some citizens, who answered to a “higher law” than the Fugitive Slave Acts, actively sought to thwart slaveholders who attempted to capture former slaves living on free soil. Prosecutors who
sought to convict these abolitionists for violating the Fugitive Slave
Acts, or for more serious crimes, often faced juries who refused to
convict. These well-publicized clashes among slave catchers, fugitive slaves, and abolitionists eroded public support for the Fugitive
Slave Acts in the free states, especially after 1850. As the cost of the
law’s enforcement grew, so did its repugnance in the eyes of northern citizens.
During the antebellum era, some opponents of slavery denied
that they owed any duty to slaveholders, under either the Constitution or federal law, on the grounds that they were bound by a “higher
law” that did not recognize slavery. This philosophy was famously
articulated by New York Senator William Seward, who proclaimed
the following on the floor of the Senate during debates regarding the
status of slavery in the proposed new state of California:
the Constitution devotes the domain [of the territories] to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare, and
to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The
territory is a part . . . of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the Universe.270

270
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1446 (1850) (emphasis added); see
also DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 146–48 (2005) (discussing Seward’s speech); FONER,
GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 87 (noting Lincoln’s rejection of the
“higher law” doctrine). References to a “higher law” were also part of the rhetoric
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Although Seward did not urge defiance of federal law in this
speech, others did. Defense attorney Albert Riddle unapologetically
espoused allegiance to the “higher law” in court, in a legal proceeding stemming from an incident known as the Oberlin-Wellington
rescue.271 Although thirty-seven indictments for violations of the
Fugitive Slave Act were obtained in this case, most of the indictments were abandoned, and only two individuals were convicted.272
In defending the men who assisted fugitive slave John Price in his
escape to freedom,273 Riddle declared himself a “votary” of the
“Higher Law,” arguing, “Right, and its everlasting opposite, Wrong,
existed anterior to the feeble enactments of men, and will survive
their final repeal . . . they are such unchanged and unqualified by
your acts of Congress, and statutes of your Legislatures.”274 Riddle
encouraged the jury to reward rather than convict Price’s rescuers,
who had “follow[ed] the path of conscience” and “obeyed the laws
of God.”275 After his conviction, defendant Charles Langston, a free
black man, also eloquently embraced the higher law when he spoke
to the court, arguing that his actions were honorable and right, “no
matter what the laws might [be].”276
The Oberlin-Wellington rescue was but one example of the
clashes that arose among slaveholders, federal authorities, and
of the American Revolution. Hamilton eloquently espoused this view: “The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or
musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human
nature, by the hand of the divinity itself and can never be erased or obscured by
mortal power.” Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, &c., [23 February]
1775, NAT’L ARCHIVES FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0057.
271
See LUBET, supra note 82, at 267–68; see also NAT BRANDT, THE TOWN
THAT STARTED THE CIVIL WAR 89–111 (1990) (discussing Price slave rescue and
resistance to slavery in Oberlin, Ohio); Villarruel, supra note 6, at 1437–39
(same).
272
FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 239.
273
With the help of Langston and others, Price escaped slavery and fled to
Canada. LUBET, supra note 82, at 246–47.
274
Id. at 267.
275
Id. at 267–68.
276
Charles Langston’s Speech at the Cuyahoga County Courthouse,
ELECTRONIC OBERLIN GROUP, http://www2.oberlin.edu/external/EOG/OberlinWellington_Rescue/c._langston_speech.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). Charles
Langston’s grandson was the acclaimed poet Langston Hughes. See FAITH
BERRY, LANGSTON HUGHES, BEFORE AND BEYOND HARLEM 2 (1992).
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northern citizens when abolitionists attempted to physically block
enforcement of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law in their states (with
varying degrees of success). Many of the most well publicized slave
rescues occurred in Massachusetts. Early attempts to enforce this
federal law in Boston were unsuccessful: William and Ellen Craft,
prominent Boston abolitionists who had fled slavery in Georgia,
evaded slavecatchers just weeks after passage of the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Law.277 The Crafts ultimately settled in England, where they
continued to protest slavery.278 Shadrach Minkins, a former Virginia
slave who worked as a waiter at a Boston coffee shop, evaded attempts to re-enslave him when members of the black community
forcibly removed him from the federal courtroom in Boston and then
hid him so that he could escape to Canada.279 Although ten defendants were criminally charged in Minkins’ escape (three white and
seven black men), none were convicted.280 Another former slave
from Georgia, Thomas Sims, was not so fortunate. Sims was seized
on April 3, 1851, and tried before federal commissioner George
Ticknor Curtis in Boston.281 Ultimately, in spite of much legal maneuvering by the anti-slavery bar, Curtis issued a certificate authorizing Sims’ return to slavery in Savannah, Georgia.282 To avoid another escape and to ensure successful enforcement of the federal
law, a heavy chain was placed around the Boston courthouse. 283
Sims was marched from the federal courthouse to a south-bound
ship at 4:00 AM, escorted by three hundred armed men.284 Sims’

277

See LUBET, supra note 82, at 267–68.
Id. at 47–49, 134–35.
279
See id. at 137–41.
280
See id. at 141–46.
281
Id. at 147–48; CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 117–21 (discussing Sims’s
arrest and rendition to slavery).
282
See LUBET, supra note 82, at 149–55. After he was forced to return to
Georgia, Sims was jailed and ultimately sold to a brick mason in Vicksburg, Mississippi, from whom he escaped in 1863, during the Civil War. CAMPBELL, supra
note 227, at 120.
283
See LUBET, supra note 82, at 149–49; see also COVER, supra note 20, at
176 (noting that an abolitionist newspaper, The Liberator, proclaimed, “Justice in
Chains.”)
284
See LUBET, supra note 82, at 155; see also FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE,
supra note 34, at 234.
278
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rendition to slavery cost the federal government approximately
$20,000.285
The arrest and rendition of another fugitive slave in Boston, Anthony Burns, further aroused public sentiment against slavery in the
Northeast.286 After Burns’ arrest, a mob stormed the courthouse in a
violent, yet ultimately futile, attempt to free him.287 During the attempt to free Burns from federal custody, a U.S. Marshal was
killed.288 An estimated crowd of 10,000 people subsequently gathered around the courthouse for the trial.289 After Burns was convicted of being a fugitive slave, federal troops marched him to the
harbor through the streets of Boston, which were draped in black. 290
The federal power displayed in Boston on behalf of the Southern
slaveholder who claimed to own Anthony Burns was even more
“formidable and costly” than in the Sims case.291 American flags
were hung at half-mast and a coffin labeled “The Funeral of Liberty” was displayed over State Street.292 At an antislavery rally held
at Faneuil Hall in Boston soon after Burns was returned to slavery
285

See LUBET, supra note 82, at 155; see also FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE,
supra note 34, at 234. In an apparent reference to the arrest and rendition of
Thomas Sims, Maine Republican John Perry remarked on the House floor in 1860
that the “Boston court-house has been put in chains, and the peaceable people of
that State kept out of the temple of justice by Federal bayonets, and the Treasury
of the United States robbed of its thousands and tens of thousands to pay the bills
for returning a fugitive slave.” CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1036
(1860). Perry’s point in making this observation was to demonstrate that Northern
citizens had enforced the Fugitive Slave Law, despite the heavy burden of doing
so, in response to Southern claims that they had failed to uphold their Constitutional duty in this respect. See id. at 1035 (“[Y]ou charge us with numerous derelictions in duty [under the Constitution]; we charge them back upon you.”).
286
See CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 124–32 (discussing arrest, trial, and rendition of Anthony Burns); LUBET, supra note 82, at 159–67 (same); see generally
ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS: FREEDOM AND
SLAVERY IN EMERSON’S BOSTON (1998); JANE H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE,
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW AND ANTHONY BURNS: A PROBLEM IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 43 (1975); Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves, supra
note 97.
287
CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 126.
288
Id. at 127.
289
Id. at 128.
290
Id. at 129.
291
FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 237.
292
Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1795
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in Virginia, abolitionist Wendell Phillips said, “Nebraska I call
knocking a man down, and this [the arrest and extradition of Anthony Burns] is spitting in his face after he is down.”293 Despite attempts to prosecute those who were involved in the rioting and in
the death of the marshal during Anthony Burns’ arrest, trial, and return to slavery, no one was convicted.294
The need for federal intervention to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Law was not isolated to Boston. One of the most violent confrontations between the federal authorities and abolitionists occurred in
Christiana, Pennsylvania, on September 11, 1851, soon after the
passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law.295 A Maryland slaveholder,
Edward Gorsuch, his relatives, and a deputy marshal attempted to
reclaim two alleged fugitive slaves from the home of a free black
person, William Parker.296 A group of black men armed with guns
and clubs assembled at Parker’s home, and they refused to surrender
the alleged fugitives.297 Shooting ensued, leaving Gorsuch and three
black men dead, with several others injured.298 President Millard
Filmore sent the Marines and federal marshals to arrest those responsible.299 A federal grand jury indicted thirty-six blacks and five
whites for violating the Fugitive Slave Act and for treason; however,
no one was convicted.300
These incidents, in conjunction with political developments—
chief among them the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act—both
molded and mirrored public opinion in the free states regarding slavery. Resistance to the institution of slavery, at least as to Southerners’ attempts to capture and enslave (or re-enslave) those living on
free soil, was thus not significantly impeded by the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Act, but ultimately encouraged by it.
293
FEHRENBACHER & MCAFEE, supra note 34, at 237. Phillips’ reference to
Nebraska alluded to passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.
294
Id.
295
See CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 151–53; LUBET, supra note 82, at 51–
52; see generally THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, BLOODY DAWN: THE CHRISTIANA RIOT
AND RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (1991) (detailing the events
leading up to, during, and after the Christiana Riot).
296
CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 151.
297
Id. at 152; see also LUBET, supra note 84, at 52.
298
CAMPBELL, supra note 227, at 152.
299
FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39, at 146.
300
Id.
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II.

FUGITIVE SLAVES AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: THE
PRESENT ECHOES THE PAST
In many ways, the modern conflict between federal immigration
laws and state sanctuary policies echoes the crisis of federalism engendered by the clash between the Fugitive Slave Acts and state personal liberty laws. In each case, the federal government has enacted
laws or enforced laws in ways that deviate from the mores of individual citizens (at least those living in certain states). Both then and
now, some states have enacted laws that attempt to reflect and protect the values of the people living within their borders. The extent
to which these state and federal laws can peacefully co-exist presents a thorny legal and ethical issue today, just as it did approximately 150 years ago.
A.

The Higher Law Fuels Resistance to Federal Enforcement
on Moral Grounds
A law that deviates sharply from the beliefs and mores of the
citizens it purports to regulate has lost its moral legitimacy, and thus
some people will defy it.301 This phenomenon played out in the antebellum era, as many Northern citizens were confronted with a federal Fugitive Slave Law that opened their borders to the institution
of slavery, undermining their core values with respect to freedom
and humanity. In the modern era, many citizens similarly believe
that federal immigration laws are being enforced in ways that are
inhumane and destructive to fundamental notions of human dignity.
In both contexts, some of those who perceive the applicable federal
law as immoral or unjust will reject the law and refuse to follow it.302
301
Rierson, supra note 25, at 768 (observing that “the greater the disparity
between the conduct demanded by law and the underlying social norm, the greater
the possibility that the governed will reject or rebel against the law and, consequently, that the law will have limited effectiveness.”); see also ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137–47
(1991) (arguing that “legal centralism,” the primacy of law in shaping human behavior, has been overstated); see generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs.
Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
302
See generally Villarruel, supra note 6; Pamela Begaj, Comment, An Analysis of Historical and Legal Sanctuary and a Cohesive Approach to the Current
Movement, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135 (2008). See also BRANDT, supra note
271, at xiii (comparing the abolitionist community in Oberlin, Ohio to the Sanctuary movement of the 1980’s). Similar networks of individuals willing to defy
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If the underlying law is unjust, the argument then goes, good citizens
should not support it and are not morally bound to follow or enforce
the law.303
The federal laws at issue in the context of both immigration and
slavery expressly anticipate and forbid resistance to their enforcement. As discussed above, anyone who assisted in the escape of a
runaway slave could be imprisoned and/or forced to pay a significant fine under either the 1793 or 1850 version of the Fugitive Slave
Act. The 1793 Act imposed a $500 fine on anyone who “knowingly
and willingly” obstructed or hindered attempts to seize and arrest a
fugitive slave or who concealed or harbored a known fugitive
slave.304 The 1850 Act went farther, both in terms of prohibited conduct and its penalties.305 It contained the same language noted above
from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793;306 in addition, it imposed liability on anyone who rescued or attempted to rescue a fugitive slave,
or who aided, abetted, or assisted in the escape of a fugitive slave,
either “directly or indirectly.” 307 A person who violated these provisions risked six months imprisonment and up to $1000 in fines and
civil penalties.308
Modern immigration law echoes the Fugitive Slave Acts with
regard to the harboring or concealment of those the law targets for
exclusion. The anti-harboring provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) impose criminal penalties on anyone who
knowingly “conceals, harbors, or shields from detection” an alien
who “has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law,” or attempts to do so.309 To prove a violation of the
INA’s harboring provisions, the government must show
unjust laws existed in Europe during World War II, saving thousands of Jews from
death during the Holocaust. See LINDA RABBEN, SANCTUARY AND ASYLUM: A
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 108–21 (2016).
303
See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and
the Value of ‘Justice Delayed,’ 78 IOWA L. REV. 89, 89 (1992) (noting that “[i]f
the law itself is unjust, then its enforcement may be equally unjust.”).
304
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 302, 305.
305
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
306
Compare Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, with Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
307
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462, 464.
308
Id.
309
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).
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(1) the alien entered or remained in the United States
in violation of the law, (2) the defendant concealed,
harbored or sheltered the alien in the United States,
(3) the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that
the alien entered or remained in the United States in
violation of the law, and (4) the defendant’s conduct
tended to substantially facilitate the alien remaining
in the United States illegally.310
Violation of these provisions constitutes a felony, punishable by
a fine and up to five years imprisonment.311 The individuals who
violate these laws generally do so intentionally—and sometimes
openly—because they reject the law’s legitimacy.312
Abolitionists who shepherded former slaves to freedom during
the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, like Harriet Tubman and Frederick Douglass, made no pretense of obeying the Fugitive Slave Laws or any other statutory authority that sanctioned
slavery.313 As discussed above, well-publicized incidents such as the
freeing of Shadrach Minkins in Boston, the Oberlin-Wellington
Rescue, and the violent confrontation at Christiana, Pennsylvania,
demonstrated that some opponents of slavery were willing to openly
defy state and federal laws with respect to slavery and fugitive
slaves.314 Sometimes referred to as the Underground Railroad, the
collection of people who chose to violate the Fugitive Slave Acts in
310

United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also
John Medeiros & Philip Steger, Sanctuary and Harboring in Trump’s America,
44 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 869, 885–900 (2018) (discussing the definition
of “harboring” under INA).
311
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii). The penalties significantly increase if aliens
are harbored for private financial gain (up to ten years imprisonment), or if serious
bodily injury occurs as a result of the defendant’s conduct (up to twenty years
imprisonment). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii). If a person is killed as a result
of defendant’s conduct in violation of the statute, the defendant may be subject to
the death penalty or life in prison. 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(B)(iv).
312
See, e.g., Lorne Matalon, Extending ‘Zero Tolerance’ to People Who Help
Migrants Along the Border, NPR (May 28, 2019, 4:22 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/05/28/725716169/extending-zero-tolerance-to-people-who-help-migrants-along-the-border.
313
See generally FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM, supra note 39.
314
See supra Section I.E.2.
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favor of allegiance to God’s “higher law” risked prosecution and
imprisonment. In some communities, the broader populace shared
these beliefs, as evidenced by numerous examples of jury nullification in such cases.315
Willingness to defy an unjust law—also known as civil disobedience—is also part and parcel of the state/federal conflict embedded in modern immigration law. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present in the Trump era, defiance of federal immigration
law, especially in religious communities, reflects the judgment of
those communities that these laws are immoral and unjust, just as
similar communities rejected the laws of slavery and the Fugitive
Slave Acts over 150 years ago. As federal immigration law has
waxed and waned in its enforcement severity, it has to varying degrees conflicted with the mores of the people who live in the states
where the laws are being enforced. For example, the Sanctuary
Movement in the United States relies on “God’s law” to justify offering shelter and support to immigrants who may face death or persecution if they are deported. Like the slave rescuers, these individuals, who are often religious leaders, risk and have faced criminal
prosecution.
The most well-documented immigration sanctuary movement in
the United States arose during the 1980s. Like the conductors on the
Underground Railroad, the leaders of this movement spurned federal laws they deemed to be fundamentally unfair and sinful.316 The
Sanctuary Movement arose from the Reagan administration’s treatment of immigrants from Central America, primarily El Salvador

315

See supra notes 272, 280, 294, & 285 and accompanying text.
See Valerie J. Munson, On Holy Ground: Church Sanctuary in the Trump
Era, 47 SOUTHWESTERN L. REV. 49, 52–53 (2017); Begaj, supra note 302, at 141–
45; Michael Scott Feeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented
in the American Context, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 819–24 (1990); Villarruel,
supra note 6, at 1433–35. A leader of the movement, Pastor John Fife, explained,
We believe that justice and mercy require that people of conscience actively assert our God-given right to aid anyone fleeing from persecution and murder. The current administration of
the United States law prohibits us from sheltering these refugees from Central America. Therefore we believe that administration of the law is immoral as well as illegal.
Arthur Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States
Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 493, 502 (1986).
316
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and Guatemala.317 During this time period, the United States largely
refused to grant asylum to individuals fleeing these countries.318 Out
of approximately 5500 applications for asylum submitted by Salvadorans in 1981 and 1982, the United States granted two.319 As advocates began to realize that individuals fleeing these countries
could not obtain safe haven in the United States through asylum procedures administered by the INS, they adopted a new strategy of
evading immigration laws rather than adhering to them.320 By the
mid-1980s, approximately five hundred churches and synagogues
across the country had declared themselves sanctuaries for Central
Americans seeking refuge in the United States.321 These religious
havens sought to provide “physical and spiritual assistance” to Central American refugees, and often placed them with sponsoring congregations to ease their transition to life in the United States.322
The federal government’s tolerance of the church-led sanctuary
movement ended in 1984, when federal prosecutors conducted an

317

Munson, supra note 316, at 52; Begaj, supra note 302, at 141–45; Feeley,
supra note 316, at 819–21; Villarruel, supra note 6, at 1433–34.
318
Begaj, supra note 302, at 145 (describing the Sanctuary Movement as a
“‘dramatic response to the refusal of the United States Government to grant legal
sanctuary, or asylum’ to immigrants facing deportation.”) (citation omitted); Feeley, supra note 316, at 820 (noting that “[i]n spite of an energetic legal advocacy
program, the INS deported Salvadorans and Guatemalans in droves” during the
early 1980’s).
319
Feeley, supra note 316, at 817, 820 (comparing Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum approval rates in 1983 and 1985, ranging from one percent to three
percent, with much higher rates for applicants from other countries); Medeiros &
Steger, supra note 310, at 877–78 (citing similar statistics).
320
See Feeley, supra note 316, at 820; see also Medeiros & Steger, supra note
310, at 878–79 (noting that the movement “transitioned from working within the
law to exploring more options that posed higher legal risks” after discovering that
its efforts to secure asylum were “futile”).
321
Munson, supra note 316, at 53; see also Feeley, supra note 316, at 820
(noting that “several hundred churches [had] openly declared themselves sanctuaries”); Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 880 (noting that “[b]y the fall of
1983, the number of sanctuary sites throughout America rose to almost 70, and
by the summer of 1984 grew to more than 150, with thousands of individuals
committed to the movement”)
322
Feeley, supra note 316, at 820; see also Munson, supra note 316, at 52–53
(noting that sanctuaries provided lodging to refugees and “aided them in obtaining
medical, legal, and other needed services.”); Helton, supra note 316, at 493.
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undercover sting ironically named “Operation Sojourner,”323 referencing the former slave and conductor on the Underground Railroad, Sojourner Truth.324 Operation Sojourner employed four undercover agents to infiltrate church congregations, where they surreptitiously gathered evidence.325 As a result, several religious leaders
(including Catholic priests, a nun, and a Presbyterian minister) were
arrested, indicted, and ultimately convicted of violating INA’s antiharboring provisions.326
In upholding these convictions, the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Aguilar described the sanctuary movement as “a modernday underground railroad that smuggled Central American natives
across the Mexican border with Arizona.”327 In this case, which the
prosecutor dubbed the “death knell of the Sanctuary Movement,”328
the Ninth Circuit refused to allow the defendants to argue that they
had not “knowingly” violated federal immigration law because they
honestly believed that the aliens they were assisting were legally entitled to remain in the United States.329 Specifically, the defendants
argued that they believed these individuals qualified as refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980330 due to the individuals’ well-founded
fear of persecution in their home countries.331 The Ninth Circuit determined that to allow such a defense would essentially “put Reagan
Administration foreign policy on trial” in the context of the criminal
case.332 The court also rejected the argument that the defendants’
activities were protected as religious exercise under the First

323

Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 882; Feeley, supra note 316, at 821.
Sojourner Truth was a former slave from New York who settled in Battle
Creek, Michigan, in 1857, where she assisted runaway slaves on the Underground
Railroad. See generally SOJOURNER TRUTH, NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER TRUTH,
A NORTHERN SLAVE (1850).
325
Feeley, supra note 316, at 821; see also Medeiros & Steger, supra note
310, at 882.
326
Feeley, supra note 316, at 821–22; see also United States v. Aguilar, 883
F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
327
Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 666.
328
Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 882.
329
Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 673.
330
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982).
331
See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 673–76.
332
Id. at 673.
324
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Amendment.333 The jury convicted all of the defendants, who were
then sentenced to probation and did not serve jail time.334
Although more recent examples of religious sanctuary have not
had the same level of impact as the widespread movement of the
1980s, they do still exist.335 In fact, the number of places of worship
acting as immigration sanctuaries has more than doubled since the

333
Id. at 684–85. But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682,
719–26 (2014)) (holding that a contraception mandate would violate a corporation’s right to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §2000(b)(b), enacted 1993); Elizabeth Brown & Inara
Scott, Sanctuary Corporations: Should Liberal Corporations Get Religion?, 20
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, 1121–38 (2018) (arguing for a corporate right to offer
sanctuary under the RFRA).
334
Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 667.
335
See, e.g., Stephanie McCrummen, A Sanctuary of One, WASH. POST (Mar.
31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp
/2018/03/31/feature/after-30-years-in-america-she-was-about-to-be-deportedthen-a-tiny-colorado-church-offered-her-sanctuary/ (describing one woman’s decision to seek sanctuary from deportation by living in a small Colorado church);
see also Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal Sanctuary to Undocumented
Immigrants?, CNN (Feb. 17, 2017) (discussing the growing number of churches
willing to provide sanctuary to undocumented immigrants in the Trump era); Laurie Goodstein, Houses of Worship Poised to Serve as Trump-Era Immigrant Sanctuaries,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/us/houses-of-worship-poised-to-serve-as-trump-era-immigrant-sanctuaries.html. (same). One website, action.groundswell-mvmt.org,
has collected over 40,000 signatures through various campaigns, supporting a resurgent sanctuary movement. Sanctuary Movement, GROUNDSWELL, https://action.groundswell-mvmt.org/efforts/sanctuary2014?page=2 (last visited Mar. 15,
2020). It describes its mission as follows:
Calling upon the ancient traditions of our faiths, which recognized houses of worship as a refuge for the runaway slave, the
conscientious objector, and the Central American refugee fleeing the civil wars of the 1980s, Sanctuary is once again growing
among communities of faith that are standing in solidarity with
immigrants and marginalized communities facing immoral and
unjust deportation and discrimination policies.
Id. The religious sanctuary phenomenon is not limited to the United States. See,
e.g., Richard Perez-Pena, 5 Weeks and Counting: Dutch Church Holds Worship
Marathon to Protect Migrant Family, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/bethel-church-netherlandsdeportation.html (describing the efforts of one Dutch church to prevent the deportation of an Armenian family who was denied asylum in that country).
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inauguration of President Trump.336 The federal government has not
aggressively cracked down on these efforts to provide safe harbor
within the confines of houses of worship, most likely because of the
negative publicity that would almost certainly accompany Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) raids on churches and synagogues.337 Recently, however, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has attempted to coerce self-deportation by issuing
hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines to immigrants seeking
sanctuary in houses of worship for “willfully” remaining in the
United States and having “connived or conspired” to avoid deportation.338
The Trump administration has aggressively prosecuted individuals whom it perceives to have impeded enforcement of federal immigration laws. In April 2017, Trump’s then-attorney general, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions,339 issued a memorandum to all federal
prosecutors instructing them to prioritize cases under the anti-harboring provisions of the INA.340 In fiscal year 2018, more than 4500
336

Medeiros & Steger, supra note 310, at 872 (“In response to the President’s
hard line stance on immigration, many American churches and other places of
worship have declared themselves sanctuaries, or safe havens, for undocumented
and other vulnerable immigrants.”); see also Brown & Scott, supra note 333, at
1102–03 (noting that, as a result of President Trump’s immigration policies, a
growing number of institutions have begun to offer “support and refuge” to an
“increasingly vulnerable immigrant population”).
337
The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) avoids
arresting individuals at “sensitive locations” like a church. Hanna, supra note 335.
Immigration law professor Stephen Yale-Loehr suggests that ICE “does not like
to go into churches,” for “publicity reasons.” Id.
338
Maria Sacchetti, Trump Administration Threatens Hefty Fines on Immigrants Who Elude Deportation, WASH. POST (July 2, 2019, 2:27 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administration-threatenshefty-fines-on-immigrants-who-elude-deportation/2019/07/02/956e2334-9cc211e9-9ed4-c9089972ad5a_story.html.
339
Attorney General Jeff Sessions resigned at the request of President Trump
in November 2018. See Devil Barrett et al., Jeff Sessions Forced Out as Attorney
General, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-resigns-attrumps-request/2018/11/07/d1b7a214-e144-11e8-ab2cb31dcd53ca6b_story.html.
340
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jeffrey Sessions to All Federal Prosecutors About Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr.
17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download.
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people were charged with violating this section of the statute, a more
than 30% increase since 2015.341
The government has also taken an increasingly broad view of
what constitutes “harboring” an alien, filing criminal charges
against individuals who have provided food and water to migrants
in southern border crossing areas. Many border regions are harsh
deserts, and, since 2001, thousands have died here as they attempted
to cross the border into the United States.342 A spokesperson for the
humanitarian aid group No Más Muertes, or No More Deaths, has
decried the government’s recent “criminalization of humanitarian
aid work.”343
The government has criminally charged multiple members of No
Más Muertes for illegally entering federally protected land—a necessary action for the members to assist migrants in remote desert
areas.344 For example, in August 2017, four members of the group
were charged with misdemeanors for leaving canned food and water
jugs in a federal refuge frequented by migrants.345 A federal magistrate judge convicted them in January 2019, finding that the women
had violated “the national decision to maintain the Refuge in its pristine nature.”346 However, in February of 2020, United States District
Judge Rosemary Márquez reversed the convictions on the basis that
the defendants’ actions were protected under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).347 The RFRA was enacted in 1993, four
years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Aguilar, which rejected a

341

Matalon, supra note 312.
Id.
343
Asher Stockler, As Trump’s DOJ Prosecutes Aid Worker, Humanitarian
Groups Promise Continued Support for Migrants, NEWSWEEK (May 29, 2019,
5:10 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/work-continues-humanitarian-groupsvow-support-migrants-doj-prosecutes-aid-1438793.
344
See Matalon, supra note 312.
345
Kristine Phillips, They Left Food and Water for Migrants in the Desert.
Now They Might Go to Prison, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2019, 2:52 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/01/20/they-left-food-water-migrants-desert-now-they-might-go-prison/.
346
Id.
347
United States v. Hoffman, No. CR1900693001TUCRM, 2020 WL 531943,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2020) (holding that defendants’ actions were protected under the RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014)).
342
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similar defense based on freedom of religion. 348 Whether other
courts will similarly recognize the provision of life-saving food and
water to migrants as a religious act, entitled to protection under the
RFRA, remains to be seen.
The government has also filed more serious criminal charges
against individuals offering humanitarian assistance to migrants.
Scott Warren, a thirty-six-year-old geography teacher and No Más
Muertes volunteer, was charged with three felonies under the antiharboring provisions of the INA in 2018.349 In June 2019, Warren
was tried by a jury, which deadlocked 8-4 in favor of acquittal.350
When the government chose to retry the case against Warren in November of the same year, the jury acquitted him.351 If convicted,
Warren would have faced up to twenty years in prison.352 In a similar case, Theresa Todd, a city and county attorney in Marfa, Texas,
was arrested and detained by Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) officers on suspicion of harboring aliens, because she
pulled over in her car to help a woman in danger of dying from dehydration.353 Whether the Department of Justice will continue to
prosecute these types of humanitarian activities—and, if it does,
whether juries will convict—is an open question.
The “zero tolerance policy” embraced by the Department of Justice has also resulted in legal action against a sitting state court judge

348

United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1989); see supra
note 333 and accompanying text.
349
United States v. Warren, No. MJ-17-0341-TUC-BGM, 2018 WL 2416188,
at *1 (D. Ariz. May 29, 2018); see also Miriam Jordan, An Arizona Teacher
Helped Migrants. Jurors Couldn’t Decide If It Was a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June
11,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/scott-warren-arizonadeaths.html..
350
Hung Jury in Case Against Scott Warren, NO MORE DEATHS (June 11,
2019), https://nomoredeaths.org/hung-jury-in-case-against-scott-warren/; see
also Jordan, supra note 349.
351
Teo Armus, After Helping Migrants in the Arizona Desert, an Activist Was
Charged with a Felony. Now, He’s Been Acquitted, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2019,
7:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/21/arizona-activistscott-warren-acquitted-charges-helping-migrants-cross-border/.
352
Matalon, supra note 312.
353
Manny Fernandez, She Stopped to Help Migrants on a Texas Highway.
Moments Later, She Was Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/us/texas-border-good-samaritan.html.
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in Massachusetts, Judge Shelley M. Richmond Joseph.354 In a case
described by the media as a “dramatic turn in the long-running clash
between the Trump administration and state governments that have
resisted its hard-line approach to immigration,” federal prosecutors
obtained a grand jury indictment against Judge Joseph due to her
failure to cooperate with ICE.355 They charged her with obstruction
of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and obstruction of a federal
proceeding.356 The judge allegedly orchestrated the exit of a criminal defendant from the courtroom after he was released from state
custody via a back door rather than the front, to enable him to avoid
arrest and deportation.357 Massachusetts Attorney General Martha
Healey, a Democrat, described the indictment as “a radical and politically motivated attack on our state and the independence of our
courts.”358 The U.S. Attorney defended the indictment, stating that
“[w]e cannot pick and choose the federal laws we follow, or use our
personal views to justify violating the law.”359 Judge Joseph, who
rejected a plea deal from the federal government, faces up to twentyfive years in prison if convicted of the obstruction of justice
charges.360
The Trump administration’s zero tolerance policy with regard to
illegal immigration—a category that it has defined to include individuals who have a legal right to apply for asylum in this country—
354
See Liam Stack, Judge Is Charged with Helping Immigrant Escape ICE at
Courthouse,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/judge-shelley-joseph-indicted.html.
355
See id.; see also Steve Burkholder, Massachusetts Judge and Ex-Official
Accused of Preventing Migrant’s Arrest by ICE, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2019 7:46
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/massachusetts-judge-andex-official-accused-of-preventing-migrants-arrest-by-ice/2019/04/25/664ed43c677e-11e9-82ba-fcfeff232e8f_story.html.
356
Indictment at 15–17, United States v. Joseph, No. 19-CR-10141 (D. Mass.
Apr. 25, 2019), ECF No. 1, 2019 WL 1878050.
357
Id. at 10–11.
358
Stack, supra note 354. Healey also argued that “[i]t is a bedrock principle
of our constitutional system that federal prosecutors should not recklessly interfere with the operation of state courts and their administration of justice.” Id.
359
Id.
360
Jonathan Ng, Judge Shelley Joseph Rejects Deal in ICE Obstruction Case,
BOS. HERALD (July 24, 2019), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/07/24/indicted-massachusetts-judge-shelley-joseph-rejects-plea-deal-over-ice-obstruction-case/ (last updated July 24, 2019, 6:14 PM); Stack, supra note 354 (noting
the possibility of a twenty-five year sentence for Judge Joseph).
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has led to heart-wrenching results. While these policies may appeal
to President Trump’s base of support among Republican voters, they
are not widely shared across the country.361 Among Democratic voters in the states where these laws are being enforced, especially California, the rate of disapproval is presumably even higher.362 As the
gulf between the values reflected in federal policy and those held by
individuals widens, the incentive to reject and disobey the law exponentially increases.
B.

Deprivation of Due Process in the Nineteenth Century and
Today
While some individuals may be compelled by religious belief or
internal moral compass to openly defy an unjust law, most citizens
are unwilling to take this risk. Moreover, some people comply with
laws that they disagree with, even those that they find to be morally
repugnant, out of respect for the rule of law. To these individuals,
the only acceptable way to protest an unjust law is to attempt to
amend or repeal it via the legislative process.
Federalism, of course, poses unique challenges in this regard.
Citizens of an individual state are constrained in their ability to
change federal law, especially if their views are not shared across
the United States. They can more easily adopt state laws reflecting
their own views and values, but these laws are valid only so long as
they do not conflict with or frustrate the purpose of federal law. With
respect to both fugitive slaves and immigrants, the concept of federal supremacy has limited states’ ability to effect change via legislation, as discussed below.

361
See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Asylum Changes Are Even Less Desired Than
His Border Wall, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2019, 10:02 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/30/trumps-asylum-changesare-even-less-desired-than-his-border-wall/ (noting that, according to a Post-ABC
poll, only about thirty percent of Americans favor changes to make the process of
applying for asylum more difficult); Alana Abramson, Most Americans Don’t Approve of Trump’s Immigration Policies, Poll Finds, TIME (July 6, 2018),
https://time.com/5332298/trump-immigration-policy-poll/ (discussing a PostSchar School poll result showing that approximately sixty percent of American
do not approve of Trump’s immigration policies).
362
See Blake, supra note 361 (noting only 15% of Democrats support parts of
President Trump’s immigration policies).
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One aspect of federal legislation that is central to the controversies surrounding both fugitive slaves and undocumented immigrants, hinges on the legal status of specific individuals: free versus
slave; asylee versus excludable alien. As in the antebellum era, some
people are wrongfully targeted for removal when they have a legal
right to stay. Some alleged fugitive slaves were free blacks who had
been kidnapped and sold into slavery.363 Some “illegal aliens” have
a right to stay in the United States because they have a well-founded
fear of persecution in their home countries.364 In each instance, the
law must provide a process to determine the legal status of the individual. Under the INA, like the Fugitive Slave Acts, the process to
determine removal is often wholly inadequate, especially given that
an incorrect decision can result in serious bodily harm or death to
the affected person.365 In both instances, federal judicial officers are
(or were) making these critical decisions with a lesser and inferior
degree of process than would be accorded in a criminal case.366 The
doctrine of federal supremacy prevents the states from altering or
augmenting these federal procedures, but their inadequacy undermines public confidence in the laws and increases the difficulty of
their enforcement.
1. SLAVE OR FREE?
As discussed at length above, blacks were afforded very little
process when they were arrested and accused of being fugitive
slaves.367 This system almost certainly led to errant results. Because
there was no right of appeal, it is impossible to tell what percentage
of individuals arrested and ultimately deported to the South, under
the auspices of the Fugitive Slave Laws, were in fact free.
Both the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts failed to guarantee
any semblance of due process to a person accused of being a fugitive

363

See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 378–387 and accompanying text.
365
Professor Christopher Lasch has similarly drawn a parallel between the
lack of procedural integrity under the Fugitive Slave Acts and in immigration rendition proceedings. See Lasch, supra note 6, at 220–24 (arguing that the “near
absolute lack of procedural protections for immigrants in the rendition” causes it
to mirror the slave rendition process of the antebellum period).
366
See infra note 392 and accompanying text.
367
See supra Sections I.B & I.E.
364
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slave.368 Perhaps most offensive to modern sensibilities, the 1850
Fugitive Slave Law prohibited the alleged fugitive from testifying
in her own defense: the accused could not tell the court why she
believed herself to be free.369 Slaveholders, on the other hand, could
not be required to provide in-person testimony; instead they could
establish their putative property interest in another human being by
simply providing an affidavit.370 Two of the key procedural protections that were fundamental to antebellum law—the right to trial by
jury and the right to seek review via the writ of habeas corpus—
were denied to alleged fugitives under federal law.371 States attempted to extend these rights to alleged fugitives long after the Supreme Court declared such laws void under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.372 Moreover, there was
no right of appeal from the decision of a federal commissioner as to
a person’s slave status under either version of the law. 373 If the alleged fugitive claimed that the federal commissioner had erred in
finding him to be a slave, his only legal recourse was to seek justice
in the courts of the slave state to which he was returned.374 Perhaps
not surprisingly, this option was not feasible for most slaves, who
neither had access to courts nor the resources to hire counsel in the
states where they were enslaved.375

368

See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
369
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463–64.
370
Id.
371
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
372
See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text; see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842).
373
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
374
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 stat. 462, 463–64; see also
Crump & Brophy, supra note 70, at 480–81.
375
See Crump & Brophy, supra note 70, at 489 (observing that “even temporarily and wrongfully enslaved people . . . needed the assistance of powerful white
people to successfully assert their freedom.”); see also ANDREW FEDE,
ROADBLOCKS TO FREEDOM: SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES
SOUTH 147–50 (2011).
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2. EXCLUDABLE ALIEN OR ASYLEE?
Even in the context of a legal system that recognizes slavery,
legal process should not permit the enslavement of persons who are
legally free. Similarly, the U.S. government should not deport a person who has a “well-founded fear of persecution” in the country
from which she is fleeing.376 Under the letter of the law, these individuals are entitled to remain in the United States.377 However, the
attainment of this status requires the decision of a court, just as
courts were called upon to determine whether a black person who
was apprehended in the mid-nineteenth century was free or a fugitive from slavery. As was the case with fugitive slaves, the cost of
an errant decision can be fatal.378
Asylum law, in the United States and many other countries,
traces its roots to World War II and the Holocaust. As a result of the
horror unleashed by this war, particularly the genocide resulting in
the deaths of approximately six million Jewish people, the United
States and 144 other countries signed a treaty—the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”).379
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018) (defining the term “refugee”).
See infra notes 384–388 and accompanying text.
378
See Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence (recounting various instances of refugees who were deported from the United States and subsequently murdered in their home countries). The article is based on a study conducted by the Global Migration Project
at the Columbia School of Journalism, which created a database of over sixty
people who were deported to their deaths or other serious harm. Id.; see also
C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring) (noting
that “[t]he impact of deportation could be persecution, including potential police
beatings, torture, and sexual assault . . . or gun violence at the hands of gang members”); Anthony Asuncion, Note, INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a
More Liberal Asylum Standard, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 915, 919 (1988) (observing
that the “[r]eality for those wrongfully deported may mean death”).
379
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 32, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; see also RABBEN, supra note 302, at 122–26 (discussing the Refugee Convention and noting the connection between the Holocaust and the revivification of international human rights
law). The United States signed the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) in 1968. The Protocol incorporated articles 2
through 34 of the Refugee Convention and adopted the Convention’s definition
of refugee. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268; see also
376
377
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The “core principle” embodied in the Refugee Convention is that of
non-refoulement, which commands that “a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or
freedom.”380 The treaty defines a refugee as a person who has “a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.”381 Under the terms of the Refugee Convention, a person
who satisfies these criteria cannot be compelled to return to a territory where she fears threats to her “life or freedom.”382 Thousands
of would-be Jewish refugees died in the Holocaust because the
United States and other countries refused to admit them as immigrants.383 The Refugee Convention reflects an international consensus that this tragedy should not happen again.
Kristin Garner, Aliens’ Rights to Notification of the Availability of Political Asylum and Assistance of Counsel Affirmed, Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1990), 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 822, 825–26 (1992) (discussing the Convention and the Protocol).
380
The 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited Mar. 16,
2020); see also 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 379, art. 33. Non-refoulement was first recognized as a principle of international law when it was
embodied in the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees of
1933. See Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct.
28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199. However, only eight countries signed this treaty (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Italy, Norway, and Czechoslovakia),
and it applied only to a narrow category of Russian and Armenian refugees. Id.
art. 1; see also Henry Mascia, Comment, A Reconsideration of Haitian Claims for
Withholding of Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 19 PACE INT’L
L. REV. 287, 290–91 (2007).
381
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 379, art. 1, ¶ A(2).
382
Id. art. 31, ¶ 1.
383
See Daniel A. Gross, The U.S. Government Turned Away Thousands of
Jewish Refugees, Fearing that They Were Nazi Spies, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov.
18, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-government-turnedaway-thousands-jewish-refugees-fearing-they-were-nazi-spies-180957324/ (discussing Herbert Karl Friedrich Bahr, a Jewish refugee convicted of spying on behalf of Germany, and the impact of his case on refugee policy in the United States
during World War II); see generally DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF
THE JEWS: AMERICA AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1941–1945 (1984). The most infamous example of U.S. policy in this regard is the case of the St. Louis, a German
ship that carried over 900 refugees, almost all Jewish, to the United States in 1939,
only to be denied entry and sent back to Germany. Gross, supra. About a fourth
of those onboard died in the Holocaust. Id.; see also Rebecca Erbelding, After the
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The principle of non-refoulement, expressed in the Refugee
Convention, is codified in two sections of United States immigration
law that provide alternative remedies.384 First, the INA permits withholding of deportation as to any alien who “more likely than not”
would be persecuted, if forced to return to his home country.385 Second, the Refugee Act of 1980 provides a broader remedy to those
seeking refuge in the United States: asylum.386 Under this statute, a
refugee is defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to return
to his home country due to a “well-founded fear of persecution” on
the grounds of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”387 The right to apply for asylum exists for “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United
States or who arrives in the United States,” regardless of whether
she crosses the border “illegally” (i.e., not at a designated port of
entry) and “irrespective of [her] status.”388
The rights of asylum applicants are protected by the U.S. Constitution and by statute. The Due Process guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment apply to individuals who apply for asylum in the United
States.389 By statute, individuals applying for asylum have a right to
Holocaust, the U.S. Promised to Protect Refugees. We’re Failing, WASH. POST
(Jan. 31, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/01/31/after-the-holocaust-the-u-s-promised-to-protect-refugeeswere-failing/?utm_term=.8de26754dfe5 (“We lament America’s failure to admit
more European Jewish refugees before the Holocaust. Our descendants will be
much harsher when they look at America’s inaction today.”).
384
See generally Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases—Immigration
Law, Political Asylum: Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 101 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1987) (discussing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987), and the difference between these two remedies); Asuncion, supra note 378.
385
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2018); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30
(1984) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) (1976)); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. at 423–24. The test for determining withholding of deportation is commonly
referred to as the “clear probability of persecution” standard. Stevic, 467 U.S. at
429.
386
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
387
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
388
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919
F.2d 549, 553–54 (9th Cir. 1990).
389
C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring);
see also Orantes-Hernandez, 919 F.2d at 554; Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 90–91
(9th Cir. 1988); Rios-Berrios v. INS., 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985); Haitian
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be represented by counsel of their choosing.390 Furthermore, they
are entitled to be notified of their right to seek counsel.391 However,
they do not have a right to appointed counsel under the Sixth
Amendment because immigration matters are considered civil, not
criminal, proceedings.392 Given that most aliens seeking asylum arrive in the United States penniless and destitute, as a practical matter, the vast majority rely on pro bono legal services for representation, which are often unavailable.393
International human rights law recognizes a right to procedural
due process in expulsion proceedings, including, “most importantly,
the right to be represented.”394 Although immigration advocates

Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); United States
v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978).
390
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(a); § 1362; see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 91; 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.10 (2019).
391
Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 862 (discussing the right to counsel in deportation proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (2019) (requiring Immigration Judges to advise aliens seeking asylum of their “right to representation, at no expense to the
Government, by counsel of [their] own choice,” and to advise them “of the availability of free legal services programs” authorized to practice in the immigration
courts); U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, NATIONAL STANDARDS ON
TRANSPORT, ESCORT, DETENTION, AND SEARCH 16 (Oct. 2015),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Feb/cbp-tedspolicy-october2015.pdf [hereinafter CBP STANDARDS] (instructing CBP officers
that “[d]etainees referred for removal proceedings shall be provided with a list of
legal service providers and their contact information”).
392
Baires, 856 F.2d at 90; see also Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307,
1312 (9th Cir. 1988).
393
See Kara A. Naseef, Note How to Decrease the Immigration Backlog: Expand Representation and End Unnecessary Detention, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
771, 780 (2019) (noting that “non-citizens often must proceed pro se as they are
unable to afford or find counsel.”); Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of
Children Who Go to Immigration Court Alone, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/children-immigrationcourt/567490/ (discussing the dearth of lawyers available to represent children in
immigration proceedings in Fresno County, California).
394
Won Kidane, Procedural Due Process in the Expulsion of Aliens Under
International, United States, and European Union Law: A Comparative Analysis,
27 EMORY INT’L L.J. 285, 297–302 (2013); see also 1951 Refugee Convention,
supra note 379, art. 33, ¶ 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 13, Dec. 6, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons art. 31 ¶ 2, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
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have argued that the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee extends the right of counsel in this setting,395 the federal courts have
not agreed to date.396 Not surprisingly, access to counsel is critical
for asylum-seekers, especially minors.397 Data collected from over
100,000 cases showed that about 90% of children who did not have
a lawyer in their immigration proceedings were ordered deported;
almost half of the children who were represented by an attorney
were allowed to stay in the United States.398 In cases involving
women and children, courts were fourteen times more likely to allow those represented by an attorney to stay in the United States.399

395

See, e.g., Denis Slattery, New Push to Grant Immigrants Right to Counsel
Gains Support from Advocates and Lawmakers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 15, 2020,
4:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-immigrants-right-tocounsel-legislation-hoylman-albany-20200115-3ltsjawul5acvfiecv5ntyuh5istory.html.
396
The Ninth Circuit recently had the opportunity to address the issue of minors’ right to counsel in immigration proceedings, but, in the words of the concurrence, “inexplicably punt[ed] the question yet again.” C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923
F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring). The concurrence argues in
favor of a right to appointed counsel for minors claiming asylum. Id. at 630–39.
397
Id. at 631 (“‘The importance of counsel, particularly in asylum cases where
the law is complex and developing, can neither be overemphasized nor ignored.’
For immigrant children, that is especially true.”) (quoting Reyes-Palacios v. INS,
836 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988)). According to data collected by the Study
Group on Immigrant Representation, headed by Second Circuit Chief Judge Robert Katzmann, “[o]nly 13 percent of asylum-seeking immigrants prevail in their
cases without a lawyer, while 74 percent of those with a lawyer see success.”
Nicole Narea, 3 Cases that Could Boost Immigrants’ Access to Counsel, LAW360
(Feb. 10, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1124682/3-casesthat-could-boost-immigrants-access-to-counsel.
398
TRAC Immigration, New Data on Unaccompanied Children, in TRAC
SERIES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2014),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/359/; see also Stillman, supra note 378
(discussing the case of a Honduran girl who was separated from her grandmother
at the border and convinced to sign a form waiving her right to a hearing before
an immigration judge).
399
TRAC Immigration, Representation Makes 14-Fold Difference, in TRAC
SERIES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2014),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/396. The report further found that “[i]n
cases that have thus far been closed, women and children were represented by an
attorney only 14.0 percent of the time.” Id.
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Under the Trump administration’s family separation policy, discussed infra,400 children as young as three are representing themselves in immigration court.401
The need for legal representation in cases where a person’s
safety and freedom are at stake is as apparent today as it was in the
nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, under the Fugitive Slave Acts,
the federal government did not provide legal representation to persons accused of being fugitive slaves.402 However, some states’ personal liberty laws guaranteed alleged fugitives the right to counsel,
a role often fulfilled by the local district attorney.403 These states
also endeavored to ensure that alleged fugitives were not hamstrung
by a lack of resources, providing that they could not be charged for
the cost of serving a subpoena, for example.404 These states recognized that, without legal assistance and access to the courts, alleged
fugitives stood no chance of proving their entitlement to freedom.
Some states have attempted to ensure that immigrants have access to counsel in deportation proceedings, even though federal
courts have not required them to do so. New York, which was the
first state to guarantee legal representation to alleged fugitive
slaves,405 recently became the first state to provide this same right
to immigrants in detention and facing deportation.406 While the right
to counsel is not guaranteed in California, the state has expanded its
state budget allocation for immigration legal services, and the San
Francisco Public Defender’s Office recently opened an immigration
unit to fight “deportation of detained non-citizens.”407 These efforts,
while laudable, are insufficient in that the majority of individuals

400

See infra notes 419–38 and accompanying text.
See Christina Jewett & Shefali Luthra, Immigrant Toddlers Ordered to Appear in Court Alone, TEX. TRIBUNE (June 27, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/27/immigrant-toddlers-ordered-appear-court-alone/;
Egkolfopoulou, supra note 393.
402
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
403
See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1840, ch, 225, § 9, 1840 N.Y. Laws 174, 175–76.
404
See, e.g., id. § 10.
405
See id. § 9 (providing that the County district attorney must “render his
advice and professional services” to alleged fugitive slaves, and “shall attend in
his behalf on the trial of such claim”; attorney fees were paid by the county).
406
Naseef, supra note 393, at 790.
407
Id.
401
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who appear in immigration court proceedings, including children,
still lack legal representation.408
Even the limited statutory and Constitutional rights that are accorded to asylum applicants are routinely violated. CBP officers are
supposed to screen detained noncitizens for potential asylum claims
before deporting them by asking whether the person has “any fear
or concern about being returned to [her] home country or being removed from the United States.”409 Approximately a dozen female
asylum seekers interviewed by the Columbia Global Migration Project in 2016 and 2017 reported that CBP officers did not ask them if
they feared returning to their home countries; instead, officers “ignored, mocked, or even sexually propositioned” the women and
then deported them with no further process.410 Many of these
women were attacked and seriously harmed after they were forced
to return to the places from which they had fled.411 Similarly, approximately half of the 350 asylum-seeking individuals surveyed at
the San Diego Migrant Family Shelter in 2019 indicated that they
had suffered various forms of “mistreatment from immigration officers during apprehension, processing and/or detention.”412 Although the scale of these abuses appears to have grown during the
408

Despite efforts to increase legal representation for minors in immigration
proceedings, data shows a trend in the opposite direction. Thirty percent of children whose immigration cases began in fiscal year 2015 were unrepresented.
TRAC Immigration, Children: Amid A Growing Court Backlog Many Still Unrepresented, in TRAC SERIES ON JUVENILES AND FAMILIES IN IMMIGRATION
COURT (2014), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/482. That figure rose to
forty percent, for children whose cases began in 2016. Id. Seventy-five percent of
children whose immigration cases originated in 2017 represented themselves in
their immigration proceedings. Id.
409
Claims of Fear, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/claims-fear (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
410
Stillman, supra note 378. Of course, such conduct violates internal government standards, which require all CBP officers to “speak and act with the utmost
integrity and professionalism,” and espouses a “zero tolerance policy” as to all
forms of sexual abuse of detainees. CBP STANDARDS, supra note 391, at 3, 4.
411
Stillman, supra note 378.
412
JILL ESBENSHADE ET AL., AMER. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF SAN
DIEGO, THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM: MIGRANT’S STORIES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, DIGNITY, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 6, 24
(2019),
https://www.aclusandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/The_Right_to_Seek_Asylum-Migrant-Stories_with_Links-1.pdf.
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Trump administration, they did not originate with it.413 However,
the remarkable level of hostility towards asylum-seekers expressed
by the President himself is unprecedented.414
President Trump has loudly and persistently complained about
the very existence of asylum law in the United States, characterizing
it as a “loophole”415 in the immigration system and a “big fat con
job”416 being perpetrated on the American people. He has character-

413

For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction against the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) in 1990, supported by
“overwhelming” evidence that the agency had systematically coerced El Salvadoran immigrants to waive their right to apply for asylum by signing voluntary
departure forms. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 559, 562
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding that, even after a preliminary injunction was issued forbidding this conduct, the pattern of inducing class members into accepting voluntary departure persisted, even when the noncitizen expressed fear of returning to
El Salvador or had specifically requested asylum).
414
See infra notes 415–18 and accompanying text.
415
E.g., President Donald J. Trump is Working to Stop the Abuse of our Asylum System and Address the Root Causes of the Border Crisis, WHITE HOUSE
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidentdonald-j-trump-working-stop-abuse-asylum-system-address-root-causes-bordercrisis/ [hereinafter Trump Working to Stop Abuse of Asylum System] (“The Asylum Loophole: Migrants are flooding to our border to use asylum to gain entry
into our country and remain here indefinitely.”). President Trump is quoted as
stating, “The biggest loophole drawing illegal aliens to our borders is the use of
fraudulent or meritless asylum claims to gain entry into our great country.” Id.;
see also Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executiveoffice-immigration-review (charging that the asylum system “is currently subject
to rampant abuse and fraud”).
416
President Trump made this statement during a campaign rally in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. Donica Phifter, Donald Trump Calls Asylum Claims a ‘Big Fat
Con Job,’ Says Mexico Should Stop Migrant Caravans from Traveling to U.S.
Border, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2019, 12:13 AM). During the speech, he appeared
to mock a would-be asylum applicant:
You have people coming, you know they’re all met by the lawyers . . . and they say, ‘Say the following phrase: I am very
afraid for my life. I am afraid for my life.’ OK. And then I look
at the guy. He looks like he just got out of the ring. He’s a heavyweight champion of the world. It’s a big fat con job.
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ized immigrants as “invad[ing]” the country and advocated removing them with “no Judges or Court cases.”417 In addition to the incendiary rhetoric, Trump has issued executive orders and proposed
changes to existing administrative regulations that make it even
more difficult, if not impossible, for asylum-seekers to file claims
and have them fairly adjudicated.418 Much like the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850, which gutted the limited procedural safeguards accorded to those accused of being fugitive slaves, the changes
wrought by the Trump administration have vitiated procedures designed to protect some of society’s most vulnerable people.
The most infamous of Trump’s policies designed to discourage
migration of asylum-seekers into the United States was known as
the “zero tolerance” family separation policy.419 Without a formal
announcement of a change in policy, in 2017, the Trump administration began to forcibly separate parents and children who crossed the
border together.420 Many of these families were fleeing persecution
in their home countries and thus sought to claim asylum in the
Id.; see also Maria Saccheti, U.S. Asylum Process is at the Center of Trump’s
Immigration Ire, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019, 6:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-asylum-process-is-at-the-center-of-trumps-immigration-ire/2019/04/09/7f8259b8-5aec-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html.
Trump also referred to the asylum process as a “con job” at a roundtable discussion regarding the economy in Minnesota, claiming, “You look at some of these
people, you want protection from them, and they are saying, ‘We need protection
from our country.’” Steven Nelson, Trump Says GOP ‘Can Retake the House’ by
Addressing Asylum ‘Con Job,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 15, 2019, 4:30 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/trump-says-gop-canretake-the-house-by-addressing-asylum-con-job.
417
President Trump tweeted, “We cannot allow all of these people to invade
our Country. When somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or
Court Cases, bring them back from where they came.” @realDonaldTrump,
TWITTER (Jun. 24, 2018, 8:02AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329.
418
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); see
generally Jean Galbraith, Trump Administration Tightens Procedures with Respect to Asylum Seekers at the Southern Border, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 377 (2019)
(discussing various actions by the Trump administration to restrict access to asylum); see also infra notes 470–478 and accompanying text.
419
See Julia Ainsley, Trump Administration Discussed Separating Moms,
Kids to Deter Asylum Seeks in Feb. 2017, NBC (June 18, 2018, 3:43 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-discussed-separating-moms-kids-deter-asylum-seekers-feb-n884371.
420
See id.
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United States.421 Rather than release or detain the parents and children together, CBP agents began to forcibly separate the two by
placing adults in federal detention centers and children in foster care
or government facilities for “unaccompanied minors,” sometimes
thousands of miles away.422 The federal government implemented
the family separation policy to dissuade Central Americans from
seeking asylum in the United States.423 As news of this policy began
to trickle out, moral outrage ensued and continues to this day.424
Forcibly separating children from their parents causes both the child
and the parent to suffer severe emotional harm and can permanently
damage the relationship between parent and child, even after they
are reunited.425 A federal court has held that the policy deprives parents of their substantive due process rights to family integrity.426 The
421

See Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133,
1137 (S.D. Cal. 2018), modified by 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that
many of the parents and children who were separated were seeking asylum in the
United States).
422
See id. at 1154–55.
423
John Burnett, To Curb Illegal Immigration, DHS Separating Families at
the
Border,
NPR
(Feb.
27,
2018,
7:41
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/589079243/activists-outraged-that-u-s-borderagents-separate-immigrant-families (“The Department of Homeland Security has
undertaken its most extreme measure yet to discourage asylum seekers from coming to the U.S.—family separation.”).
424
See, e.g., Ashley Fetters, The Moral Failure of Family Separation,
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
13,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/trumps-family-separation-policy-causes-national-outrage/579676/.
425
See HHS-OIG Oversight of the Unaccompanied Alien Children Program:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. 8 (2019) (statement of Ann Maxwell, Assistant Inspector General, Department of Health and
Human Services) (stating that “separated children exhibited more fear, feelings of
abandonment, and post-traumatic stress than did children who were not separated.
Separated children experienced heightened feelings of anxiety and loss as a result
of their unexpected separation from their parents after their arrival in the United
States.”); see also Christopher Sherman et al., US Held Record Number of Migrant Children in Custody in 2019, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://apnews.com/015702afdb4d4fbf85cf5070cd2c6824 (quoting Dr. Jack
Shonkoff as stating that “‘decades of peer-reviewed research’ show that detaining
kids away from parents or primary caregivers is bad for their health”); Joanna
Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy and Family Separation: The Consequences for
Children’s Well-Being, 132 SOCIAL SCI. & MED. 245, 247–49 (2015).
426
See Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1137.
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damage that the U.S. government has done to these families may
never be repaired.427
After inflicting the trauma of family separation, the government
had to admit that it had no plan to reunify the families it had torn
apart. It had made no effort to do so.428 In June 2018, a federal court
ordered the government to discontinue the policy and reunite the
thousands of families that it had separated, finding that the government’s conduct was “egregious,” “outrageous,” and sufficient to
“shock the contemporary conscience.”429 Approximately 5500 migrant children were separated from their parents at the border under
the policy that was officially halted in June 2018.430 Although most
of these families were eventually reunited, as of January 2020,
twenty-one children remained in government custody.431

427
A class action lawsuit was filed in 2019 seeking damages against the federal government for the harms inflicted by the family separation policy. Class Action Complaint, A.I.I.L. v. Sessions, No. 4:19-CV-00481-JAS (D. Ariz., Oct. 10,
2019).
428
The court made the following findings in this regard:
[T]he practice of separating these families was implemented
without any effective system or procedure for (1) tracking the
children after they were separated from their parents, (2) enabling communication between the parents and their children after separation, and (3) reuniting the parents and children after
the parents are returned to immigration custody following completion of their criminal sentence. This is a startling reality.
Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1144; see also Jonathan Blitzer, The Government Has
No Plan for Reuniting the Immigrant Families it is Tearing Apart, NEW YORKER
(June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-governmenthas-no-plan-for-reuniting-the-immigrant-families-it-is-tearing-apart.
429
Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1145–46.
430
Jasmine Aguilera, Here’s What to Know About the Status of Family Separation at the U.S. Border, Which Isn’t Nearly Over, TIME,
https://time.com/5678313/trump-administration-family-separation-lawsuits/
(last updated Oct. 25, 2019, 2:49 PM); see also Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S.
Planned to Separate 26,000 Migrant Families Before Outcry Over ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy, CBS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/family-separations-zero-tolerance-policy-us-planned-to-separate-more-than-26000-migrant-families-201911-27/ (last updated Nov. 27, 2019, 9:47 PM).
431
CHRISTI A. GRIMM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IMPEDED HHS’S RESPONSE
TO THE ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY 8 (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oeiBL-18-00510.pdf; see also Aguilera, supra note 430 (noting that, as of September
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Although the Trump administration officially halted the family
separation policy in June 2018,432 family separation has clearly continued.433 Over one thousand children have been separated from
their parents since the family separation policy officially ended in
June 2018.434 Thousands of young children have been detained in
government facilities without adequate access to medical care or
basic hygiene.435
Several children have died in government custody.436 Despite at
least three deaths attributable to the flu, the government has refused
to provide children in ICE detention with the flu vaccine, even when
doctors volunteered to provide the vaccinations at no cost to the government.437 One commentator has characterized the federal government’s immigration policy of taking children from their parents as
“of a piece with some of the darkest moments of American history,”
including slavery.438
Images of screaming children ripped from the arms of their parents were just as devastating in the nineteenth century as they are
2019, twenty-seven children remained in government custody as a result of the
policy).
432
The family separation policy was partially withdrawn by the Trump administration on June 20, 2018. See Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435
(June 20, 2018).
433
See Aguilera, supra note 430; Montoya-Galvez, supra note 430.
434
See Aguilera, supra note 430; Montoya-Galvez, supra note 430.
435
See Lizzie O’Leary, ‘Children Were Dirty, They Were Scared, and They
Were Hungry,’ ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/child-detention-centers-immigration-attorney-interview/592540/; Simon Romero et al., Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant
Detention Center in Clint, Texas, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol-clint.html.
436
Nicole Acevedo, Why Are Migrant Children Dying in U.S. Custody?, NBC
(May 29, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/why-are-migrant-children-dying-u-s-custody-n1010316 (noting that at least seven children
died in CBP custody between 2018 and May 2019).
437
See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, After Child Deaths, Doctors Pressure Border
Patrol to Let Them Administer Flu Vaccines, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019, 11:32
AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-11-19/la-na-border-patrol-migrant-flu; see Robert Moore, CDC Recommended that Migrants Receive
Flu Vaccine, but CBP Rejected the Idea, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 3:58 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/cdc-recommended-that-migrantsreceive-flu-vaccine-but-cbp-rejected-the-idea/2019/11/25/8aba198e-0fb8-11eab0fc-62cc38411ebb_story.html.
438
Fetters, supra note 424.
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today. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s iconic novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin,
brought a vivid picture of slavery’s destruction of the family into
American homes when it was published in March 1852.439 In one of
the novel’s early scenes, a mother, Eliza, flees over the frozen Ohio
River with her four year-old son, Harry, to avoid separation after
Harry was sold to pay the debts of the family who “owned” them.440
Although Stowe’s novel was a work of fiction, it was based on
Stowe’s investigation of actual events and people caught up in the
web of slavery.441 The book was immensely popular in the free
North, where it sold over 300,000 copies in its first year of circulation and helped to turn the tide of public opinion against slavery.442
Although “[h]istory cannot evaluate with precision the influence of
a novel upon public opinion . . . the northern attitude toward slavery
was never quite the same after Uncle Tom’s Cabin.”443 Whether outrage over the Trump administration’s family separation policy will
have a similarly lasting impact on public opinion regarding federal
immigration law remains to be seen.
The family separation policy is one of several executive actions
taken by the Trump administration designed to deter and prohibit
migrants from seeking asylum in the United States. All of these executive actions have been challenged in court, and some have been
enjoined, at least temporarily.444 In June 2018, Attorney General
439
See generally HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN: A TALE OF
LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY (1852); see also POTTER, supra note 236, at 140 (noting
that Stowe “made vivid the plight of the slave as a human being held in bondage”).
440
STOWE, supra note 439, at 42, 59–73.
441
See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM’S CABIN 1
(1853).
442
See POTTER, supra note 236, at 140 (noting that the book ultimately sold
almost three million copies in the United States, and another three and a half million copies abroad); see generally DAVID S. REYNOLDS, MIGHTIER THAN THE
SWORD, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA (2012).
443
POTTER, supra note 236, at 140.
444
President Trump has made several additional proposals that, if ultimately
implemented, will further burden asylum-seekers and undermine the United
States’ commitment to the principle of non-refoulement, a fundamental tenet of
international law that is embodied in multiple federal statutes. In April 2019, President Trump issued a “presidential memorandum” directing the implementation
of regulations that would (1) require the payment of a fee to apply for asylum or
a work permit; (2) deny provisional work permits while asylum applications are
pending; and (3) mandate that all asylum cases be decided within 180 days. See
Presidential Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border Security
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Sessions issued a decision overruling and vacating precedent from
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), finding that victims of
domestic abuse in their country of origin generally should not qualify for asylum in the United States.445 He further noted in dictum
that those fleeing gang violence should also “generally” not qualify
for asylum.446 A federal lawsuit challenging Sessions’s decision as
applied to expedited removal proceedings was filed on behalf of
twelve adults and children seeking asylum in the United States, who
were found not to have a credible fear of persecution based on Sessions’ new policy.447 The court held that a blanket application of
Sessions’ ruling at the credible fear stage was inconsistent with the
INA and the Administrative Procedure Act.448 As a result, the policy
of subjecting asylum seekers expressing fear of domestic abuse or

and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-additional-measures-enhance-border-security-restore-integrity-immigration-system/; see also Trump Working to Stop Abuse of Asylum System, supra note 415;
Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Caitlin Dickerson, Asylum Seekers Face New Restrictions Under Latest Trump Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/trump-asylum.html. Proposed
regulations have been issued that would charge migrants $50 to apply for asylum,
and $490 to apply for a work permit. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 84 Fed. Reg. 62,280, 62,318, 62,320 (Nov. 14, 2019) (proposed). The
vast majority of countries do not require payment from asylum seekers; currently,
only Australia, Fiji, and Iran impose such a fee. See Sasha Abramsky, Charging
for Asylum? It’s Unpopular for a Reason, NATION (Nov. 12, 2019).
445
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320–21 (A.G. 2018); see also U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR
PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- (2018) (discussing the implementation of the
policy announced In re A-B-).
446
In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will
not qualify for asylum.”).
447
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 104–05 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing
how plaintiffs “alleged accounts of sexual abuse, kidnappings, and beatings in
their home countries during interviews with asylum officers”).
448
Id. at 125–28.
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gang violence to expedited removal was enjoined.449 The government is appealing this decision.450
A few months later, President Trump issued an executive proclamation rendering any individual who did not present himself for
inspection at an authorized port of entry ineligible for political asylum.451 This rule also contravenes the INA, which specifies that
“[a]ny alien” who is physically present in the United States or who
arrives in the United States, “whether or not at a designated port of
arrival,” may apply for asylum.452 As a result, another lawsuit was
filed in federal court, and implementation of the rule was enjoined.453 This decision was also appealed; however, the Supreme
Court denied review.454
In January 2019, the Department of Homeland Security issued
the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”), commonly referred to as
the “Remain in Mexico” policy,455 which requires non-Mexican asylum-seekers who enter the United States through Mexico to be “re-

449

Id. at 105 (“[B]ecause it is the will of Congress—not the whims of the
Executive—that determines the standard for expedited removal, the Court finds
that those policies are unlawful.”).
450
Brief for the Appellants, Grace v. Barr, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018)
(No. 19-5013), 2019 WL 2354784.
451
Donald J. Trump, Exec. Office of the President, Addressing Mass Migration Through Southern Border of the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 9,
2018) (ordering that “aliens who enter the United States unlawfully through the
southern border in contravention of this proclamation will be ineligible to be
granted asylum”); see also Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934,
55,939–40 (Nov. 9, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
452
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
453
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 868 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (issuing temporary restraining order against implementation of the policy);
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 780 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying
emergency motion to stay district court’s order pending appeal). The district court
reasoned that “[w]hatever the scope of the President’s authority, he may not rewrite the immigration laws to impose a condition that Congress has expressly forbidden.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 844.
454
Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2018), denying cert.
455
Vanessa Romo, U.S. Supreme Court Allows ‘Remain in Mexico’ Program
to
Continue,
NPR
(Mar.
11,
2020,
3:38
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814582798/u-s-supreme-court-allows-remainin-mexico-program-to-continue.
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turned to Mexico . . . for the duration of their immigration proceedings,” and, with certain limited exceptions, excluded from the
United States during that time period.456 In other words, these asylum applicants must wait in Mexico, typically for several months,
while their asylum claims are being adjudicated in the United
States.457 Between January and November 2019, approximately
60,000 asylum applicants were forced back across the border and
required to remain in Mexico while their asylum applications are
being adjudicated pursuant to this policy.458 To date, only eleven
applicants pursuing asylum claims from Mexico—approximately
0.1 percent—have been granted asylum.459 Like the family separa-

Migrant Protection Protocols, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols; see also Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing the MPP). The United States and Canada have entered into an agreement,
the Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”), under which asylum-seekers who
enter Canada through a land-border with the United States, or vice-versa, are eligible to apply for asylum only in their state of first arrival. Agreement Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of
Third Countries art. 4, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1229; see also
Cara D. Cutler, The U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement: Slamming the
Door on Refugees, 11 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121, 128–29 (2004) (critiquing
the STCA). A lawsuit was recently filed in Canada, challenging the STCA on the
grounds that, under the Trump administration’s current immigration policies, the
United States is no longer “safe” for refugees. See Annie Hylton, Canada Questions the Safety of Asylum Seekers in the U.S., NEW YORKER (May 1, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/canada-questions-the-safety-ofasylum-seekers-in-the-us; see also Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Indirect Refoulement: Challenging Canada’s Participation in the Canada-United States Safe
Third Country Agreement, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 142, 150–52 (2012).
457
See Jonathan Blitzer, How the U.S. Asylum System is Keeping Migrants at
Risk
in
Mexico,
NEW
YORKER
(Oct.
1,
2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-the-us-asylum-system-is-keeping-migrants-at-risk-in-mexico.
458
See Juju Chang et al., Blocked at the Border: Young Families, Pregnant
Mothers Struggle for Asylum, ABC (Dec. 18, 2019, 4:08 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/International/blocked-border-young-families-pregnantmothers-struggle-asylum/story?id=67777661.
459
Gustavo Solis, Remain in Mexico Has a 0.1 Percent Asylum Grant Rate,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 2019, 4:42 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/story/2019-12-15/remain-in-mexico-has-a-0-01-percent-asylum-grant-rate; see also Details on MPP (Remain in
456
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tion policy, the MPP is designed, at least in part, to discourage Central Americans from filing asylum claims in the United States.460
Hundreds of migrants, most of them fleeing violence in Central
America, have been subject to kidnappings, rape, other forms of assault, and even murder while living in makeshift encampments on
the Mexican border.461 Migrant children, in particular, are being further traumatized by the violence they are witnessing and experiencing in Mexico.462 Though these asylum applicants have a statutory
Mexico) Deportation Proceedings by Hearing Location and Attendance, Representation, Nationality, Month and Year of NTA, Outcome, and Current Status,
TRACC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/mpp/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Details on MPP].
460
Molly O’Toole, Trump Administration Appears to Violate Law in Forcing
Asylum Seekers Back to Mexico, Officials Warn, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2019,
12:12 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-28/trump-administration-pushes-thousands-to-mexico-to-await-asylum-cases (quoting Mark
Morgan, acting head of CBP, as stating that the policy was for immigrants’ “own
protection” but was also intended to “deter asylum seekers”).
461
As of December 2019, there were 636 publicly documented cases of kidnappings, rapes, and other violent assaults perpetrated against migrants living in
Mexico under the MPP, with almost half of those assaults occurring in November
2019 alone. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HUMAN RIGHTS FIASCO: THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S DANGEROUS ASYLUM RETURNS CONTINUE 2, 4–5 (2019)
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-rights-fiasco-trump-administration-s-dangerous-asylum-returns-continue (“Vulnerable asylum seekers and
migrants, including pregnant women, children, and people with disabilities, are
kidnapped, raped, and assaulted in shelters, in taxis and buses, on the streets, on
their way to U.S. immigration court, and even while seeking help from Mexican
police and migration officers.”); Miriam Jordan, ‘I’m Kidnapped’: A Father’s
Nightmare on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/21/us/border-migrants-kidnapping-mexico.html (describing
various cases of abduction, rape, assault, and murder, suffered by asylum applicants forced to live in Mexican border towns under the MPP). According to data
collected by the U.S. Immigration Policy Center at the University of California,
San Diego, a quarter of asylum seekers subject to the MPP have experienced violence in Mexico. Judy Woodruff, Asylum Seekers Forced to Remain in Mexico
Face Daily Threat of Violence, PBS (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/asylum-seekers-forced-to-remain-in-mexico-face-daily-threat-of-violence (interviewing Yamiche Alcindo, a White House Correspondent who traveled to Mexico to experience firsthand the impact of the MPP).
462
Steven Berkowitz & Alisa R. Gutman, Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy
is Traumatizing Kids. Bring Asylum-Seekers Here to Heal, USA TODAY (Jan. 6,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/06/trump-remain-in-mexico-policy-causing-child-trauma-psychiatrists/2784393001/ (stating
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right to seek legal representation,463 they have little to no access to
lawyers while forced to live in Mexico.464 A district court judge preliminarily enjoined implementation of the policy, holding that it
conflicted with the INA.465 After initially staying implementation of
the district court’s order,466 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction, finding that the “individual plaintiffs risk substantial harm,
even death, so long as the directives of the MPP are followed.”467
However, less than a week later, the Ninth Circuit temporarily
stayed implementation of its own ruling, despite finding that the
MPP “clearly violates” federal law.468 When the Ninth Circuit stay
expired, the Supreme Court issued another emergency stay, effectively blocking the injunction until the final resolution of the case.469
Whether the courts will ultimately determine that the MPP is consistent with the will of Congress, as reflected in the INA, has yet to
be determined.

psychiatrists’ opinion that “[t]he children whom the Trump administration is
sending back to unspeakable violence in Mexican border towns are at risk for
serious traumatic reactions and dysfunction that could impact them for the rest of
their lives”).
463
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018) (cross-referencing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)).
464
Miriam Jordan, In Court Without a Lawyer: The Consequences of Trump’s
‘Remain in Mexico’ Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/migrants-court-remain-in-mexico.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article. Data shows that migrants
subject to the MPP have obtained legal representation in less than one percent of
cases. Details on MPP, supra note 459 (finding that migrants obtained legal representation in 57 immigration cases out of a total of 8,377).
465
Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (holding that plaintiffs were likely to prove that the MPP does not comply
with the Administrative Procedures Act, “because the statute DHS contends the
MPP is designed to enforce does not apply to these circumstances, and even if it
did, further procedural protections would be required to conform to the government’s acknowledged obligation to ensure aliens are not returned to unduly dangerous circumstances”).
466
Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 2019).
467
Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 951 F.3d 1073, 1093 (9th Cir. 2020).
468
Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2020).
469
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 2020 WL 1161432 (Mar. 11, 2020). Justice
Sotomayor dissented from the order granting the emergency stay. Id.
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Even more significantly, in July 2019, the Trump administration
proposed and began to implement a federal regulation that constitutes a “new mandatory bar for asylum eligibility,” applicable to
any migrant who fails “to apply for protection in a third country outside the alien’s country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence through which the alien transited en route to the
United States.”470 “The effect of the Rule is to categorically deny
asylum to almost anyone entering the United States at the southern
border if he or she did not first apply for asylum in Mexico or another third country.”471 Immigrant advocacy organizations immediately sued to block enforcement of the rule, arguing that “[t]he Rule
is a part of an unlawful effort to significantly undermine, if not virtually repeal, the U.S. asylum system at the southern border, and
cruelly closes our doors to refugees fleeing persecution, forcing
them to return to harm.”472 Although the district court initially enjoined enforcement of the rule,473 the injunction was later limited in
scope by the Ninth Circuit.474 However, the Supreme Court, in a
one-paragraph opinion, stayed enforcement of the injunction pending final adjudication of the case.475 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor lamented that “[o]nce again the Executive Branch has issued a rule that seeks to upend longstanding practices regarding refugees who seek shelter from persecution.”476 The implementation of
this rule will effectively preclude Central Americans, Cubans, Haitians, and anyone else who attempts to cross into the United States

470

Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829,
33,830 (July 16, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (emphasis added).
471
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929–30 (N.D.
Cal. 2019).
472
Complaint at 3, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922
(N.D. Cal. 2019).
473
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 930–31.
474
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
475
Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3, 3 (2019).
476
Id. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Id.; see also Opinion, The Supreme Court Just Gave Trump
Temporary Rein to Play with the Lives of Desperate Migrants, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
12, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-09-12/asylumsupreme-court-trump-mexico-central-americans (decrying the willingness of “the
U.S. government and the nation’s highest court” to “disregard the health, safety
and legal rights of people in desperate need”).
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through the Southern border from seeking asylum in this country.477
Although the legal viability of this executive action remains to be
determined, while it is enforced, it will effectively deter and outright
bar the vast majority of refugees from seeking or obtaining asylum
in the United States.478
The executive measures discussed above have had the practical
effect of precluding asylum seekers from finding refuge in the
United States. However, all of them purport to provide some form
of legal process for those with legitimate asylum claims. In the
throes of the COVID-19 crisis, the Trump administration has, at
least temporarily, closed the Southern border to asylum seekers
completely. Under this policy, anyone attempting to cross the border
without proper documentation, including those attempting to seek
asylum, will be removed from the country immediately and without
due process.479 The administration claims that the measures are necessary to protect “migrants, our frontline agents and officers and the
American people” from the spread of the coronavirus at Border Patrol stations and detention facilities.480 Immigration advocates have
477

See Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Top Trump Official Ken Cuccinelli Says Asylum Restriction will be a “Deterrent” for Migrants, CBS: FACE THE NATION
(Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuccinelli-says-asylum-restriction-allowed-by-supreme-court-will-be-a-deterrent-for-migrants.
478
See id.
479
See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Michael D. Shear, & Maggie Haberman,
Citing Coronavirus, Trump Will Announce Strict New Border Controls, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/trumpcoronavirus-mexican-border.html (“Under the [proposed] policy, asylum seekers
would not be held for any length of time in an American facility nor would they
be given due process.”); Quinn Owen, Trump Administration to Impose New Restrictions at Border, Leaving Asylum Seekers in Limbo, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20,
2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-administration-impose-restrictions-border-leaving-asylum-seekers/story?id=69717143 (quoting Acting
Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf as stating that those “without proper
travel documentation” will face “immediate removal”).
480
Owen, supra note 479 (quoting Acting Homeland Security Secretary
Wolf). To date, the administration has rejected calls to release some portion of
the approximately 37,000 individuals held in crowded immigration detention facilities, to prevent the spread of the virus, even though about half of those detainees have not been charged with any crimes and are being held solely due to alleged
civil immigration violations. About 6,000 of those detained are seeking asylum.
See Joel Rose, Immigration Grinds to a Halt as President Trump Shuts Borders,
NPR (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/18/817965714/immigration-
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decried these measures as yet another attempt to “falsely [scapegoat]
immigrant communities in the name of public safety,” and argue that
they “unquestionably violate both domestic and international law”
and abdicate the country’s “moral responsibility to protect vulnerable people.”481
The Trump administration has all but repudiated the United
States’ commitment to the principle of non-refoulement. The President’s own statements show that he does not value either the historical or humanitarian significance of asylum law, a belief reflected in
the policies he has tried to implement. Moreover, the Trump administration’s attempts to impose such laws via executive action, rather
than through the legislative process, violate basic principles of federalism and separation of powers, which is largely why—to date—
many of these policies have been enjoined by federal courts. The
Trump administration’s failure to seek or obtain Congressional approval for these fundamental changes to asylum law reflects a lack
of national consensus sufficient to support them. In this sense, these
executive actions lack even the level of democratic legitimacy enjoyed by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. That heinous Act—although enacted at a time when vast swaths of the American population were excluded from the franchise—was part of a legislative bar-

grinds-to-a-halt-as-president-trump-shuts-borders; Michael Edison Hayden, Nativist Hate Groups Want to Keep People in ICE Detention Despite COVID-19
Threat,
SOUTHERN
POVERTY
L.
CTR.
(Apr.
9,
2020),
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2020/04/09/nativist-hate-groups-wantkeep-people-ice-detention-despite-covid-19-threat. See also Class Action Complaint at 3, Gayle v. Meade, No. 1:20-cv-21553-XXXX (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2020)
(seeking court order releasing ICE detainees due to ICE’s practice of “cohort
quarantin[ing]” in detention); (Complaint at 3, Dawson v. Asher, No. 2:20-cv00409 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2020) (seeking court order releasing certain civil
detainees from ICE facilities due to increased risk of serious illness resulting from
COVID 19).
481
Rose, supra note 480 (quoting Michelle Brané at the Women’s Refugee
Commission); see also Hamed Aleaziz, The Trump Administration Is Now Deporting Unaccompanied Immigrant Kids Due to the Coronavirus, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/coronavirus-unaccompanied-minors-deported?bfsource=relatedmanual
(quoting Human Rights First representative as stating that the Trump administration is using a public health crisis “to advance their long-standing goal of overturning U.S. laws protecting vulnerable children and people seeking asylum”).
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gain and hence adopted by the majority of the nation’s elected Congressional representatives. The same cannot be said for the “executive proclamations” and federal regulations promulgated by the
Trump administration with regard to asylum. Although the federal
government does have broad powers in the immigration arena, at a
minimum, those powers are shared by Congress and do not belong
to the President alone.
3. FEDERAL SUPREMACY AND THE LIMITS OF STATE POWER TO
REGULATE MATTERS CONCERNING FUGITIVE SLAVES AND
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
Just as it did with respect to the Fugitive Slave Acts and the personal liberty laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal law
preempts state law in the immigration arena. The Constitutional case
for federal supremacy, in the immigration context, is actually much
stronger than it was in the case of fugitive slaves. As discussed
above, the list of subjects over which Congress has the power to act,
as enumerated in Article I, Section 8, does not include any reference
to fugitive slaves.482 This Constitutional provision does, however,
address immigration, specifying that Congress shall have the power
to create a “uniform Rule of Naturalization.”483 The Supreme Court
has observed that “[t]he Government of the United States has broad,
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of
aliens.”484 However, although the Executive Branch does have

482

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. IV.; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1;
see generally Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 618 (1842).
483
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court
originally found that the federal government’s right to exclude “foreigners of a
different race” came from sovereignty itself rather than the text of the Constitution. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). The Supreme
Court has held that the federal government’s broad power over immigration matters stems from its “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations
with foreign nations.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012); see
also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing the Federal Government’s
“broad authority over foreign affairs” as a source of its authority to regulate the
status of aliens).
484
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394–95 (“The federal power to determine immigration
policy is well settled.”; “Federal governance of immigration and alien status is
extensive and complex.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (“[T]he
supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including
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broad powers in this area of the law, it shares that power with the
legislative branch, as reflected in the plain language of the Constitution.485 Most of the changes that the Trump administration has attempted to inflict on the asylum process would almost certainly have
been upheld in court if they had been adopted by Congress rather
than executive fiat.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of state authority to regulate immigration matters in Arizona v. United States, a case in
which it invalidated multiple Arizona state laws on grounds of federal preemption.486 However, unlike the state personal liberty
laws—which often sought to impede the federal government’s efforts to expel individuals arrested under the auspices of the federal
law—the Arizona laws aimed for the opposite effect. The laws’
stated purpose was to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and
presence of aliens and economic activity [in Arizona] by persons
unlawfully present in the United States,” and thereby to implement
a policy of “attrition through enforcement.”487 The Court found that
“Arizona bears many of the [negative] consequences of unlawful
immigration” based on the factual record in the case.488
Most, but not all, of the laws passed by Arizona regarding the
immigration process, collectively known as State Bill (“S.B.”) 1070,
were struck down on grounds of federal preemption.489 The first
state law at issue, section 3 of S.B. 1070, purported to criminalize a
power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution . . . and has since been given continuous recognition by this Court.”);
Toll, 458 U.S. at 10 (“Our cases have long recognized the preeminent role of the
Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.”).
485
See U.S CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 2.
486
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 387; see also Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 528–39 (5th Cir. 2013) (invalidating, on preemption grounds, a Texas ordinance that purported to criminalize the rental of housing
to and by aliens not lawfully present in the United States); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2088 (2013) (noting that “the Supreme Court has consistently and overwhelmingly disapproved of state attempts to regulate immigration, discriminate against noncitizens, or discourage immigrant presence in a particular locality”).
487
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 393 (quoting Note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-1051 (2012)).
488
Id. at 397–98.
489
Id. at 416.
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person’s failure to obey federal laws regarding alien registration.490
The Court held that, because Congress has occupied this entire field,
“even complementary state regulation was impermissible.”491 Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 would have criminalized employment, or efforts to obtain employment, by “unauthorized alien[s].”492 This law
was also struck down as preempted by federal law.493 Because Arizona’s criminal penalties differed from the federal civil penalties
imposed for the same conduct regarding employment, the Court held
that the Arizona law posed an “obstacle” to the federal regulatory
scheme.494 Finally, section 6 of S.B. 1070 permitted state officers to
arrest a person without a warrant if the officer found “probable
cause” that he had committed a “public offense” that would render
him removable from the United States.495 This statute was also
struck down, because it also posed an obstacle to the comprehensive
system of federal laws governing alien removability.496
Only one provision in the Arizona statutory scheme was upheld
and allowed to co-exist with federal immigration law: Section
2(B).497 Section 2(B) requires all state and local authorities to contact the federal government and attempt to verify the immigration
status of any individual they have lawfully stopped, arrested, or detained, if they have a “reasonable suspicion” that “the person is an
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”498 Further, the
490

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2012); see also Arizona, 567 U.S. at
401–03 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-509).
491
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–
68 (1941) (finding a similar Pennsylvania alien registration statute invalid on
grounds of federal supremacy).
492
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C).
493
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403–07.
494
Id. at 406–07.
495
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5).
496
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407–10.
497
Id. at 415.
498
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B). In upholding the constitutionality of
section 2(B), the Supreme Court noted the three limitations embodied in the statute: (1) an officer implementing the statute cannot consider the race, ethnicity, or
national origin of the person arrested, except to the extent permitted by the Arizona and United States constitutions; (2) the statute requires that it be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of
United States citizens”; and (3) any person presenting an officer with a valid form
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law provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined [by contacting the Federal
Government] before the person is released.”499 In upholding the constitutionality of the law, the Court noted that, under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g)(10)(A), the federal government welcomes this type of cooperation, and therefore a state law requiring it does not frustrate the
purpose or pose an obstacle to the federal scheme.500
Critically, the federal law referenced in the Arizona opinion,
Section 1357(g)(10)(A), permits—but does not mandate—the type
of federal/state cooperation required by the Arizona law.501 Section
1357(g) authorizes the federal government to enter into written
agreements with the states allowing state employees to implement
federal immigration law; however, it specifies that such agreements
cannot be required.502 In addition, it clarifies that, even in the absence of a written agreement, state officers may communicate with
the federal government “regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not
lawfully present in the United States,” or otherwise to cooperate
with the government regarding the “identification, apprehension,
detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
States.”503 However, even though the federal statute allows communication and cooperation between federal and state governments regarding immigration matters, it does not, and, for reasons addressed
below, cannot compel it.504
Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Arizona v. United
States did not cite or otherwise reference Prigg v. Pennsylvania—in
which the Court struck down the Pennsylvania personal liberty law
on grounds of federal supremacy—the decisions are consistent. As
discussed, the Supreme Court in Prigg invalidated Pennsylvania’s
efforts to regulate the process by which the federal government de-

of identification (including an Arizona driver’s license) is presumed not to be an
alien unlawfully present in the United States. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411.
499
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (emphasis added).
500
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411–12.
501
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018).
502
8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(1)–(9).
503
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).
504
See infra notes 516–549 and accompanying text.
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termined whether individuals were removable from the state as fugitive slaves on grounds of federal supremacy.505 Similarly, the
Court largely struck down Arizona’s efforts to regulate alien removability and other aspects of immigration law, also on grounds of federal supremacy.506 Both decisions also addressed the question of
federal/state cooperation in their respective contexts.507 However, in
Prigg, the federal law at issue, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, at
least indirectly required state cooperation to enforce it.508 In Arizona, state law, rather than federal law, directed state officials to
assist the federal government in achieving its aims.509
In both Prigg and Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution permitted the state to cooperate with the federal government, even in areas deemed to be exclusively within the control of
the federal government.510 The Court distinguishes permission from
compulsion, however. In Prigg, Story concluded that the states
could not be compelled to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law: “it might
well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist, that the states are bound to provide means to
carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted [sic] to them by the constitution.”511 However,
he entertained no doubt that state magistrates could, “if they choose,
exercise that authority [in Fugitive Slave Act cases], unless prohibited by state legislation.”512 In sum, Story’s opinion meant that
“[s]tates could . . . either assist in enforcing federal law or refuse to
aid in enforcement if they so desired.”513 In Arizona, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute requiring state officers to

505

See supra Section I.C.
See supra notes 486–496 and accompanying text.
507
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 600 (1842); Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012).
508
See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; see also Prigg, 41 U.S.
at 565.
509
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416.
510
Prigg, 41 U.S. at 656; Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411–13.
511
Prigg, 41 U.S. at 615–16.
512
Id. at 622.
513
See Kraehenbuehl, supra note 6, at 1477; see also Finkelman, The Roots of
Printz, supra note 22, at 1408–09 (interpreting Story’s opinion as finding “that
state officials should, but could not be required to, enforce the Fugitive Slave
Law”).
506
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provide such aid and assistance in the immigration context.514 However, it did not hold or suggest that the federal government could
similarly compel state officers to assist in the enforcement of federal
immigration law. As discussed below, the federal government’s inability to coerce the states to carry out its mandates—known as the
anti-commandeering principle—was and is a critical tool of states’
resistance to federal policies that they do not support, both in the
antebellum era and today.
C.

The Anti-Commandeering Principle as a Vehicle of State
Resistance
In the modern era, unlike the mid-nineteenth century, the concept of federal supremacy and judicial review are well established.
States that disagree with federal immigration policy cannot directly
change the way in which it is being implemented, and, as a general
matter, they do not attempt to do so. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has invalidated even indirect attempts to legislate in the
immigration arena by the states on grounds of federal supremacy.515
However, the states do have one legal recourse: they can refuse to
cooperate and choose not to assist the federal government in enforcing federal immigration law. This precedent was set by the Supreme
Court in 1844, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,516 and reaffirmed by the
Court in Printz v. United States517 in 1997. The “non-cooperative”
personal liberty laws, discussed supra, utilized this means of resistance.518 States that have followed this model in the modern era
are often referred to by the misnomer of “sanctuary” jurisdictions,
implying that immigrants cannot be prosecuted for violating federal
immigration law within their borders.519 States do not provide true
sanctuary in this sense. Rather, these states have insisted that the

514

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411–13.
See supra Section II.B.3.
516
Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622.
517
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
518
See supra notes 147–187 and accompanying text.
519
See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 281 (7th Cir. 2018) (characterizing the term “sanctuary” city as “commonly misunderstood”); see also
RABBEN, supra note 302, at 95 (“Sanctuary was and is a predominantly religious
institution, and it often flourishes outside the law.”).
515
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federal government retain responsibility for the implementation and
enforcement of federal immigration laws within their borders.520
1. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL COERCIVE POWER
As discussed above, the Supreme Court scouted the boundaries
of federalism in the context of both slavery and immigration in its
decisions in Prigg and Arizona. However, the Court has not addressed the precise question of whether and to what extent the federal government can compel the states to execute the nation’s immigration laws—particularly when the states do not wish to do so. The
Court has, however, ruled on the question of whether the federal
government can direct state actors to effectuate a federal regulatory
scheme in a different context: gun control.521 In Printz v. United
States, the Court held that “even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain
acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts.”522 The rule articulated in Printz and a case that
preceded it, New York v. United States,523 has come to be known as
the anti-commandeering doctrine, which forbids the federal government from “commandeering” state actors to enforce federal laws
and regulations.524
Although the anti-commandeering doctrine explicated in Printz
and New York follows the Court’s reasoning in Prigg,525 neither case
cites this opinion. In Printz, Justice Scalia cites the 1793 Fugitive
Slave Act as an example of an early federal statute that imposed a
520

See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 281.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
522
Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
523
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
524
See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475–76
(2018) (“The anticommandeering doctrine . . . is simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision
to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.”; noting that “conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the
power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States”); Printz, 521 U.S.
at 925 (referring to the “[f]ederal commandeering of state governments”); New
York, 505 U.S. at 175 (noting federal action that would “‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes . . . would . . . be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state governments.”).
525
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925; New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
521
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duty on state judges “to enforce federal prescriptions,” which in this
case related to hearing the claims of slaveholders and issuing certificates authorizing the “forced removal” of alleged fugitives to the
states where they were enslaved.526 In doing so, Justice Scalia distinguished the compulsion of state judges from that of the state executive power.527 However, he never mentions that the Court—at
the very least—called into question the constitutionality of this part
of the Act in Prigg.528 As discussed at length above, this reasoning
in Prigg was significant, as it led to the enactment of a slew of state
laws that attempted to capitalize on it.529 Congress avoided this constitutional issue when it changed the enforcement provisions of the
1850 Act.530
The anti-commandeering doctrine is grounded in the history of
the Founding. Both the form of government adopted at the Constitutional Convention and the process by which the Constitution was
ratified derived their authority directly from “We the People.”531 In
this respect, the nation’s new form of government diverged significantly from the Articles of Confederation, under which the national
government was required to act through the states and had no power
to enact legislation that regulated the conduct of individuals.532 Alexander Hamilton characterized this limitation under the Articles of
Confederation as “a great evil,” the cure for which lay in enabling
“the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as
those of the states.”533 Because the Constitution conferred upon
526

Printz, 521 U.S. at 906.
Id. at 907.
528
Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1401 (discussing the
omission in the majority opinion in Printz).
529
See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
530
Finkelman, The Roots of Printz, supra note 22, at 1410.
531
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”) (emphasis
added).
532
Compare id., with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.
533
The Debates in the Convention of the State of New York, in 2 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 205, 233 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS] (remarks by Alexander Hamilton during
New York ratifying convention). In lamenting the federal government’s inability
to collect moneys owed from the states under the Articles of Confederation, Massachusetts delegate Rufus King observed that “[l]aws, to be effective, . . . must
527
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Congress a list of enumerated powers as to which it may issue laws
binding directly upon the people, it may not instead command or
“commandeer” the states to implement these powers on its behalf.534
To do so infringes on the sovereignty of the States, reducing them,
in Justice Scalia’s words, to “puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”535
The anti-commandeering doctrine also seeks to preserve the notion of dual sovereignty that lies at the heart of federalism itself.
“Residual state sovereignty” is inherent in the structure of the Constitution, which grants “discrete, enumerated” powers to Congress
in Article I, Section 8, but reserves the remainder to the States and
the people via the Tenth Amendment.536 “This separation of the two
spheres [of government] is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”537 The division of sovereignty created by the
Constitution is intended to prevent either state or federal governments from accumulating too much power over the people: “a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.”538 As the Court noted in Printz, “[t]he power of the Federal
Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to
impress into its service—at no cost to itself—the police officers of
the 50 States.”539
not be laid on states, but upon individuals.” Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Massachussetts, in THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS 1, 56 (remarks by Rufus King at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence
Ball ed., 2003) (describing this limitation as a “great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation,” rendering its laws “mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option”); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1992); Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
534
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
535
Id. at 928 (quoting Brown v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
536
Id. at 919; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (“The Constitution confers
on Congress not plenary legislative power but only certain enumerated powers.
Therefore, all other legislative power is reserved to the States, as the Tenth
Amendment confirms.”).
537
Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.
538
Id. (citation omitted); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
539
Printz, 521 U.S. at 922; see also Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old Normal”: A Brief History of Police Federalism, 119 COLUM.
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Although the anti-commandeering doctrine primarily derives
from the structure of the Constitution, it also has public policy implications. First, it “promotes political accountability” by requiring
each political sovereign—either the state or federal government—to
take responsibility for the policies that it enacts.540 When states are
forced to implement a federal program, they are “put in the position
of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.”541
As Justice Scalia noted in Printz, if the federal government were to
require state police officers to conduct background checks for gun
purchasers, a state police officer would be “stand[ing] between the
gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun, . . . not some
federal official,” leading the purchaser to direct his ire about the policy to the state rather than the federal government.542 Second, the
anti-commandeering policy forces each sovereign to shoulder the
financial burden, as well as the political consequences, of its own
policy choices.543 If state governments are compelled to “absorb the
financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program,
Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher
federal taxes.”544 In sum, the anti-commandeering doctrine forces
L. REV. 1, 5–6, 67 (2019) (“Historically, Americans have . . . insisted that the federal government keep its distance from local police institutions . . . .[T]he American public has traditionally rejected the prospect of the local beat cop serving as
an agent of the federal government.”); Louis Freeh, Former FBI Director Says
U.S. Doesn’t Need a National Police Force, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117529284571255075 (last updated Mar. 31,
2007, 12:01 AM) (“For over 200 years, Americans have thoroughly rejected the
notion of a national police force.”).
540
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 929–30; New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992).
541
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 168–69 (noting that
if the Federal Government makes a “detrimental or unpopular” decision, state officials “will bear the brunt of public disapproval” if forced to implement that decision).
542
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. The Court added that, if the purchaser were mistakenly rejected in his attempt to purchase a firearm, he would likely direct his ire
at the state rather than the federal government. Id.
543
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (“[T]he anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.”).
544
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (reasoning
that, if Congress were allowed to shift the cost of implementing its programs onto
the State, then Congress would avoid the responsibility of weighing the expected
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the federal government to bear the costs—both in terms of dollars
and constituent displeasure—of legislating in fraught policy arenas,
rather than push those burdens onto the States.
Not surprisingly, the anti-commandeering doctrine tends to arise
in controversial arenas. The temptation for Congress to “commandeer” the States to enforce its policy choices is especially high when
the policy itself is polarizing and, hence, deeply unpopular among
some groups. As discussed supra, the roots of the doctrine trace to
the fugitive slave crisis, one facet of the system of slavery that ultimately brought about the Civil War. It resurfaced when Congress
attempted to legislate responsible gun control545 and the safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste.546 These laudable goals were
thwarted when the Court invalidated both statutes due to the federal
government’s attempt to compel state cooperation on these issues.547
In Printz, the Court observed that the result in these cases may seem
“formalistic” to “partisans of the [federal statute] at issue,” because
these legislative efforts are “typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity.”548 However, “the Constitution protects us from
our own best intentions: it divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the
temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”549 In the eyes of many, the current
“crisis of the day” is immigration.

benefits of these programs against their costs); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for
Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360 (2001) (“If our system of political checks is to rest on a foundation of popular loyalty, the people need to know
when to get upset and at whom . . . . It must be clear when the national government has acted, as opposed to the states, so that the people can provide feedback
to the political process that resulted in the action.”).
545
Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–04 (describing the Brady Act).
546
New York, 505 U.S. at 149–54 (describing the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act). The doctrine also resurfaced in the arena of sports gambling.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
547
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933, 936; New York, 505 U.S. at 149.
548
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187).
549
Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187).
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2. STATES AND CITIES PUSH BACK: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY
LAWS OF TODAY
Conflicts between states and the federal government over immigration policy are nothing new. As discussed above, the Reagan Administration’s policies regarding Salvadorans gave rise to the Sanctuary Movement in religious institutions across the United States.550
President Obama’s immigration policies generated dissatisfaction
on the right as well as the left, as he was attacked for both underand over-enforcement of federal immigration laws.551 However, the
Trump administration’s stance on immigration is unique, at least in
the post-World War II era, in terms of its overall hostility to refugees
and its rejection of the nation’s asylum laws, which the President
has called “ridiculous.”552 The administration’s hostile stance towards asylum-seekers and immigrants in general has inspired numerous states and municipalities to enact laws that seek to resist implementation of these federal policies within their borders.553 Like
the personal liberty laws that sprang up in the wake of the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850, these so-called “sanctuary laws” seek to fill the
space created for state action—more accurately characterized as
state inaction—by the anti-commandeering doctrine discussed
above.
The Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, as discussed, was primarily fueled by a religious and moral imperative that operated outside of federal immigration law, rather than within it.554 However,
even during this time period, some states and municipalities enacted
550

See supra notes 317–22 and accompanying text.
Compare Lasch, supra note 6, at 234 (arguing that the “federal government’s promise [under the Obama administration] to prioritize the deportation for
so-called ‘criminal aliens’ has been largely myth”; critiquing the Secure Communities program), with supra notes 486–504 and accompanying text (discussing
Arizona’s efforts to legislate in the immigration field, to increase enforcement of
federal immigration laws during the Obama Presidency).
552
Ian Kullgren et al., Trump Weighs Plan to Choke off Asylum for Central
Americans, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/30/asylum-restrictions-trump-central-america-1489012 (last updated May 30, 2019, 9:00 PM)
(“The asylum procedures are ridiculous . . . . No place in the world has what we
have in terms of ridiculous immigration laws.”) (quoting President Trump).
553
See, e.g., infra notes 560–578 and accompanying text (discussing the California Values Act); S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (2019) (prohibiting use of City
or County funds or resources to assist federal immigration officers).
554
See supra notes 316–322 and accompanying text.
551
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laws that attempted to thwart the enforcement of federal immigration laws within their borders.555 These measures aimed to create a
safe space for refugees.556 One tool for doing so—similar to both the
antebellum era and today—involved prohibiting local police from
reporting the presence of refugees seeking sanctuary to federal authorities.557 However, these statutes were adopted without the full
benefit of the Court’s anti-commandeering jurisprudence, which primarily emerged during the 1990s with the Court’s decisions in New
York and Printz.558 During the Trump era, the vast majority of states
and municipalities that have attempted to exert independence in the
immigration arena have attempted to do so within the confines of
the modern anti-commandeering doctrine.559
California has taken the strongest stance against the federal immigration policies of the Trump administration. California has enacted multiple statutes that seek to minimize the impact of the
Trump administration’s immigration policies within the borders of
the state.560 The U.S. government has sued California, claiming that
these statutes are preempted by federal immigration law and are thus

555

During this period, four states and twenty-three cities adopted some type
of sanctuary measure, ranging from enacted state laws to municipal resolutions
and ordinances, state executive orders, and proclamations. See Begaj, supra note
302, at 145; see also Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations:
Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 297–98
(1989) (discussing various municipal and state sanctuary laws passed during the
1980s); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2006).
556
See Munson, supra note 316, at 52–53.
557
Carro, supra note 555, at 311–12.
558
See supra notes 524–549 and accompanying text.
559
See Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the
Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 557–58 (2017);
Davide Macelloni, Note, A Violation of the Anti-Commandeering Principle and
Spending Powers Jurisprudence or a Valid Exercise of Federal Powers? Executive Order 13768 and Its Effects on Florida Localities, 42 NOVA L. REV. 95, 104–
05 (2017).
560
The three statutes enacted by the California legislature are (1) The California Values Act (“S.B. 54”), (2) the Immigrant Worker Protection Act (“A.B.
450”), and (3) Inspection and Review of Facilities Housing Federal Detainees
(“A.B. 103”). See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282; id. § 7282.5 (West 2017); id.
§ 7284.2; id. § 7284.6; id. § 7285.1; id. § 7285.2; id. § 7285.3; id. § 12532.
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unenforceable.561 The statute at the heart of the controversy is the
California Values Act (“S.B. 54”), 562 which evokes the noncooperative personal liberty laws of the nineteenth century as it directs state
officials not to assist or support federal officers in carrying out a
policy that is inconsistent with the values of the people of the state
of California. Also echoing the personal liberty laws, the California
Values Act does not permit the use of state resources, specifically
state facilities, to detain individuals for immigration purposes.563
The words of historian Thomas Morris, used to describe the postPrigg personal liberty law in Pennsylvania, are equally apt in describing the California Values Act, as “an experiment in the possibilities left open by [Supreme Court precedent], as well as an effort
at containment.”564
The California Values Act delineates the policies that support it:
(1) immigrants are “valuable and essential” members of society in
California; (2) state and local officials need to have a “relationship
of trust” with immigrant communities; and (3) that relationship of
561

See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 873 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s decision regarding motion for
preliminary injunction). The government has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of this decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019), No.
19532. The federal government has also recently filed a similar lawsuit against
the state of New Jersey, arguing that a New Jersey state law limiting state and
local cooperation with ICE also conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) and is
preempted by federal law. See Complaint, United States v. New Jersey, No. 20CV-01364-FLW-TJB (S.D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020). On the same day, the federal government filed an additional lawsuit against California, challenging a new state law
banning the operation of private detention facilities in the state. See Complaint,
United States v. California, No. 20-CV-0154-MMA-AHG (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10,
2020).
562
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.
563
Id. §§ 7284.6 (a)(5)–(6) (prohibiting the dedication of office space within
a city or county law enforcement facility exclusively for use by federal immigration authorities; barring state law enforcement agencies from entering into contracts with the federal government to use state law enforcement facilities to detain
individuals under federal immigration laws); see also City of Phila. Exec. Order
5-16
(2016),
https://www.phila.gov/ExecutiveOrders/Executive%20Orders/eo0516.pdf (prohibiting use of Philadelphia prison facilities to detain prisoners pursuant to ICE civil detainer requests, unless the detainer is supported by a
judicial warrant, or the person is being released after conviction for a violent felony).
564
Morris, supra note 41, at 118.
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trust is threatened such that members of the immigrant community
may be reluctant to contact these officials to report crimes, attend
school, or seek health services if the officials are “entangled with
federal immigration enforcement.”565 The statute also states a policy
objective that derives directly from the anti-commandeering doctrine: “[e]ntangling state and local agencies with federal immigration enforcement programs diverts already limited resources and
blurs the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal
governments.”566
The California Values Act bars state law enforcement agencies
from using resources or personnel to “investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.”567 In directing its law enforcement personnel in this manner,
the California statute is the inverse of Arizona statute 2(B).568 The
law instructs California law enforcement agencies not to assist federal immigration authorities in the manner permitted under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g), whereas the Arizona law compels such cooperation.569
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court upheld the Arizona law;
however, the Court’s ruling in Arizona in no way suggested that any
state was required to enact such a law, or that the federal statute
compelled such cooperation.570
Two key provisions of the INA are addressed in the California
Values Act. INA section 287(g), cross-listed at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284.2(b)–(c). Studies have shown that “fear of police inquiring into immigration status” reduces the likelihood that undocumented
immigrants will contact police to report a crime, either as a victim or a witness,
by seventy percent. San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 951–52 (N.D.
Cal. 2018). Even for Latinos who were born in the United States, and thus are
citizens of this country, the rate of reporting drops by twenty-eight percent. Id. at
964. The California Values Act also seeks to preserve the constitutional rights of
the people of the state, specifically under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clauses. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.2(e).
566
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284.2(d), (f); see also supra notes 540–544 and accompanying text (discussing this policy justification for the anti-commandeering
doctrine).
567
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a).
568
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012), with CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 7284.6.
569
Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051, with CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 7284.6.
570
See supra notes 502–0504 and text accompanying.
565
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permits the Attorney General to “enter into a written agreement with
a State,” pursuant to which officers of that state may carry out the
duties of a federal immigration officer, including apprehending and
detaining aliens, “at the expense of the State . . . and to the extent
consistent with State and local law.”571 The statute specifies that
such agreements are strictly voluntary.572 However, section 1357(g)
also specifies that an officer or an employee of a State may do the
following without a written agreement between the state and federal
government: (1) “communicate with the Attorney General regarding
the immigration status of any individual, including reporting
knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the
United States,” or (2) “cooperate with the Attorney General in the
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.”573 Unlike the provisions outlined
in 1357(g), section 1373(a) is couched in mandatory terms: “a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”574
The California Values Act prohibits any law enforcement officer
from entering into an agreement with the federal government to perform the functions of a federal immigration officer, “whether formal
or informal.”575 In doing so, it declines to enter into the type of written agreement described in section 1357(g), as it is permitted to do
pursuant to the terms of the federal statute.576 The Values Act also
goes further and, in doing so, declines to provide the federal government with the type of cooperation that is described in section
1357(g)(10).577 Specifically, it instructs California law enforcement
officers not to (1) detain an individual based on an immigration hold
request from the federal government; (2) transfer an individual to
571

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2018).
Id. § 1357(g)(9).
573
Id. § 1357(g)(10).
574
Id. § 1373(a) (emphasis added).
575
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(a)(1)(G) (West 2017).
576
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to require any State . . . to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.”).
577
Compare CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(a)(1), with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).
572
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federal immigration authorities, “unless authorized by a judicial
warrant or judicial probable cause determination”; (3) provide personal information about an individual to the federal government, including home and work address, unless that information is publicly
available; or (4) notify the federal government of a person’s release
date from state custody, unless that information is publicly available.578 The federal government has argued that federal law preempts
these state law provisions.579
The government contends that the California Values Act conflicts with the plain language of sections 1373(a) and 1357(g).580
Particularly as to section 1357(g), this argument is weak. As noted
above, the portions of section 1357(g) that permit cooperation between the federal and state governments in the immigration arena do
not mandate any state action.581 Both the Ninth and the Fifth Circuits
have held that section 1357(g) “does not require cooperation at
all.”582 The federal statute that does compel state action is section
1373(a), which, as discussed above, bars states from prohibiting or
restricting state and local officials from exchanging information
with the federal government regarding a person’s citizenship or immigration status.583
The California Values Statute directly addresses section
1373(a), specifying that it does not prohibit any state entity or official from complying with it.584 California and the federal government, however, disagree as to the meaning of the statute’s reference

CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 7284.6(a)(1)(B)–(D), (G)(4). The law also bars state
law enforcement officers from (1) inquiring into an individual’s immigration status; (2) arresting any individual based on a civil immigration warrant; and (3)
using federal immigration officers as interpreters in state law enforcement matters. Id. at §§ 7284.6(a)(1)(A), (E), (G)(3).
579
See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2019).
580
See id. at 887.
581
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9); see also California, 921 F.3d at 887.
582
California, 921 F.3d at 887; City of City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d
164, 178 (5th Cir. 2018).
583
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
584
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(e). The statute also purports to comply with 8
U.S.C. § 1644, which contains the same language as 1373(a), except to apply
more narrowly to any “alien in the United States” instead of “any individual.” See
id.; compare 8 U.S.C. § 1644, with 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
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to “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an individual.”585 The federal government contends that this language encompasses data such as an individual’s
release date from state custody and her personal information (e.g.,
an address), both of which the Values Act prohibits state officials
from sharing with federal immigration officers.586 Both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the
plain meaning of the statute referenced only “a person’s legal classification under federal law,” consistent with the state’s interpretation.587
The government also argues that California’s failure to cooperate with it—specifically by refusing to provide “personal information” like addresses and release dates from state custody—poses
an “obstacle” to the federal immigration scheme.588 The government
claims that the “cooperation” provisions of section 1357(g) imply a
duty to provide these types of information.589 While the Ninth Circuit agreed that California’s failure to cooperate made enforcement
of the federal law more burdensome, it rejected the conclusion that
the government’s frustration constituted obstacle preemption:
“[R]efusing to help is not the same as impeding. If such were the
rule, obstacle preemption could be used to commandeer state resources and subvert Tenth Amendment principles.”590
The anti-commandeering rule and the Tenth Amendment principles that it embodies are, at least in part, built into the plain language of the INA. As the federal courts have, at least to date, recognized, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) uses non-compulsory language in terms

585

California, 921 F.3d at 891.
Id.; see also San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 951 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (Justice Department argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 required disclosure
of an immigrant’s “address, location information, release date, date of birth, familial status, contact information, and any other information that would help federal immigration officials perform their duties.”).
587
California, 921 F.3d at 891.
588
Id. at 880.
589
Id. at 874.
590
Id. at 888 (citing United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1104
(E.D. Cal. 2018)).
586
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of its direction to the states—because it must.591 Otherwise, the statute would run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine.592 Congress cannot satisfy the anti-commandeering rule by using non-compulsory language in a statute, but nevertheless compelling compliance by the states; to do so would subvert the rule entirely. Congress’s expectation of state cooperation in the federal immigration
regime does not engender a duty on the part of the state to comply:
“when questions of federalism are involved, we must distinguish between expectations and requirements. In this context, the federal
government was free to expect as much as it wanted, but it could not
require California’s cooperation without running afoul of the Tenth
Amendment.”593
3. FEDERAL TOOLS FOR INDUCING STATE COOPERATION
Although both the plain language of the INA and the anti-commandeering doctrine prohibit the federal government from compelling state cooperation with federal immigration authorities, the government has sought to utilize exceptions to the anti-commandeering
rule to achieve the same end. The level of federal/state interaction
today far exceeds that which existed in the nineteenth century, when
Northern states enacted personal liberty laws to avoid implementation of the federal Fugitive Slave Acts. The federal government’s
provision of grants to the states to fund certain programs, and its
ability to attach conditions to those grants, provides the federal government with a potential vehicle to persuade where it cannot compel
compliance by the states. Whether the federal government’s attempts to assert control over the states in this manner will succeed
remains to be seen.
a.

Is Information Sharing an Exception to the AntiCommandeering Rule?
One provision of the INA orders, rather than permits, state cooperation: 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a), which forbids states from adopting
laws that bar information sharing with the federal government.594 In
591

See, e.g., id. at 888–91.
See Lasch, supra note 6, at 219–24 (reaching similar conclusions as to federal immigration detainer requests).
593
California, 921 F.3d at 891 (emphasis in original).
594
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2018).
592

702

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:598

United States v. California, the government has argued that section
1373 does not violate the prohibition against commandeering, because it merely mandates information sharing.595 In dicta, the Court
in Printz distinguished statutes that force a state to administer a federal program—which it held invalid under the Tenth Amendment—
from those statutes that “require only the provision of information
to the Federal Government.”596 The Court did not indicate whether
such statutes would survive scrutiny under the anti-commandeering
doctrine, other than to discount their significance as part of a “constitutional tradition” of federal/state interaction based on their relatively recent vintage.597 As noted above, California, like many other
states and municipalities, has attempted to comply with the information-sharing provisions of section 1373(a), although it disputes
the federal government’s broad interpretation of the plain language
of the law.598 However, the constitutional question remains: does a
federal information-sharing requirement imposed upon the states
constitute commandeering?
Some federal courts have held that the answer to this question is
“yes.”599 The government’s broad interpretation of section 1373 is
critical to the constitutional analysis. The Department of Justice has
argued that section 1373 compels states to disclose to federal immigration officers far more than an individual’s legal immigration or
citizenship status, including “address, location information, release
date, date of birth, familial status, contact information, and any other
information that would help federal immigration officials perform

595

California, 921 F.3d at 889.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917–18 (1997); see also id. at 936
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court appropriately refrains from deciding
whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on
state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly
invalid.”).
597
Id. at 918 (majority opinion). In doing so, the Court cited INS v. Chadha,
which held the legislative veto to be unconstitutional, despite its enshrinement in
hundreds of federal statutes that were enacted between 1932 and the 1970’s. INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983).
598
See supra notes 584–587 and accompanying text.
599
See, e.g., San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 950–53 (N.D.
Cal. 2018); Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 885, 865–66 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
596
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their duties.”600 By forcing state officials to provide federal immigration officers with any information they have that would help federal officers perform their duties, the federal government essentially
seeks to compel the type of broad cooperation that it is free to permit
or expect, but not require, as discussed above.601 The district court
in City and County of San Francisco noted that, to comply with section 1373 as the federal government interprets it, a state or municipality would “need to submit control of their own officials’ communications to the federal government” and “allocate their limited law
enforcement resources to exchange information with the federal
government whenever requested,” rather than provide essential services to their communities.602 In doing so, the federal government
effectively “shifts a portion of immigration enforcement costs onto
the States,” a result that contravenes the anti-commandeering doctrine.603
Section 1373, especially as it has been interpreted by the Trump
administration, directly targets and seeks to invalidate the “personal
liberty laws” of today. In doing so, section 1373 “effectively
thwart[s] policymakers’ ability to extricate their state or municipality from involvement in a federal program,” which is the statute’s
goal.604 The anti-commandeering doctrine does not permit the federal government to compel participation by the States in the federal
immigration system.

600
San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 951; see also Chicago v. Sessions, 888
F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817
(7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated en banc on other grounds, No. 17-2991, 2018
WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (stating that “[t]he Attorney General in this
case used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to
aid in federal civil immigration enforcement”).
601
See supra notes 590–593 and accompanying text.
602
San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 951 (“The statute undermines existing
state and local policies and strips local policy makers of the power to decide for
themselves whether to communicate with INS.”).
603
See id. at 952; see also supra notes 543–544 and accompanying text.
604
San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 953 (quoting Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d
at 949)).
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b.

Can Cooperation Be Compelled via the Attachment
of Conditions to the Provision of Federal Funds to the
States?
Another purported exception to the anti-commandeering doctrine relates to funding provided to the states via federal programs.
The Court in New York recognized that “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”605 Such funding can function
as a “method of influencing a State’s policy choices.”606 However,
Congress cannot use the power of the purse as a means of “outright
coercion” on the States.607 For this reason, conditions placed upon
the receipt of federal funds must “bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending”; otherwise, “the spending power could
render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal
authority.”608 In addition, the exercise of the Congressional spending power, via grant conditions, must further the “general welfare”;
in other words, it must be “intended to serve general public purposes.”609 Finally, if Congress wishes to impose a condition on the
States’ ability to receive federal funds, “it must do so unambiguously,” so that States can make a fully informed decision as to
whether they wish to participate in the federal program.610
The Trump administration embraced the funding-related exception to the anti-commandeering doctrine when it issued Executive
Order 13,768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United
States, on January 25, 2017, five days after President Trump was
inaugurated.611 The Order targets so-called “sanctuary jurisdic605

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 917–18 (1997) (distinguishing federal statutes that impose “conditions upon
the grant of federal funding” from those that act as “mandates to the States”).
606
New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
607
Id.
608
Id. at 167; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987).
(affirming constitutionality of federal statute that withheld highway funds from
states that chose not to adopt the minimum drinking age established by Congress).
609
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
610
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
611
Exec. Order No. 13,76, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also San
Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing the Executive Order); Lai & Lasch, supra note 559, at 557–63 (discussing efforts to defund “Sanctuary Cities” during the Trump presidency).
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tions,” claiming that they “willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States,” and, in
so doing, have “caused immeasurable harm to the American people
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”612 The Order gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to decide whether a state
or municipality is a “sanctuary jurisdiction,” defined as a jurisdiction that “willfully refuse[s] to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”613 If
a state is deemed a sanctuary jurisdiction, then the Order instructs
that the state is “not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as
deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.”614 Remarkably,
at a campaign rally, President Trump proclaimed that “nobody who
supports sanctuary cities should be allowed to run for President of
the United States.”615
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that conditions may
attach to the States’ receipt of federal funds, the power to impose
such conditions lies with Congress, not the Executive.616 Implementation of President Trump’s Executive Order 13,768 was therefore
enjoined because it violates the Constitution’s separation of powers
doctrine.617 Congress exclusively holds the power of the purse,
which is directly tied to its power to legislate.618 No provision in the

612

82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799.
Id. at 8801.
614
Id. The Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security are empowered to decide whether grant funding is necessary for law enforcement purposes. Id.
615
Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Orlando, Trump Kicks Off His Reelection Campaign with an Old, Divisive Message, NEW YORKER (June 19, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/in-orlando-trump-kicks-offhis-reelection-campaign-with-an-old-divisive-message.
616
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
617
City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir.
2018) (affirming summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs but vacating nationwide
injunction and remanding for further factual findings).
618
Id. at 1231 n.2. The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and
collect Taxes,” pay debts, and to borrow money on behalf of the United States, so
as to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”
U.S. CONST., Art. I, §§ 8 (1), (2); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) (Congress “commands the purse.”).
613
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Constitution enables the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes, or to cancel appropriations passed by Congress.619 As Justice
Kennedy observed, if spending decisions are “determined by the Executive alone, without adequate control by the citizen’s Representatives in Congress, liberty is threatened.”620 Therefore, President
Trump exceeded his authority as President in issuing the Executive
Order.
The Trump administration’s second attempt to influence state
policy choices regarding immigration via the power of the purse targeted the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne
JAG”). The Byrne JAG program, which is administered by the Justice Department, awards grants to state and local governments to
“support law enforcement efforts by providing additional personnel,
equipment, supplies, training, and other assistance.”621 The Byrne
JAG is the “leading source of federal [criminal] justice funding to
state and local jurisdictions.”622 The Byrne JAG is a “formula grant”
program, meaning that the statute creating the program establishes
a formula to calculate the amount of grant funding for all applicants.623 The statute identifies eight program areas for the use of
funding under the Byrne JAG; immigration enforcement is not included.624 In 2017, the Department of Justice announced that it
619
San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1232, 1235 (quoting Clinton v. New York, 524
U.S. 417, 438 (1998)) (holding that, without Congressional approval, “the Administration may not redistribute or withhold properly appropriated funds in order
to effectuate its own policy goals”).
620
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
621
City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 935
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing 34 U.S.C. § 10152). California uses Byrne JAG funds to
support education and crime prevention, as well as court and law enforcement
programs. Id. at 936. California expected to receive 28.3 million dollars in JAG
funding for fiscal year 2017. Id.; see also Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d
855, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (noting that, in 2016, Chicago used Byrnes JAG funding
to buy police cars and to support non-profits working in high-crime areas).
622
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/jag/overview (last visited Mar. 19,
2020).
623
See 34 U.S.C. § 10156(a) (2018); see also San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d
at 935–36, 945.
624
The program areas included are law enforcement, prosecution and courts,
crime prevention and education, corrections, drug treatment and enforcement,
technological improvements, crime victims and witnesses, and mental health. 34
U.S.C. §§ 10152(a)(1)(A)–(H); see San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 936.
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would be imposing three new conditions on any state or city applying for funds under the Byrne JAG: (1) the grant applicant must provide ICE with “access to their correctional facilities for immigration
enforcement purposes”; (2) the applicant must notify ICE of the release dates for any individual detained by the applicant; and (3) the
applicant must certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 under penalty of perjury.625 Two of these three provisions directly conflict
with the California Values Act.626
Like President Trump, the Department of Justice is not Congress. Therefore, it also does not hold the power of the purse. As a
result, its attempt to impose new prerequisites for receipt of federal
funding by the States under the Byrne JAG was challenged under
the separation of powers doctrine.627 The Ninth Circuit held that the
statute authorizing the Byrne JAG program did not empower the Attorney General to precondition receipt of funding on federal immigration cooperation.628 It noted that Congress has previously imposed conditions on Byrne JAG grant funding related to various policy objectives, but it tried and failed to enact “anti-sanctuary” legislation as a funding-related proviso to the Byrne JAG program.629
Because Congress did not statutorily authorize the Attorney General
to tie Byrne JAG grant funding to immigration-related conditions,

625

San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 933–34. The Department of Justice attempted to impose similar conditions as part of the community-oriented policing
(“COPS”) grant program, which provides funds to police departments to hire
more officers to increase their capacity for community policing. City of Los Angeles v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The conditions
were challenged on various grounds and the district court entered a nationwide
injunction barring their enforcement. Id.
626
See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.6(a).
627
San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 944–49.
628
Id. at 946; see also Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271, 281 (E.D.
Pa. 2018); Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282, 293 (7th Cir. 2018).
629
San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 946 (citing Stop Sanctuary Cities Act,
S. 1814, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2015); Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act,
H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2015)); see also San Francisco v. Trump, 897
F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Congress has frequently considered and thus
far rejected legislation accomplishing the goals of the Executive Order.”); Lai &
Lasch, supra note 559, at 550–53 (discussing various failed attempts by Congress
to legislate the defunding of “Sanctuary” states and cities).
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the court enjoined the Trump administration from imposing these
requirements on grant recipients.630
To date, Congress has not yet amended the statute authorizing
the Byrnes JAG grants, or any other statute, to condition a state’s
receipt of federal funds on that state’s participation in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. If Congress were to impose such
a restriction, it would have to show that the conditions being imposed bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal law.631
The government could not readily show that compelling states to
open their jails to ICE and provide ICE with the release dates for all
state inmates furthers the purpose of the Byrne JAG.632 As noted
above, the statute identifies eight program areas for these grants,
none of which include immigration enforcement.633 A federal program more directly tied to immigration issues would be a better fit
in terms of justifying the imposition of any grant condition similar
to the ones being pushed by the Department of Justice today.
Whether Congress will eventually pass such legislation remains to
be seen and will turn, in part, on the results of federal elections in
2020 and beyond.
The anti-commandeering doctrine, as applied in the nineteenth
century and today, allows the safety valve of federalism to function
as the drafters of the Constitution intended it. The Trump administration is attempting to compel state participation in the enforcement of federal immigration law.634 The Constitution permits the
states to volunteer this type of cooperation. It does not permit the
federal government to require it. If Congress cannot pass legislation
and appropriate funds to pay for the type of immigration enforcement that the Trump administration seeks, then these policies do not
enjoy sufficient support to warrant their implementation.
630

San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 953.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)
632
The Ninth Circuit has noted that, even if Congress had authorized the Department of Justice to impose the challenged conditions on the Byrne JAG, they
would still be unenforceable because they fail the relatedness requirement. San
Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 958–61.
633
See supra note 624 and accompanying text.
634
See Gardner, supra note 539, at 76 (noting that President Trump’s executive order regarding immigrant sanctuary “makes clear that, with respect to the
enforcement of federal immigration law, the federal executive, commandeering
rule or not, is demanding rather than requesting compliance”).
631
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CONCLUSION
“Our Federalism” is central to the Constitution as the foundation
of the American government. The Supreme Court has described it
as follows:
[federalism] does not mean blind deference to
‘States’ Rights’ any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors
to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States.635
In both the nineteenth century and today, political crises test the
resilience of the system of government established by the Framers
of the Constitution. In the nineteenth century, the fundamental contradiction of slavery in a nation founded on the principle that “all
men are created equal” triggered one such crisis. The demarcation
between slavery and freedom, North and South, became more distinct over time, widening the gulf between the values of the people
in the free states and those reflected in the federal Fugitive Slave
Acts. The federal government’s determination to rigidly enforce the
fugitive slave laws, without responding to the Northern states’ legitimate concerns regarding the rights of the accused fugitives, hardened rather than softened the resolve of the people who resisted implementation of the federal laws. The chasm between North and
South was ultimately resolved via the Civil War, which almost
ended the United States as we know it.
Today, the Trump administration’s approach to immigration—
often described as “zero tolerance”636—is also tone-deaf as to the
635

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
See Catherine E. Shoichet, Zero Tolerance a Year Later: How the U.S.
Family Separations Crisis Erupted, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/04/us/immigrant-family-separations-timeline/ (last updated Apr. 8,
2019).
636
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concerns of states like California, where about half of all children
have at least one parent who is an immigrant.637 As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the federal government must respect the legitimate interests of the states, even when it is anxious to vindicate
an important national interest.638 Attempts to force compliance with
a federal law in a manner that ignores legitimate state concerns—
e.g., as to the due process rights of asylum applicants who reside
within the borders of the state—inevitably invite resistance, just as
in the antebellum era. Moreover, the Trump administration’s heavy
reliance on executive orders and proclamations, rather than the legislative process, has generated policies that lack widespread support
among the national citizenry, not just that of an individual state. Like
dual federalism, separation of powers is a central pillar of the government framework created by the Constitution.
The United States may learn some valuable lessons by reflecting
on its past, specifically the history of the federal laws that sought to
force the free states to recognize slavery within their borders.
Heavy-handed attempts to compel compliance with federal law tend
to engender resistance rather than cooperation, especially when, in
the eyes of many citizens, the federal law lacks both moral and democratic legitimacy. Ideally, the legislative process should resolve
this problem: if the voters dislike the laws enacted by Congress or
the executive proclamations issued by their President, they can elect
new politicians who more closely reflect their views. However, this
process may take years, and federalism plays a critical role in the
interim. At a minimum, California and similar states should not be
commandeered by the federal government to implement federal immigration policies that are misaligned with the mores of the majority
of their citizens. Until Congress enacts an immigration law that enjoys support in both Red and Blue states, especially those states
where the laws will be implemented, the federal government should
not demand or expect state cooperation.
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CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 7284.2(a) (West 2017).
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.

